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Preface 
I r IS PERHAPS IRONIC that some of the most outstanding work in pre-Civil War American historiography con- cerns national political institutions which touched 
only lightly the daily lives of most citizens. Still more ap- 
parent is the scholarly neglect of the forms of state and 
county government closest to the people, the institutions 
which affected their mundane but urgent problems, from 
business schemes to party patronage to the care of orphans 
and death settlements. Although a handful of historians 
have written monographs or essays on the subject of county 
government, their studies have been essentially digests of 
duties and powers based upon the dry bones of legislative 
statutes.l Two exceptions to this tendency are Charles S. 
Sydnor's works on county government in colonial Virginia 
and the antebellum South and Merle E. Curti's intensive 
examination of Trempealeau County, Wisconsin, between 
1854 and 1880. While both writers do identify basic themes 
of county constitutional politics, their accounts are nonethe- 
less parts of works much larger in scope and are necessarily 
brief and somewhat s~perficial .~ Aside from Sydnor and 
Curti, historians of the last two decades have, in large part, 
left the study of county government to political scientists, 
whose efforts are usually devoted almost exclusively to anal- 
yses of the contemporary scene.3 
As for Kentucky, studies of the history of her county gov- 
ernment are almost nonexistent. They invariably comprise 
an insubstantial part of larger discussions of current pro- 
cedures and weaknesses. In some cases these summaries of 
the historical background of county government are mis- 
leading and generally unsatisfactory, and all of them leave 
much work to be done. The  numerous histories of Ken- 
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tucky's many counties are equally unenlightening with re- 
gard to the county courts. Most of them resort to a brief 
summary of delegated powers and lengthy quotations from 
court records. 
The  purpose of this book is to correct partially this his- 
toriographical deficiency by identifying the place of the 
county courts in the constitution and politics of antebellum 
Kentucky. I t  seeks not only to define the powers and prac- 
tices of the county courts but also to establish their relation- 
ship with county officials, the legislature, the governor, the 
higher judicial tribunals, and the towns and cities of the 
state. An effort is made to estimate the socioeconomic posi- 
tion of the county court justices and to measure the pro- 
found impact of two-party politics on the processes of local 
government. Finally, the study explores the grievances and 
weaknesses which attached themselves to the county court 
system, thus revealing why at the mid-nineteenth century it 
became the object of major constitutional reform. 
1 See, for example, Paul W. Wager, County Government and Administra- 
tion in North Carolina (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1928) and Albert Ogden Porter, 
County Government in Virginia: A Legislative History, 1607-1904 (New 
York, 1947). 
2 Sydnor, American Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices in 
Washington's Virginia (New Yo,rk, 1965), pp. 74-85, and The Development 
of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848 (Baton Rouge, La., 1948), pp. 33-53; 
Curti et al., The Making of an American Community: A Case Study of De- 
mocracy in a Frontier County (Stanford, Calif., 1959). pp. 259-94. 
3 See, for example, Clyde F. Snider, Local Government in Rural America 
(New York, 1957) and Herbert Sydney Duncambe, County Government in 
America (Washington, D.C., 1966). 
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The Corny Courts 
in Antebellam Kentucky 
T HE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS of county government in Kentucky, as throughout colonial America and the antebellum South, were the justices of the 
peace, and the principal institution, which the magistrates 
formed collectively, was the county court. This institution 
as it existed in Kentucky was the end product of centuries 
of constitutional development, having been most strongly 
influenced by English tradition. Englishmen invented the 
county, the commission of peace, and the justices who im- 
plemented it. During the late middle ages and throughout 
the early modern period these local magistrates were em- 
powered individually or in groups to administer the poor 
laws, supervise the highways, hear petty criminal and civil 
cases, suppress riots, and generally to perform the business 
of governing the most significant local unit of the English 
constitution, the c0unty.l 
I t  is not surprising that colonial America adopted much 
of her local government from her imperial mistress, Eng- 
land. In the colonies of New England and the Middle At- 
lantic region, county courts, comprising justices of the 
peace, shared the responsibilities of local control with town- 
ships. In  the southern colonies the courts completely over- 
shadowed the towns and were the principal agents of the 
local constitutions. American justices of the peace per- 
formed most of the main functions of their English fore- 
bears, including the licensing of ferries and taverns and the 
punishment of vagrants. In most of the colonies the justices 
of the peace were appointed, usually by the governor, with 
the advice and consent of his council. In  Virginia the mag- 
istrates were self-perpetuating, filling vacancies on the 
county courts themselves. 
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With independence and maturing, the nature of county 
government in the new nation gradually changed, especial- 
ly in New England, the Middle Atlantic states, and the Old 
West. Here elected boards of county commissioners began 
to replace justices of the peace and county courts as the nu- 
cleus of the county constitution. However, in Kentucky, as 
in most of the southeastern part of the United States, the 
county court remained supreme until 1850 or a f t e r ~ a r d . ~  
As colonial America borrowed from English practice, so 
Kentucky absorbed much from Virginia in establishing a 
county governmental structure in 1792. Indeed, in estab- 
lishing the county courts, the legislature expressly declared 
in June 1792 that the local tribunals were to continue to 
have cognizance over all "cases of which the county courts 
as now constituted have jurisdiction." In jurisdiction and 
in practice the early county courts of Kentucky differed 
from their Virginia antecedents in only two matters. The  
Kentucky courts did not retain vast patronage powers? and 
the members of the local tribunals, the county court justices, 
no longer collectively constituted the principal trial courts 
of the Commonwealth, the courts of quarter  session^.^ In  
1 Sidney Webb Passfield and Beatrice Webb Passfield, English Local Gov- 
ernment: A Series. . . on the Growth and Structure of English Local Govern- 
ment, 11 vols. (London, 1906), vol. 1, The  Parish and the County; Bertram 
Osborne, Justices of the Peace, 1361-1848 (Shaftesbury, Dorset, 1960); J. H. 
Gleason, The  Justices of the Peace of England, 1558-1640 (Oxford, 1969). 
2 For a brief but useful survey of county government in England, the 
American colonies, and the United States, see Snider, Local Government in 
Rural America, pp. 3-28. 
3 Acts of Kentucky, 1792, 1st sess., chap. 35, sec. q (hereafter cited as Acts). 
4 While the first county courts of Kentucky retained the power to ap- 
point constables and the clerk, they lost the power to fill their own vacancies 
and to name the sheriff, the coroner, the surveyor and the officers of the 
local militia. 
5 In Virginia the justices of the peace met four times a year as the court 
of quarter sessions and heard civil and criminal cases. The same magistrates 
thus constituted both the county courts and the courts of quarter sessions. 
Sydnor, American Revolutionaries in the Making, p. 79; Lincoln County 
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1799 Kentuckians wrote a new Constitution6 which appre- 
ciably enlarged the powers of the county courts over pa- 
tronage. The  new Constitution provided for a "county 
court . . . in each county" but delegated to the legislature 
the task of assigning jurisdiction. More important, the doc- 
ument restored to the county courts privileges which had 
existed before 1792: filling their own vacancies, appointing 
the sheriff from among their senior members, and selecting 
the remainder of the county  officer^.^ The  legislature in- 
sured general continuity by allocating practically the same 
powers and responsibilities as before to the county courts, 
which remained intact until 1851. 
In many ways the county courts were the most vital part 
of Kentucky government. The Frankfort Convention put it 
this way: "considering the nature of their powers, the num- 
ber of justices and their location in every county in the 
Court Order Book, 1791-1794, pp. 3-2 i (microfilm, reel MgS:zoi7-18, King 
Library, University of Kentucky). (Hereafter microfilms of government doc- 
uments in the King Library will be cited as U.K. microfilms.) The first Gen- 
eral Assembly of Kentucky prohibited justices of the peace who constituted 
the courts of quarter sessions from sitting on the county courts. Acts, 1792, 
1st sess., chap. 35, sec. 18. In December 1792 the legislature defeated an at- 
tempt to merge the two courts and provided that justices of the courts of 
quarter sessions did not have to perform many of the duties of single jus- 
tices of the peace; three years later it specified that appointees to that tri- 
bunal need not be justices of the peace. Journal of the House of Representa- 
tives of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1792, zd sess., pp. 67-68 (hereafter 
cited as H.J.); Acts, 1792, nd sess., chap. 2, sec. I ;  Acts, 1795, chap. 57, sec. 1. 
Between 1802 and 1804 the legislature abolished the courts of quarter ses- 
sions and replaced them with circuit courts, which were staffed by judges 
who were not justices of the peace. Acts, 1802, chap. 1; William Littell, The 
Statute Law of Kentucky . . . , 5 vols. (Frankfort, Ky., 18og-181g), 3:184-86 
(hereafter cited as Littell, Statute Law). 
6 Throughout this study the terms constitution and Constitution are em- 
ployed. The term constitution refers to the aggregate of the vital parts of 
government, whereas the term Constitution refers expressly to the written, 
formally adopted charter of the state, the "supreme law" of the Common- 
wealth. 
7 Constitution of 1799, Art. 3, secs. g, 31; Art. 4, secs. 5.8. 
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state, the county courts are the most powerful branch of the 
judiciary, and collectively, capable of exerting a greater in- 
fluence than all others." Indeed the extent of their author- 
ity was such that the courts became, in effect, violations of 
the separation of powers doctrine. The  Convention con- 
tended that "the anomalous character of its powers, being 
legislative, executive and judicial, enables this court to 
wind its way into all the affairs and ramifications of so- 
ciety." W. C. Marshall, delegate to the Constitutional Con- 
vention of 1849, remarked that the county court was, of all 
governmental agencies, closest to the people: "It is a court 
in which the people of the various counties feel a deep, 
essential, and . . . abiding interest . . . it is a matter which 
is brought to their houses and their  fireside^."^ 
So essential were these local tribunals to Kentuckians 
that any group of citizens who experienced the slightest 
inconvenience in reaching the county seat inevitably peti- 
tioned the state legislature for the creation of a new county. 
By 1850 there were one hundred counties in Kentucky, 
nearly the largest number per square mile and per capita 
of any state in the Union. So comprehensive and pervasive 
were the powers and responsibilities of the courts that soon- 
er or later almost everyone in the county, from white adults 
to slaves, had business with them. County court day at- 
tracted many hundreds each month. People brought their 
deeds to be recorded, their petitions to be heard, and their 
crops and livestock to be sold after their official business was 
completed. Court day was also the occasion for politicking 
and merrymaking, gossiping, and sometimes brawling. 
I t  can even be argued that in states like Kentucky county 
government as embodied in the county courts was the most 
8 Frankfort Convention, 27 March, 7 July 1847 (hereafter cited as Con- 
vention): Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the 
Revision of the Constitution of the State of Kentucky, 1849 (Frankfort, Ky. ,  
1849). p. 703 (hereafter cited as Proceedings). 
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significant element of the constitution. Most Kentuckians 
dealt mainly with their county governments, seldom with 
state agencies, and rarely with national ones. The  state gov- 
ernment delegated much of its business to the county 
courts, while national government was relatively inactive, 
seldom taxing, regulating, protecting, or otherwise aiding 
Kentuckian~.~ Indeed, one of the federal agencies which 
most affected people in Kentucky, the Bank of the United 
States, was more of a private organization than a public 
one.1° Thus an examination of the county court system will 
do much to reveal the lives of antebellum Kentuckians. 
9 Allan Nevins, among others, has argued convincingly that the major 
loyalties, enterprises, and energies of Americans before the Civil War were 
locally, not nationally, oriented. "A Major Result of the Civil War," Civil 
War  History 5 (September, 1959): 237-50. Throughout most of the old coun- 
ty court system the principal tax imposed by the federal government was a 
tariff or duty on imports, and it is doubtful that many Kentuckians paid 
this type of levy. Many in Kentucky doubtless were subject to the federal 
whiskey tax, but this was a relatively short-lived excise lasting only from 
1791 to 1802 and from 1814 to 1817. The type of federal tax which affected 
most Kentuckians was the "direct tax," but it was imposed only from 1798 
to 1801 and from 1814 to 1817. Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the 
United States (New Yark, 1918), pp. 105, 108-11, 120, 138-42, and 277; His- 
torical Statistics of the  United States, 1 7 8 ~ 1 9 4 5  (Washington, D.C., 1952). 
pp. 297-98. The period under study was also one of little federal aid to, or 
regulation of, the economy. Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of 
American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890 (New York, 1960). Furthermore, 
the principal protective force in antebellum America was not the federal 
army, which was always small, but rather the state militia, and in Kentucky 
this institution was especially county-oriented. 
10 For an especially persuasive argument that the nature of the Bank of 
the United States was more private than public see Harold J. Plous and 
Gordon E. Baker, "McCulloch v. Maryland: Right Principle, Wrong Case," 
Stanford Law Review g (July 1957): 710-30. 
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Chapter I 
T H E  ANATOMY 
OF T H E  COUNTY COURTS 
T HE JUSTICES of the peace of the counties consti- tuted the membership of the county courts. In  ad- dition to serving on the county courts, justices of 
the peace individually performed a wide variety of func- 
tions including the trial of petty civil and criminal matters, 
the taking of depositions, the certifying of legal documents, 
and the impaneling of commissions to inspect turnpikes. 
Under the first state Constitution, which operated until 
1800, the governor selected the magistrates with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. Thereafter the courts filled their 
own vacancies by recommending two persons to the chief 
executive, who was bound to commission one of them 
(without approval from the Senate). When new counties 
were created from parts of old ones, the members of the 
House of Representatives from the old counties in effect 
selected the members of the new county court.' 
Though entitled to fees for their services as individual 
magistrates, the justices of the peace received no salaries as 
members of the county court. The  fact that under the sec- 
ond state Constitution the senior magistrate of each county 
was ordinarily commissioned county sheriff was thought to 
be reward enough. In some of the more wealthy counties, 
however, members of county courts may have received an 
illegal income in the form of proceeds from the sale of var- 
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ious county offices. Neither the Constitution nor the laws 
of the state specified prerequisites for membership on the 
courts other than that the candidate be a citizen and res- 
ident of the state for one year. Legal training was not re- 
quired. In practice the membership of the county courts was 
limited to white male adults. 
The number of justices of the peace in Kentucky steadily 
grew throughout the period of the old county court system 
so that by 1848, on the eve of constitutional change, there 
were approximately 1,550 magistrates in the state. Most of 
the impetus for increasing or decreasing the membership 
of county courts came from the creation of new counties 
and petitions from county residents. Often when the legis- 
lature formed a county it would not only create magistracies 
for the new county but also decrease the number of mag- 
istrates for the now smaller parent county or counties. Res- 
idents of counties would frequently petition the legislature 
for additional justices of the peace in order to secure repre- 
sentation on the county court as well as the benefits of a 
local magistrate. Sometimes petitioners sought a reduction 
of court membership, presumably for the sake of economy 
and efficiency, but the membership of most courts increased 
steadily until approximately 1830. After that time, al- 
though the number of magistrates for the entire state con- 
tinued to rise, many courts experienced a reduction of 
membership. Between 1837 and 1844 the membership of 
forty-four courts increased, while that of thirty courts 
decreased. 
The  number of members varied widely from county to 
county. For example, in 18 15 the court of Owen County 
had seven members and those of Bracken and Grayson had 
eight, while those of Jefferson and Mercer had twenty-two 
1 Constitution of 1792, Art. 2 ,  sec. 8; Art. 5, sec. 6; Constitution of 1799. 
Art. 4, secs. 8, 9. 
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and that of Christian had twenty-seven. Thirty years later 
the Christian and Jefferson county courts each had twenty- 
five, and changes had occurred in most counties. Although 
the legislature never set criteria for determining the num- 
ber of magistrates in each county, presumably it considered 
the size of the county, its geographical features, and its 
population. 
Members of the county courts were appointed for life on 
the condition of good behavior, although few served longer 
than the time it took to gain the seniority necessary to be- 
come sheriff. Some waived that office and continued to serve 
on the court or sought reappointment as justice of the peace 
after completing the two-year term of the sheriff. Many left 
the court voluntarily or involuntarily before becoming eli- 
gible for the sheriff's office. Although it is impossible to de- 
termine precisely the average length of time justices of the 
peace spent in office, certain documented speculations can 
be offered. Basing our guess on the rate of turnover occur- 
ring between 1815 and 1820 as evidenced by the entries in 
the Register of Justices of the Peace for that period, and 
allowing for the three to four months it usually took to 
nominate and commission a successor, we estimate the av- 
erage term of office for a magistrate at approximately eight 
years. Between 1836 and 1849, based again on the turnover 
rate as indicated by the Registers for that period, the esti- 
mated average term was approximately twelve years. Be- 
tween 1803 and 1849 approximately i lo men served as 
magistrates for Fayette County for an average of about eight 
and a half years. Thirty-seven men were commissioned jus- 
tice of the peace for the same county between 1792 and 1796, 
indicating a high rate of turnover and an average term of 
less than two years. Thus it appears that during the period 
of the second Constitution the term of a justice of the peace 
was on the average much longer than it was during the first 
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Constitution. The fact that after 1799 long service resulted 
in the sheriffalty doubtless accounts in large part for this 
devel~pment .~ 
The statute enacted by the General Assembly in 1792 
establishing the county courts provided that each should 
meet monthly except during the four months of the year 
when the courts of quarter sessions convened. Thereafter 
the legislature from time to time altered the number of 
meetings the tribunals were to hold each year. Generally 
the courts of the more populous counties found it necessary 
to meet every month, while those attracting less business 
could operate on the schedule established in 1792. A statute 
of 182 1 provided the framework for the remainder of the 
period of the old county court system: nineteen counties 
were authorized to hold monthly meetings; the rest were 
required to hold monthly courts except during those 
months when the circuit courts convened, usually two or 
three times a year.3 
Monday was the day on which all county courts first con- 
vened their monthly meetings. The tribunals were re- 
quired to continue court until all the business of the term 
was completed, although they did not always do this. Many 
courts met on the first Monday of the month; others met on 
the second, third, or fourth Monday. Occasionally the legis- 
lature changed the meeting dates of individual courts. Nor- 
mally certain terms of court were busier than others. The  
month in which the court of claims was held usually lasted 
2 Register of Justices of the Peace, 1815-1820, Isaac Shelby Papers (micro- 
film, reel lo, Governors' Papers, Kentucky State Historical Society); Register 
of Justices of the Peace, 1835-1844, Register of Justices of the Peace, 1845- 
1849 (microfilm, no reel number, Governors' Papers, Kentucky State Histor- 
ical Society); Fayette County Court Order Books, 3803-1850 (U.K. microfilm, 
reels M366:i-7). Hereafter microfilms of Governors' Papers, Journals, and 
Letterbooks in the Kentucky State Historical Society will be cited as G.P. 
3 Acts, 1792, 1st sess., chap. 35, sec. 4; Acts, 1821, chap. 329. 
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for several days, during which claims of the county were 
paid and the levy laid for the following year. In  Fayette 
County courts of claims sometimes lasted for as long as eight 
days and in Bath County one such term extended for a total 
of twelve days4 
While county courts were not circuit courts and were 
required to hold their sessions at the county seat, William 
Littell, an early compiler of Kentucky statutes, wrote in 
1814 that some tribunals were holding court at unautho- 
rized places. This practice apparently ceased shortly after 
Littell's published remarks, for not even the ever-critical 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1849 cited 
the grievance. Normally when residents of a county found 
it inconvenient to transact business in the county seat they 
either petitioned the legislature for the creation of a new 
county or for a change of the county seat. Both develop- 
ments were likely to create conflict. A typical instance was 
the successful effort of the citizens of the Maysville area 
to have that town named the seat of Mason County, a 
movement which elicited remonstrances from citizens of 
the original seat of government, Washington, both before 
and after the legislatively authorized referendum on the 
~ub jec t .~  
Routine business of the county courts required a quorum 
of three. Special business, such as laying the county levy, 
certifying claims, districting public roads, dispensing pa- 
tronage, and issuing tavern licenses, required the presence 
of a majority of the county magistrates. Such matters as 
claims and the districting of roads were set aside for specific 
4Speech of James W. Nesbitt, Proceedings, p. 702. In 1837 the legislature 
provided that the Jefferson County Court should devote the first week of its 
monthly meeting to county business and the second week to city affairs, Acts, 
1836-1837, chap. 410, sec. 2. 
5Littel1, Statute Law, 4:5og; H.J., 1844-1845, pp. 184, 219, 254, 279; 
Remonstrance of Citizens of Mason County, Mason County Historical So- 
ciety Papers (U.K. microfilm, reel M:i20). 
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months, during which terms all the magistrates were re- 
quired to attend court or to provide a reasonable cause for 
ab~ence .~  
Statistical studies reveal that in some counties many of 
the magistrates attended all or most of the monthly terms, 
while in others the justices were far less conscientious. 
Members of the Fayette County Court during 1841 and 
1842, for example, usually attended most of the monthly 
meetings, whereas those of the Bourbon County Court were 
less regular. In Fayette fifteen of nineteen justices of the 
peace who sat on the court throughout the two-year period 
attended a majority of the tribunal's twenty-four meetings, 
while in the same period only five of seventeen Bourbon 
magistrates attended a majority of their court's twenty-two 
meetings. 
A survey of the tax records of four counties for 1792 and 
of ten counties for 1802, 1830, and 1845 indicates that the 
general economic level of Kentucky's magistrates was con- 
siderably higher than that of the average white adult male.7 
The  justices of the peace of Bourbon, Fayette, Lincoln, and 
Madison counties for 1792 owned nearly nine times as 
much land, nearly seven times as many slaves, and two and 
a half times as much other taxable chattel property as the 
average white male adult of these counties. A decade later 
magistrates from ten sample counties owned over six and a 
6 Acts, 1815-1816, chap. 385 (claims); William Littell and Jacob Swigert, 
eds., A Digest of the Statute Law of Kentucky, 2 vols. (Frankfort, Ky., i8nz), 
2:1102 (roads) (hereafter cited as Littell and Swigert, Digest). 
7 Microfilm of state tax records is located at  the Kentucky State Historical 
Society, Frankfort. The  following list is of the counties whose records were 
examined, with reel numbers in parentheses: Bourbon (27, 29-30), Christian 
(73, 75), Fayette (loo, 102, 104-5), Fleming (1 11-13), Green (142-q3), Henry 
(172-74), Knox (230-31). Lincoln (243, 245-46). Madison (255-56, 258-59). 
and Montgomery (292, 294). These counties furnish a balance of geogaph- 
- - .  
ical location, economy, and population. 
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half times as much land and over seven times as many slaves 
as the average white male adult. While in 1830 the ratio of 
magisterial to white male adult ownership of taxable prop- 
erty declined to slightly less than three to one, by 1845 the 
margin had increased to nearly three and a half to one.s 
I t  should be admitted at once that these figures are 
slightly distorted by the presence on the courts of extremely 
wealthy persons. Indeed, certain magistrates serving during 
the earlier sample years may well have been the richest men 
in their counties. In 1802 Magistrate Green Clay of Madi- 
son County owned nearly 40,ooo acres of land, making him 
the largest landowner of the county. In 1794 Clay owned 
over ioo,ooo acres of land, over one-fourth the total owner- 
ship of all county residents. Likewise, the largest land- 
owner of Knox County in 1803, John Ballinger, who owned 
over 20,000 acres of land, was a member of the county court. 
Nevertheless, for magistrates (totaling 536) of all the sample 
counties in the years examined, over 75 percent owned 
more taxable property than the average white male adult. 
Although Kentucky's many regions varied greatly in 
wealth and agricultural characteristics, one useful measure 
of socioeconomic status is slave ownership. A comparison of 
the slaveholdings of magistrates and white male adults of 
five counties (Boone, Breckinridge, Butler, Hart, and 
Mercer) for 1820 reinforces the conclusion that the average 
county court member of antebellum Kentucky was rela- 
tively prosperous. The  census of that year indicates that 
nearly 73 percent of the magistrates of these five counties 
owned slaves and in a quantity 2.5 times greater than that 
of nonmagistrate slaveowners. Furthermore, only 33 per- 
8 The  total tax value of each taxpayer is not given in the tax lists be- 
tween 1792 and 1803; therefore comparative statistics are based on land, 
slaves, and livestock, which were the most significant forms of taxable 
property. Between 1820 and 1845 taxable property also included such mis- 
cellaneous chattels as buggies, pianos, and gold watches. 
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cent of the "heads of families" from these counties owned 
slaves, making the incidence of ownership among magis- 
trates 2.2 times greater than in the general population. On 
the average there were 5.6 times more slaves per magistrate 
than for other heads of families. Of course, wide variations 
existed among counties, depending in part upon the extent 
of plantation farmingg 
The  historian is severely limited in any attempt to an- 
alyze the occupations of particular social groups prior to 
1850. In that year, thanks to the foresight and training of 
the commercial publisher J. D. B. DeBow, who served as 
Superintendent of the Federal Census, dependable statistics 
became available. 
The  1850 census reveals that most of the magistrates (80 
percent) in ten representative counties were farmers and 
that very few of them (5.6 percent) were lawyers.1° Mer- 
chants accounted for 4 percent, manufacturers for 2.4 per- 
cent, and saddlers and tavern keepers for 1.6 percent each. 
Rounding out the sample were a bank clerk, a silversmith, 
a preacher, an auctioneer-newspaper editor, a brick mason, 
a carpenter, a gunsmith, and a person apparently retired 
(occupation simply designated "housekeeper"). The  aver- 
age age of the magistrates for the ten counties was 49.2 
years. They were slightly older in the more established 
counties than in the newer ones, the average ages being 5 1. I 
and 46 respectively. 
Despite the absence of statistics beyond 1803, it is useful 
to note that during the early years of the county court 
system one out of three magistrates was likely to be an of- 
ficer in the state militia. Data available for all twelve of 
9 Kentucky, Population Schedules, Census of 1820 (U.K. microfilm, reels 
16-18.26). 
10 The ten counties examined were Fayette, Franklin, Fulton, Garrard, 
Grant, Larue, Letcher, Ohio, Owsley, and Taylor. Kentucky, Population 
Schedules, Census of 1850 (U.K. microfilm, vols. 61, 12-18, 17). 
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Kentucky's counties as of June 1792 and for thirty-three 
of forty-four counties in 1802 and 1803 reveal that nearly 
one-third of the members of the county courts were militia 
officers, many holding the rank of captain or higher.ll 
In order to complete the collective portrait of the county 
court members it should be noted that many justices of the 
peace were active in state as well as county politics. Between 
1'792 and 1851 almost a fourth of the members of the lower 
house and a fifth of the upper house of the legislature were 
magistrates. Likewise a majority of most of the county mag- 
istrates appear to have been active participants in Ken- 
tucky's two-party system, which emerged in 1827. Finally, 
eight of Kentucky's seventeen governors and seven of her 
twenty-one senators serving during the period of the old 
county court system had been justices of the peace before 
their election.12 
Fayette County provides one of the few surviving ex- 
amples of extensive contemporary comment on the leaders 
of county society during the antebellum period, a portrait 
which furnishes information on the relative prestige of 
members of a county court. William A. Leavey, a Lexington 
civic leader and drygoods merchant who was born in 1796, 
wrote a "Memoir of 1,exington" in 1875 that offers reflec- 
tions on the leading families of Fayette County society 
throughout much of the life of the old county court system. 
11 Statistics for this analysis were derived from C. Glenn Clift's "Corn 
Stalk" Militia of Kentucky, 1792-1811 (Frankfort, Ky., 1957) and from lists 
of magistrates in the Journal of Governor Isaac Shelby and the Papers of 
Governor James Garrard, jackets 28-29 (G.P., reels 1, 5). 
12 See Chapters 4 and 6. The  governors and the counties in  which they 
served as masstrates were Isaac Shelby (Lincoln), James Garrard (Bourbon), 
Gabriel Slaughter (Mercer), John Adair (Mercer), Joseph Desha (Mason), 
Thomas Metcalfe (Nicholas), James Clark (Clark), and John J. Crittenden 
(Franklin). Adair, Crittenden, and Metcalfe also served in the United States 
Senate, as did John Edwards (Lincoln), Martin D. Hardin (Franklin), John 
Pope ( ~ a ~ e t t e ) ;  and George Walker (Jessamine). 
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If his memoir is accepted as a reliable gauge of the level of 
prestige of county magistrates, it would seem that members 
of the court were more respected before 1825 than after- 
ward. Leavey characterizes nearly 30 percent of the magis- 
trates who were appointed between 1792 and 1800 as 
"respected," "distinguished," "esteemed," or the like. He 
describes similarly almost half of the magistrates appointed 
between 1801 and 1825. Yet he depicts only 17 percent of 
those commissioned after 1825 as leaders of society. Two 
factors, however, can be cited to impeach Leavey's judg- 
ment. First, a majority of the magistrates with whom he 
probably dealt most directly were appointed after 1825 
and familiarity often breeds contempt. Second, the eco- 
nomic level of Fayette County magistrates in 1845 and 
1850 was higher than in 1830, and statistics indicate that 
it rose steadily throughout the last twenty years of the old 
county court system. Although relatively high economic 
status does not necessarily guarantee respect from one's 
peers, such is normally the case. Therefore, with some reser- 
vation, it can be concluded that in Fayette County the 
prestige of county magistrates probably rose between 1792 
and 1825 and may have declined thereafter.13 
In summary the average justice of the peace of Kentucky 
was close to forty-nine years of age, was most likely to be a 
farmer, owned substantially more taxable property than the 
average resident, and received the general, although pos- 
sibly diminishing, respect of his contemporaries. He was 
also likely to be a political leader and was often a member of 
the legislature, an officer in the militia, or both. During the 
first decade of the old county court system he was likely to 
13 William A. Leavey, "A Memoir of Lexington and Its Vicinity with 
Some Notice of Many Prominent Citizens and Its Institutions of Education 
and Religion," Register, Kentucky State Historical Society 40 (1941): 107-31, 
253-67, 353-75; 41 (1942): 44-62, 107-37. 250-60, 31-46; 42 (1943): 26-53; 
Fayette County Tax Records, 1830, 1850 (microfilm copy, reels 102, 105). 
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serve as a magistrate for approximately two years, while in 
the remaining decades, influenced by the prospect of the 
sheriffalty, he usually held office for a much longer period 
of time. Thus the majority of the magistrates possessed the 
potential for dynamic leadership in county government. 
Whether they utilized that potential is another matter. 
Chapter 2 
T H E  JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
OF T H E  COUNTY COURTS 
T HE BUSINESS of the county courts was substantial, encompassing executive, legislative, and judicial functions. The  most significant and sometimes 
controversial elements of the jurisdiction of the courts were 
wills and estates, the poor and the vagrant, guardians and 
apprentices, ferries, milldams, bastardy, emancipation, Ne- 
gro felonies, the fining of officers, appeals from magistrates, 
roads, taxes, appropriations, towns, and patronage. The  
last five concerns will be treated in other chapters. The re- 
mainder of this important business, most of which was 
judicial in nature, will be discussed here. 
A survey of county court order books indicates that most 
of the judicial business of the courts involved probating 
wills and overseeing the administration of estates.' This 
grant of jurisdiction also encompassed the certification of 
executors, the appointment of administrators, and the selec- 
tion of commissioners to appraise the estate, settle the ac- 
counts of the executor or administrator, and divide the 
property, including any rights of dower.2 
Conflicts sometimes arose in probating estates, both be- 
tween county courts and between county and circuit courts. 
The  court of the county in which the decedent resided had 
jurisdiction over his estate, and normally there was no prob- 
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lem identifying the proper tribunal. Occasionally, though, 
disputes between county courts occurred, especially when 
the decedent possessed several farms, as in the case of James 
Speed, who owned property in both Garrard and Scott 
counties. Both county courts attempted to exercise jurisdic- 
tion over Speed's estate, and ultimately the Court of Ap- 
peals had to resolve the dispute, ruling that the Scott Coun- 
ty Court had jurisdiction over the matter since it had heard 
the case first.3 
Circuit courts intervened more frequently into the pro- 
bate affairs of county courts than did other county courts. 
As the principal repositories of equity jurisdiction in the 
judicial system of the state, circuit courts were empowered 
to hear bills in equity contesting wills and attacking the 
final accountings of county courts with executors and ad- 
ministrators. One critic proclaimed that practically every 
case in probate ultimately ended up before a circuit court 
in e q ~ i t y . ~  Suits contesting wills were infrequent but some- 
times resulted in decrees overturning the orders of county 
courts. For example, the heirs of Jeconias Singleton success- 
fully attacked his will, which had been validated by the 
Woodford County Court, on the grounds that it was a 
product of insanity and undue inf l~ence.~ 
1 Over two-thirds of the orders entered in the Fayette County Court Or- 
der Book for 1845 concerned wills and estates. More than half of the orders 
of 1816 pertained to the same subject. In Bracken County approximately 
40 percent of the court's orders for the same sample years involved probate 
makers. Fayette County Court Order Book, i ~ i 1 - 1 8 1 ~ ,  pp. 357-491 (U.K. 
microfilm, reel M366:z); Fayette County Court Order Book, 1840-1846, pp. 
439-534 (U.K. microfilm, reel M366:6); Bracken County Court Order Book, 
1797-1817, pp. 421-47 (U.K. microfilm, reel M478:12o); Bracken County 
Court Order Book, 1835-1845, p p  427-72 (U.K. microfilm, reel M478:121). 
2 Acts, 1796-1797, pp. 163-71. 
3 Pawling v. Speed's Executor, 5 T. B. Monroe 580 (1827). 
4Frankfort Kentucky Yeoman, 17 December 1846 (hereafter cited as 
Yeoman). 
5 In re Singleton's Wi l l ,  8 Dana 315 (1839). The decisions of circuit courts 
were not printed. The  decision reported is that of the Court of Appeals, 
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More frequently parties sought bills in equity to transfer 
the process of final accounting with executors or adminis- 
trators from the county to the circuit court. The  Court of 
Appeals ruled that whichever court initiated final account- 
ing should retain the action to its ~omplet ion.~ However, in 
the case of a county court its decree was thereafter subject 
to review by a circuit court sitting in equity. Thus in the 
case of Kellar's Executors v. Beelor the Jefferson County 
Circuit Court partially revised a final accounting of the 
Jefferson County Court, while in Saunders' Heirs v. Saun- 
ders' Executors a circuit court obtained complete jurisdic- 
tion over the final accounting process to the exclusion of 
a county court since the executors had waited to apply to 
the latter tribunal for the appointment of commissioners 
to settle their accounts only after the commencement of a 
suit in ~hancery.~ 
It  was natural that the state should entrust the county 
courts with the duty of appointing guardians and masters 
and protecting orphans and apprentices since it delegated 
to them the analogous responsibility of supervising execu- 
tors and estates. The  antebellum period of Kentucky history 
was an era of cholera epidemics, smallpox outbreaks, and 
relatively high mortality rates, all of which created a sub- 
stantial orphan population. In the event of the death of 
both parents the county court interceded, appointing a 
suitable person guardian of the minor children, taking 
bond from him as security, and requiring the appointee to 
to which tribunal the ruling of the circuit court was appealed. Nonetheless 
this report indicates the role of the circuit court in the litigation, as do all 
the relevant cases cited. 
6 Saunders' Heirs v. Saunders' Executors, 2 Littell 314 (1822). 
7 Kellar's Executors v, Beelor, 5 T .  B. Monroe 573 (1827); Saunders' Heirs 
v. Saunders' Executors, 2 Littell 314 (1822). T h e  report of the latter case 
does not indicate which county was involved. 
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file an inventory of the estate and to make periodic account- 
ings of receipts and expendit~res.~ 
In their efforts to see that estates of orphans were not 
wasted away, county courts sometimes found it necessary to 
remove guardians and replace them with others deemed 
more competent. The Court of Appeals greatly facilitated 
this process by ruling in 1812, in the case of Piat v. Allaway, 
that it had no right to review the act of removing a guardian 
since the proceeding was exclusively executive, not ju- 
diciaLg It was not until 1835, rather late in the period of the 
old county court system, that this decision was reversed in 
the case of Isaacs v. Taylor.  The facts of this controversy 
clearly compelled a rejection of the earlier decision. The 
Marion County Court appointed Nancy Isaacs guardian for 
her infant son and then removed her without notice, ap- 
pointing in her stead the executor of her husband's estate. 
The  high court was obviously appalled at this action, which 
removed the "natural guardian" in favor of the executor, 
"the last competent person on earth who should be the 
guardian." While paying superficial respect to Piat v. All- 
away, the high court in effect overruled it and remanded the 
case to the county court, requiring it to give Mrs. Isaacs 
notice and to show cause for her removal.'O 
Although until 1835 the county courts were relatively 
immune from judicial review of their orders removing 
guardians, they were not free from the supervision of equity 
in other matters affecting these officials. T o  straighten out 
accounts and fees, beleaguered guardians and ex-guardians 
frequently sought the services of the local circuit judge 
sitting as a chancellor in equity. Indeed the justices them- 
selves utilized the services of the circuit courts to compel 
8 For the basic statute regarding guardians see Acts, 1796-1797, pp. 145- 
48. 
9 2 Bibb 544 (1812). 
10 3 Dana 600 (183.5). 
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errant guardians to restore wasted assets to the estates of 
orphans.ll 
County courts were required by statute to bind out as 
apprentices all orphans "who hath no estate, or not sufficient 
for maintenance out of the profits."12 Guardians could bind 
out orphans with adequate assets "to such persons for learn- 
ing an art or trade" with the approval of the county court.13 
These provisions, along with those requiring the magis- 
trates to bind out illegitimate children and all progeny of 
white and free black parents who were too poor to maintain 
them, meant that a substantial portion of the judicial busi- 
ness of the county courts concerned masters and apprentices. 
Most of this business was routine-hearing proof by fellow 
justices or other county officials that a particular family was 
too impoverished to maintain their children, ordering in- 
fants bound out, securing bond from newly appointed mas- 
ters, and ordering apprentices bound to new masters when 
old ones died or resigned. Occasionally friends of ap- 
prentices, or the apprentices themselves, appeared under a 
provision of the law requiring the courts to hear their com- 
plaints of maltreatment from masters. Such proceedings 
often resulted in fines being imposed upon masters and, in 
some cases, in their removal. 
The  decisions of county courts concerning masters and 
apprentices were also subject to higher judicial revision. 
Aggrieved apprentices or their friends or parents could ap- 
peal to the Court of Appeals decisions of county courts 
binding them out. In Robarts v. Desforges the high tribunal 
reversed an order binding out the son of James Robarts 
since the record did not show that the father had been 
properly summoned before the court at the time of the 
11 Mason County Justices v. Bridges, Mercer County Circuit Court 
Judgments, September 1808 (U.K. microfilm, reel M3io:zioS-9). 
18 Acts, 1796-1797, sec. 2 ,  p. 147. 
13 Ibid., sec. 3, p. 148. 
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original pr~ceeding.'~ The  same rights extended to Negro 
children. In Payne v. Long and Rachel v. Emerson the high 
tribunal reversed county court orders binding out Negro 
children on the grounds that the persons with whom they 
had been staying had not been notified of the impending 
proceedings.I5 
Although there is no evidence of direct criticism, it is 
apparent that many county courts were less than efficient 
in the performance of their responsibilities as executors of 
the state's guardianship and apprenticeship statutes. In 
1835 the Senate considered a bill which suggested that the 
local tribunals failed to address themselves promptly to the 
needs of orphans and apprentices. The bill provided, among 
other things, that the county courts should "always [be] 
open for . . . appointing guardians and binding out appren- 
tices." l6 The Senate defeated the proposal, and the griev- 
ances of orphans and apprentices were aired no more in 
public even at the hypercritical Constitutional Convention 
of 1849. Yet the causes of the complaints which produced 
the bill of 1835 probably persisted. 
The  county courts administered the poor laws through- 
out the period of the old county court system and adminis- 
tered the vagrancy laws until 1839, when this authority was 
transferred to the circuit courts. The tribunals were re- 
quired to provide for the poor out of the county levy and 
to bind or hire out vagrants, depending on whether they 
were minors or not. A person was "poor" if he was "in- 
capable of procuring a livelihood" because of some "person- 
al debility or otherwise"; he was a "vagrant" if he was an 
"able bodied person" who was a "beggar," a wife-deserter, 
14 2 A. K. Marshall 39 (1819). 
15 Ibid., p. 158 (1819); 6 B. Monroe 280 (1845). 
16 Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 1834-1895, 
p. 326 (hereafter cited as S.J.). 
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or an "idle . . . and dissolute person, rambling about with- 
out any reasonable means of subsistence." l7 In order to 
classify a person as a vagrant the county courts had to pro- 
ceed judicially and try him before a jury. 
The  paucity of officially reported vagrancy cases before 
the Court of Appeals suggests that few people convicted by 
the county courts under the vagrancy laws appealed their 
decisions.ls The  fact that the right of appeal was not ex- 
pressly given in the statutes and the impoverished condition 
of the defendants no doubt largely explain the almost total 
absence of judicial review. 
The  only apparent controversy over the poor laws arose 
from the tendency of certain impoverished heads of fami- 
lies to send their charges into other counties to attach them- 
selves to the county dole. The legislature outlawed such 
activity in 1;198.19 
Although the legislature authorized county courts to 
administer aid to the poor by means of overseers, a system 
which had been used in colonial Virginia as well as Eng- 
land, most courts appear simply to have assigned to each 
poor person a responsible citizen of the community through 
whom funds were channeled. In some instances, especially 
in the case of infants, the persons in charge of the poor 
appear to have taken them into their homes. 
Poor relief became more institutionalized beginning in 
182 1, when the legislature authorized the county courts to 
build poorhouses and most of them did, apparently agree- 
17 Acts, 1793, chap. 38, sec. 2; Acts, 1795, chap. 55,  sec. I. 
18 The reports of the Court of Appeals contain only two cases concern- 
ing vagrancy, Gatliff v. Commonwealth, 5 Littell 166 (1824)~ and Frishe v. 
Commonwealth, 6 Dana 318 (1838). The first case did not involve the 
vagrant but the person who hired him, and the second was appealed from 
the City Court of Louisville, which had jurisdiction over vagrancy cases 
within the city limits. 
19 Littell, Statute Law, 2:87. 
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ing with the Fayette County magistrates that such structures 
would more "economically maintain" the impo~er i shed .~~ 
The  statute also authorized courts to appoint a single "keep- 
er" or "superintendent" to manage each poorhouse and 
several (usually three) "overseers" or "managers" to super- 
vise the "keeper." After construction of a poorhouse a court 
allocated a lump sum to the superintendent for care of the 
poor and only rarely made appropriations to individual 
paupers as had been done under the old system. 
In 1796 the General Assembly authorized county courts 
to "establish public ferries across those rivers or creeks with- 
in their respective counties, whenever they shall deem it 
necessary," to take performance bonds from owners, to set 
rates, and to discontinue franchises because of disuse.21 
Since ferries were usually profitable ventures and were vital 
to transportation in an era when bridge construction was 
rather crude, private entrepreneurs as well as towns and 
cities eagerly sought franchises to build and operate them. 
Competition for these franchises created conflicts and 
litigation. Aggrieved parties could appeal county court de- 
cisions to the Court of Appeals according to an express 
provision in the act of 1 7 9 6 . ~ ~  Many of the battles involved 
private entrepreneurs contesting the claims of towns and 
cities to ferry rights across the Ohio River. Before 1806 the 
legislature had reserved the right to grant franchises on the 
Ohio. Yet so many county courts awarded franchises for 
Ohio River traffic that in 1806 the General Assembly had 
to pass a statute confirming the validity of those grants and 
authorizing the county courts henceforth to award such 
20 Acts, 1821, chap. 309; Fayette County Court Order Book, 1821-1824, 
p. 81 (U.K. microfilm, reel M366:3). 
21 Acts, 1796-1797, pp. 41-43. 
22 Ibid., sec. 3, p. 42. 
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franchises. Subsequently the Court of Appeals ruled that 
the courts could grant franchises only to owners of land on 
the river.% Certain towns, claiming ownership of all their 
shoreline, sought to take advantage of this decision by ob- 
taining franchises to the exclusion of private parties already 
established in business. 
One of the most bitterly contested fights concerned the 
efforts of the town of Maysville to secure the exclusive right 
to a ferry franchise across the Ohio River. The Mason 
County Court had made five different grants before the 
town applied for a franchise in September 1827. Summonses 
were issued to all five ferry owners, three of whom appeared 
with their attorneys at the October term of the court and 
successfully opposed the town's efforts to secure a franchise. 
The  town appealed to the Court of Appeals and not only 
secured a right to have a franchise established in its name 
but in effect eliminated the other five franchises, two be- 
cause of disuse and three because they did not own the land 
adjacent to the river as required by the high tribunal.24 
Similar battles ensued in Campbell County between pri- 
vate entrepreneurs and the towns of Newport and Coving- 
ton. In Newport the fracas was particularly bitter. In 1795 
the Campbell County Court awarded James Taylor the 
right to operate a ferry between Newport and Cincinnati. 
Taylor operated the ferry without contest until 1830, when 
the town of Newport petitioned the county court for the 
exclusive right to the franchise on the grounds that it, not 
Taylor, owned the land adjacent to the river where the 
enterprise was headquartered. This challenge touched off 
a controversy which lasted for twenty years and involved 
23 Trustees of Jeflerson Seminary v. Wagnon, 2 A. K .  Marshall 379 (1820). 
24 Trustees of Maysville v. Boon, 2 J .  J .  Marshall 224 (1829); Martin 
Brown to John L. Langhorne, g October 1829, Mason County Historical 
Papers (U.K. microfilm, reel Miro). 
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two legal battles and a political struggle within the county 
court. The matter was finally resolved in 1850 when the 
Court of Appeals once and for all confirmed the validity of 
Taylor's franchise.25 
The  town of Covington fared better than its neighbor, 
Newport, when in 1830 it successfully obtained a franchise 
from the Campbell County Court to the exclusion of Sam- 
uel Kennedy, who had operated a ferry on the shoreline of 
the town for many years. The  principal question in the case 
was whether Kennedy owned the land upon which the ferry 
was established. On appeal to the Court of Appeals he 
sought to introduce new evidence proving his title, but 
his appeal was denied, eliciting a vigorous dissenting opin- 
ion from Chief Justice Robertson and leaving Covington 
as the only ferry operator within town limits.% 
The county courts of Kentucky derived their authority 
over milldams from earlier laws enacted by the legislature 
of Virginia. In  1797 the General Assembly of Kentucky 
codified these laws into one statute which was the basic 
source of jurisdiction over milldams for the rest of the pe- 
riod of the old county court system.27 Milldams, crucial to 
the economic existence of essentially agricultural Kentucky, 
formed an integral part of grist mills upon which farmers 
and millers depended. Practically every major farm had its 
own. In order to build one, a prospective miller had to go 
through a rather elaborate judicial procedure in the court 
of the county in which the dam was to be located. 
25 Trzistees of Newport v. Taylor, 6 J. J. Marshall 134 (1831); City of 
Newport v. Taylor's Heirs, I i B .  Monroe 361 (1850). For the relation of the 
ferry dispute to county court politics see L. H. Rugg et al. to Governor 
William Owsley, 15 December 1847, Owsley Papers, jacket 705 (G.P., reel 
98). 
26 Kennedy v. Trustees of Covington, 4 J. J. Marshall 538 (1830). 
27 Acts, 1796-1797, pp. 19-9. 
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The  crucial question, regardless of whether the applicant 
owned all or part of the lands surrounding the watercourse 
upon which he desired to construct his milldam, was 
whether the operation would damage the "mansion houses, 
offices, curtelages, gardens, or orchards" of his neighbors or 
menace the wildlife, fish, and health of the area.28 The  court 
ordered the sheriff to summon a jury of twelve to conduct 
an investigation. If this jury found that the proposed dam 
would cause damages or constitute a menace to health, the 
court refused to authorize it. However, the power of the 
county courts over milldams was not absolute. The  legis- 
lature periodically withdrew major streams and rivers from 
the jurisdiction of the county courts. For example, in Janu- 
ary of 1817 the General Assembly forbade county courts to 
permit further milldam construction "over the Beech and 
Rolling Forks of Salt River." Yet one year later it passed a 
special law empowering the Washington County Court to 
authorize Edward Berry and Philips Mattingly to build a 
milldam upon the Beech Fork under proper superv i~ ion .~~ 
Furthermore, as with ferries, parties could appeal coun- 
ty court orders on milldams to the Court of Appeals, which 
was empowered virtually to retry such cases. Thus the 
Court of Appeals decided in 1844 in the case of Trabue v. 
Macklin to remand an order from the Franklin County 
Court authorizing Macklin to build a dam nine feet high 
on the grounds that the proposed structure was too high. 
In  Eubank v. Pence, decided in 1824, the high court re- 
versed an order of the Shelby County Court permitting dam 
construction on the grounds that the local tribunal had 
failed to ascertain whether "fish of passage will in any de- 
gree be obstructed," while in Wootten v. Campbell, decided 
in 1838, the court reversed an order of the Spencer County 
Court on the grounds that the health of the neighborhood 
28 Ibid., sec. 3, p .  196. 
29 Acts, 1816-1817, chap. 18; Acts, 1817-1818, chap. 163. 
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would be threatened by the proposed dam of Robert S. 
C a m ~ b e l l . ~ ~  
As the chief judicial vehicles for dealing with the parents 
of illegitimate children, the county courts rendered judg- 
ments on charges of bastardy against men brought by singIe 
women. Normally a man found guilty was charged a sum 
of money judged necessary by the court to maintain the 
child during its infancy. If the father could furnish bond 
securing this money, which was usually payable over a pe- 
riod of years, he was released from the custody of the court; 
if not, he was jailed until he rendered oath as a debtor.31 
The proceedings of county courts in matters of bastardy 
were subject to judicial review by the Court of Appeals, but 
review was not as frequent as in other types of cases, such as 
those dealing with ferries. The high tribunal ruled that the 
county courts had wide discretion in assessing judgments 
for maintenance, upheld the right of the county courts to 
punish white fathers of mulatto children (provided that the 
mother was a free Negro), and ruled that there should be 
no appeal from judgments of acquittal. However, it did pre- 
vent county courts from hearing charges against fathers who 
resided out of the county or who committed their alleged 
deeds out of the state and decreed that circuit courts had 
concurrent jurisdiction over suits to enforce maintenance 
judgments.32 
County courts presided over the emancipation of slaves. 
Slaveholders could free slaves by one of two methods: a 
304 B. Monroe 407 (1844); 5 Littell 338 (1824); 7 Dana 204 (1838). 
31 Acts, 1795, chap. 1 I .  
32 Ewarts v. Commonwealth, 2 B. Monroe 55 (1841); Williams v. Blincoe, 
5 Littell 171 (1824); Commonwealth v. Sandford, 5 Littell 289 (1824); 
Carter v. Kilburn, 1 A. K.  Marshall 463 (1819); Tanner v. Allen, Littell's 
Selected Cases 25 (1806); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 3 T.  B. Monroe 212 
(1826). 
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document executed before the court or a provision in a will. 
Courts recorded the means of emancipation, issued decrees 
of freedom to the former slaves, and, if necessary, required 
the former owner or his executor to post bond to insure that 
the former slaves did not become charges against the coun- 
ty.= Sometimes a testator sought to circumvent this con- 
tingency by providing in his will that the slaves had to post 
bond in order to secure freedom.34 
Such decrees were subject to review in the circuit courts. 
This happened most often after the emancipator had died. 
Executors or heirs sometimes challenged the validity of 
emancipation in a proceeding at equity in the appropriate 
circuit In some cases the slaves themselves brought 
suit in the circuit court to secure freedom under an instru- 
ment or deed. For example, in Hill v. Squire slaves of a re- 
cently deceased slaveowner successfully sued the executor in 
the Madison County Circuit Court to require him to free 
them under a provision of the will.36 
The local tribunals were also empowered to try cases 
originating under an act passed in 1808 preventing free 
Negroes from emigrating into the state and to hear all 
prosecutions against allegedly felonious slaves. The  Court 
of Appeals significantly altered the first grant of jurisdiction 
when in 1832 it reversed a conviction of the Knox County 
Court on the grounds that the act unconstitutionally denied 
the defendant a trial by Prosecutions against slaves 
for alleged felonies were transferred to the circuit courts 
in 1 8 1 9 . ~ ~  
33 Littell, Statute Law, 2: 119-20. 
34See. for example, the case of Hill v. Squire, iz B. Monroe 557 (1851). 
35See, for example, Johnson's Administrator v. Johnson's Heirs, 8 B. 
Monroe 470 (1848). 
36 12 B. Monroe 557 (1851). 
37Dorarn and Ryan v. Commonwealth, 1 Dana 331 (1832). 
38 Acts, 1808-1809. chap. 78, sec. 7; Littell and Swigert, Digest, 1:371, 
2: I 149-64. 
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Fining county officers for neglecting their duties and 
entertaining suits against them for damages resulting from 
misfeasance comprised part of the jurisdiction of the coun- 
ty courts. More often than not courts threatened rather than 
fined either their own members or other county officials for 
alleged neglect of duty. For example, at its April term of 
1835, the Fayette County Court summoned Sheriff Asa 
Thomson to show cause why he should not be fined "for 
failing to give the necessary attention to this court as re- 
quired by law" and at the same term heard Thomson's 
explanation and released him from the order.39 Yet on oc- 
casion the courts did fine officials, as in 15 17 when the 
Greenup County Court fined George W. Davis, deputy 
sheriff of the county, for failing to return his list of fines 
collected in 1816 within the prescribed period of time.40 
County courts also heard actions by sheriffs against their 
deputies for damages resulting from alleged delinquencies 
in office and actions brought by paymasters of the militia 
against sheriffs for failure to collect and return militia 
fines.41 
The county courts possessed limited appellate jurisdic- 
tion, the most significant part of which involved appeals 
from decisions of individual justices of the peace. Originally 
the county tribunals heard appeals from magistrates' courts 
when the judgments involved twenty-five shillings or more. 
In 18 12 the legislature raised the limitation on the jurisdic- 
tion of magistrates from five pounds to fifty dollars, pro- 
vided that the county courts retain their appellate powers 
over judgments ranging from twenty-five shillings to five 
39Fayette County Court Order Book, 1833-1836, pp. 260, 267 (U.K. 
microfilm, reel M366:5). 
40 Gabriel Slaughter Papers, jacket 175 (G.P., reel 20). 
41 See, for example, Dye et al. v. Knox, I Bibb 573 (1809) and Poague v. 
C u l v e ~ ,  5 Littell 132 (1824). 
[ 32 ] County Courts i n  Antebellum Kentucky 
pounds, and gave the circuit courts the right to hear ap- 
peals from judgments in excess of five pounds.42 
It  is not known whether any magistrates ever decided 
appeals from their own judgments as members of the coun- 
ty court, although the practice was never proscribed by the 
legislature or the Court of Appeals. The  order books do not 
shed light on the question since the names of justices of the 
peace whose decisions were appealed were never recorded. 
The  fact that critics of the old county court system never 
cited the problem is evidence against the existence of self- 
review but does not eliminate the possibility altogether. 
Whether or not members of county courts reviewed their 
own judgments, it is clear that the magistrates in general 
were not reluctant to reverse decisions of their brethren. 
For example, in 1816 the Fayette County Court heard 
twenty-four appeals, affirmed ten decisions, dismissed nine 
(usually for want of prosecution), and reversed five. In the 
same year the Bracken County Court heard three appeals 
and reversed two decisions.43 
If the ability of magistrates to hear appeals from their 
own decisions did not trouble critics of the old county court 
system, inconsistency of the appellate review did. Larkin J. 
Proctor, delegate from Lewis County to the Constitutional 
Convention of 1849, accused the court of his county of in- 
consistency in two rulings on the question of whether an 
appeal could be heard from a magistrate's judgment of less 
than twenty-five shillings when the amount of the claim had 
exceeded that amount.@ It was entirely possible for incon- 
sistencies to occur since membership on County Courts 
hearing appeals was not always the same and the appellate 
42Acts, 1796-1797, sec. 8,  p. 16; Acts, 1811-1812, chap. 342, secs. 1 ,  4 .  
43 Fayette County Court Order Book, 181 1-1817, pp. 358-491 (U.K. micro- 
film, reel M366:2); Bracken County Court Order Book, 1797-1817, pp. 421- 
47 (U.K. microfilm, reel 478:120). 
@ Proceedings, pp. 698-99. 
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decisions of the courts were not subject to review by a 
higher tribunal. 
As the first half of the nineteenth century progressed and 
the amount of litigation, including that before magistrates, 
increased, the number of appeals from justices of the peace 
to county courts decreased. No direct evidence explaining 
the diminution is available, but it can be speculated that 
the governor may have taken over some of the appeals in 
his capacity as a legal officer with powers of remission and 
pardon. 
The  first and second Constitutions of Kentucky vested 
broad power with the governor to remit fines imposed by 
judicial tribunals.45 The  chief executives of the state rarely 
invoked the power of remission before 1808 but thereafter 
increasingly remitted fines imposed by lower courts. In his 
two years as governor from 1832 to 1834, John Breathitt 
remitted more fines-363-than any other chief executive 
during the period of the old county court system. There- 
after the number of remissions, although still substantial, 
declined slightly and then leveled 
In remitting fines the governors often acted as competi- 
tors of the county courts since many of the appeals to the 
chief executive were from justices of the peace and might 
instead have gone to the local tribunals. Less often did the 
governors serve as sources of appeal from decisions of the 
county courts themselves, probably because most of them 
followed a ruling of the attorney general issued in 1804 in 
which he argued that the chief executive could remit only 
fines "accruing to the benefit of the state, not to the county, 
any corporation or any individual." 47 Since most fines im- 
45 Constitution of 1792, Art. 2, sec. lo; Constitution of 1799, Art. 3, sec. 11. 
46 The above statistics were obtained from the journals of the governors 
(G.P., reels 1 ,2 ,4 ,6 ,8 ,  lo, ll,24,27,34,36,45,53-55, log). 
47 Christopher Greenup Journal, p. 6 (G.P., reel 8). 
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posed by the county courts "accrued to the benefit of the 
county," strict observance of this ruling would have limited 
severely the right of governors to remit fines imposed by 
local tribunals. The great majority of fines remitted by 
governors were those imposed for failure to file lists of tax- 
able property since such fines accrued to the benefit of the 
state, but not all governors followed the ruling of 1804. For 
example, in 1817 Governor Gabriel Slaughter remitted a 
fine imposed against Herbert G. Waggener, a justice of the 
peace for Adair County, for missing claims court even 
though the penalty accrued to the benefit of the C O I X ~ . ~ ~  
The county courts played a vital role in the judicial sys- 
tem of the state. Their jurisdiction encompassed many dif- 
ferent questions, requiring their members to be familiar 
with the laws governing wills and estates, ferries, roads, 
guardians and orphans, apprentices, bastards, milldams, and 
numerous other specialties. In the words of Squire Turner, 
a lawyer from Madison County and a delegate to the Con- 
stitutional Convention of 1849, a knowledge of so many 
technical areas of the law "require[d] a good deal of study 
and reflection." 49 
Yet where they were not subject to judicial or administra- 
tive review, as in the case of appeals from single magistrates, 
the courts were guilty of inconsistent adjudication. This 
situation deepened the disaffection in which they were held 
by their constituents and led ultimately to constitutional 
review and revision. 
48 Slaughter Papers, jacket 176 (G.P., reel 20). 
49 Proceedings, p. 700. 
Chapter 3 
T H E  FINANCIAL BUSINESS 
O F  T H E  COUNTY COURTS 
UCH OF the business of the county courts con- 
cerned matters of taxation and appropriations, 
roads, and other internal improvements. While 
some phases of this business were judicial, most were either 
executive or legislative. Both the extent of the county 
courts' authority in these cases, usually involving substan- 
tial delegations of power from the legislature, and the con- 
troversies they aroused require special consideration. 
The county courts played an important part in the assess- 
ment and collection of state taxes. From the beginning of 
statehood they were empowered to lay the counties off into 
tax districts, to appoint tax commissioners for each district 
who were to take lists of taxable property from local res- 
idents and assess the property, and to name a collector, 
usually the sheriff. The  collector, relying on the assessment 
of the commissioners, collected the taxes and turned them 
over to the state treasury.' Although critics and reformers 
from time to time attacked this procedure, it remained ba- 
sically intact throughout the period of the old county court 
system. 
While the state tax system operated efficiently for the 
most part, the performance and pay of the court-appointed 
tax commissioners sparked some controversy. The first rev- 
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enue act of Kentucky specified that the commissioners 
should be paid six shillings a day for their services, a rate 
which the legislature altered periodically so that by 1837 
commissioners were receiving a maximum of $1.50 for each 
day's work.2 During much of the period of the old county 
court system the General Assembly granted the county 
courts some discretioil in setting the commissioners' pay, 
although occasionally a dispute arose over how much a com- 
missioner was entitled to receive. Pay schedules were espe- 
cially prone to controversy when courts tried to circumvent 
per diem statutory rates by contracting in advance with a 
commissioner to take in lists for a lump sum regardless of 
the number of days spent on the job. Such was the case in 
Warren County in January 1809 when the county court 
contracted with Enas Daniel to act as a tax commissioner 
for $66, even though the revenue statute provided that the 
commissioners should be paid $1 a day for their services. 
Either the court knew what it was about or Daniel was dis- 
honest, for in October, ignoring his contract, he presented 
the magistrates with a bill for $144, claiming he had spent 
144 days taking in lists of taxable property in his district. 
The  county court rejected his claim and awarded him $66 
according to the terms of the contract, a decision which was 
upheld by the Court of Appeals on the grounds that a 
county court had absolute jurisdiction over the question of 
how much tax commissioners should be paid.3 
In 1842 this question presented itself in a much more 
comprehensive form directly connected to the question of 
the commissioners' competence. The  latter issue, which had 
been simmering for some time, involved the merits of con- 
1 See Acts, 1792, 1st sess., chap. 6 ,  which established the basic system o f  
assessing and collecting state taxes throughout the period of the old county 
court system. 
2 Ibid., sec. 6; Acts, 1836-1837, chap. 399, sec. 4. 
3 County Court of Warren v. Daniel, 2 Bibb 573 (1812). 
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tinuing to allow the county courts the power to appoint the 
commissioners. For instance, in August 1834 the Fayette 
County Court ordered several persons to examine and cor- 
rect many errors in the assessment books of the tax commis- 
s ione r~ .~  Such incidents grew more and more common so 
that by November 1839 Governor Charles Wickliffe in his 
annual message to the legislature had ample reason to de- 
liver a blast at the performance of the commissioners. Wick- 
liffe contended that "persons wholly incompetent [were] 
often selected by the county courts for reasons other than 
their fitness for the station." The  governor also criticized 
the latest revenue statute, which gave certain latitude to the 
county courts in establishing the pay for the commissioners. 
He argued that this system gave rise to favoritism and in- 
equality in allotting pay and submitted that the cost of tak- 
ing in lists of taxable property in Scott County exceeded 
that of Shelby County by 2 0  percent, while the total rev- 
enue obtained from the former was nearly 40 percent less 
than that from the latter. He recommended that the legis- 
lature take away from the county courts the power of ap- 
pointing tax commissioners and transfer it to the governor, 
who would appoint one county tax assessor responsible for 
selecting his own d e p ~ t i e s . ~  
Wickliffe's indictment of the commissioners did result in 
certain reforms, but not of the kind he had suggested. In- 
stead of divesting the county courts of some of their pa- 
tronage and creating a new officer, the legislature retained 
the old system and imposed requirements designed to make 
the commissioners' lists more reliable. In 1840 it passed a 
law requiring the county clerk to audit more carefully the 
commissioners' books, and in 1842 it lowered the commis- 
sioners' pay and imposed penalties for errors in their re- 
4Fayette County Court Order Book, 1833-1836, p. 87 (U.K. microfilm, 
reel M366:5). 
5 H .  J., z83p-1840, pp. 1&17. 
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turns. The latter measure compounded the problem rather 
than solved it. Less pay produced even less competent com- 
missioners as well as protests from certain county courts 
which found the task of appointing acceptable officers even 
more onerous. Property valuations for 1843 declined sub- 
stantially, and many blamed this on the newer and more 
inept class of commissioners. Some commentators recom- 
mended transferring the power of appointing commission- 
ers from the county courts to either the circuit courts or the 
governor. The  legislature did neither, nor did it raise the 
pay of the commissioners; instead it simply tightened once 
more the requirements of auditing, and the crisis appar- 
ently abated since nothing further was heard on the matter.6 
There were other shortcomings in the county courts' ad- 
ministration of the revenue laws. Occasionally the justices 
of the peace would appoint minors, constables, or them- 
selves as tax commissioners-or even no one at all. This gave 
rise to remedial legislation forbidding the appointment of 
minors, magistrates, or constables and empowering the state 
auditor to appoint commissioners if a court failed to do so. 
It  was found that in the smaller counties it was necessary to 
appoint constables to take in lists, so the prohibition against 
constables was removed two years after its imp~si t ion .~  
The  legislature also assigned to the county courts the re- 
sponsibility of adjusting lists of taxable property and im- 
posing fines on those who failed to cooperate with the tax 
commissioners. Accordingly, the courts not infrequently 
corrected excessive assessments by commissioners. For ex- 
ample, at its August court in 1834 the Fayette County Court 
ordered that J. Logan "be released from the payment of 
taxes on $z,ooo worth of taxable property charged by the 
6 Acts, 1839-1840, chap. 39; Acts, 1841-1842, chap. 428; Frankfort Com- 
monwealth, 7 November, 5 December 1843 (hereafter cited as Common- 
wealth); Acts, 1844-1845, chap. 84. 
7 Acts, 1839-1840, chap. 355; Acts, 1841-1842, chap. 15; Acts, 1843-1844, 
chap. 183, sec. 2; chap. 230. 
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commissioner of tax for the present year more than he 
had." 
The problem of fining those who failed to turn in tax 
lists normally occupied more of the court's time. Over fifty 
such cases were docketed in the Fayette County Court Or- 
der Book during the June term of 1838. In one rather cele- 
brated case the Court of Appeals ruled in the same year that 
the Fayette County Court could not require Madison C. 
Johnson, a prominent lawyer who was being prosecuted for 
failure to turn in a tax list, to disclose on oath the total 
amount of his taxable property. The  court held that such a 
forced disclosure would violate the privilege against self- 
incrimination. But most of the prosecutions resulted in less 
sensational decisions, few were carried to the Court of Ap- 
peals, and most were settled before a fine was i m p ~ s e d . ~  
Naturally the county courts had a more intimate rela- 
tionship with their own county levy, the basic source of the 
funds of county government. The  tax commissioners ob- 
tained from heads of families the names of all tithables, a 
category which encompassed all males and female slaves 
sixteen years of age and older except those expressly ex- 
empted by the county courts "by reason of age, infirmity, 
or other charitable reasons." The  commissioners turned the 
lists over to the sheriff, who was normally collector of the 
county levy. During a certain month, usually October or 
November, although for a time during May, a majority of 
the county magistrates held the claims court to settle claims 
and to set the county levy.1° 
In the form of a poll tax, the county levy was the same for 
everyone, old and young, rich and poor. Detractors crit- 
8 Fayette County Court Order Book, 1833-1836, p. 124 (U.K. microfilm, 
reel M366:5). 
9 Ibid., 1836--1840, pp. 281-83 (U.K. microfilm, reel M366:5); Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 7 Dana 338 (1838). 
loThe basic statute concerning the county levy was enacted in 1797. 
Acts, 1796-17979 P P  151-53. 
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icized it from time to time-most for its inherent unfairness 
and some for its alleged unconstitutionality. The  irascible 
Humphrey Marshall questioned the validity of allowing 
the county courts to levy a poll tax, arguing that the lower 
house of the legislature possessed the exclusive right to 
originate revenue bills and that it could not delegate this 
authority. Although the Court of Appeals never heard this 
question, it did rule some years after Marshall's accusation 
that it was proper for the state to permit towns and cities to 
tax and thereby seemingly scotched doubts about the valid- 
ity of the county levy.ll 
Most critics dwelt on the unfairness of the tax. In his an- 
nual message to the legislature in 1827 Governor Joseph 
Desha labelled it "wrong in principle and oppressive in 
practice." He called it a "flagrant violation of principle" for 
an undemocratic, "self-sustaining" body such as the county 
court to "tax all, the rich and poor, precisely alike" and ad- 
vocated the abolition of the tax and the substitution of an 
ad valorem property assessment in its place. Supporters of 
constitutional reform in the 1840s echoed the governor's 
complaints, stressing particularly the argument against tax- 
ation without representation.12 
In 1821 the legislature did limit the amount that the 
county courts could levy as a poll tax to $1.50 per tithable, 
but it never went so far as to abolish the tax as Desha rec- 
ommended later. Again in January 1834 the General As- 
sembly launched an inquiry into the feasibility of limiting 
the poll tax to 502 per tithable and supplementing the loss 
of revenue with an ad valorem tax on land and slaves; this 
investigation was dropped less than one month later.13 
11 Humphrey Marshall, History of Kentucky, a vols., ed ed. (Frankfort, 
Ky., 1824), 2:218; Talbot v. Dent, g B. Monroe 526 (1849). 
12 H.J., 1827-1828, p. 20; Convention, 6 March 1847. 
l3Acts, 1821, chap. 342, sec. 2; H.J., 1893-1834, pp. 104-5, 249. In 1813 the 
House narrowly defeated a proposal to repeal the poll tax. H.J., 1812-1813, 
PP. '7475. 
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Despite the existence of a maximum poll tax after 182  1, 
the county courts raised substantial amounts of money from 
the levy. Indeed, George W. Kavanaugh, a delegate from 
Anderson County to the Constitutional Convention of 
1849 ,  estimated that the county courts collected "nearly as 
much money from the people as the legislature itself." Nor 
did the limitation on the amount of the tax prevent the 
courts from successfully petitioning the legislature for per- 
mission to exceed the maximum for special projects. These 
legislative authorizations varied in form: some simply in- 
creased the regular levy beyond the maximum amount, 
while others provided for an additional levy, usually of a 
certain amount, although sometimes open-ended. Occa- 
sionally the legislature expanded the levy, as for example 
in 1811  when it permitted the Fayette County Court to 
impose a two-dollar tax on all dogs "above two, kept or 
permitted to be kept upon any farm or plantation." During 
the height of turnpike construction certain county courts 
were authorized to supplement their regular levy by assess- 
ing an ad valorem tax on real property.14 
One of the chronic problems of county taxation was the 
inability of some county courts to marshal a majority of 
their members to hold courts of claims and to assess the 
annual levy. The  state statute books are filled with special 
acts authorizing county courts to levy delinquently or rat- 
ifying delinquent levies. The  legislature from time to time 
investigated this shortcoming and in 1 8 1 6  passed a law au- 
thorizing county courts to fine those magistrates who, with- 
out cause, failed to attend the court of claims.15 Yet the 
numbers of county courts petitioning for extension of the 
time for levying or for ratification of late levies did not 
abate. In one instance the inability of a county court to 
summon a majority of its members caused acute embarrass- 
14 Proceedings, p. 710; Acts, 1810-1811, chap. 278. 
15 Acts, 1815-1816, chap. 385. 
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ment. In 1814 the Ohio County Court determined to lay the 
levy despite the fact that only half its members were pres- 
ent. An aggrieved taxpayer subsequently challenged the 
right of the sheriff to collect the tax and won a favorable 
decision in the circuit court; the county court was forced 
to assemble again and lay a new levy.16 Yet in another case 
the high tribunal refused to invalidate a levy by the Owsley 
County Court simply because the levy exceeded the known 
claims against the county; this decision upheld an earlier 
ruling that the courts had wide discretion in levying and 
appropriating funds.17 
Indeed some thought the courts had too much discretion 
in appropriation. A critic writing to the Frankfort Ken- 
tucky Yeoman in 1845 lamented the secrecy which sur- 
rounded the financial operations of the county courts and 
proposed that they open their books to the public or print 
their records in local newspapers. The present system, he 
argued, produced not a few incidents of fraud. Later a cer- 
tain "W. P. D." endorsed these accusations, alleging that 
the justices of the Jessamine County Court had illegally 
appropriated funds from the county treasury to purchase 
law books for themselves after the legislature failed to pass 
a statute providing state money for the volumes. At the 
Constitutional Convention of 1849 George W. Kavanaugh 
noted that the county levy had not attracted "as much of 
the attention of the people as it should have," and John D. 
Taylor, delegate from Mason County, thanked God the levy 
could not "go beyond $1.50" per tithable.ls 
Most of the monies appropriated by the county courts 
were directed to four areas: roads and bridges, public build- 
16 Gilbert v. Huston, Littell's Selected Cases 223 (1816). 
17 McGuire v. Justices of Owsley County, 7 B. Monroe 340 (1847). 
1s Frankfort Kentucky Yeoman, 1 1  December 1845 (hereafter cited as Yeo- 
man); Convention, 27 March 1847; Proceedings, pp. 701.710. 
F I N A N C I A L  B U S I N E S S  [43 1 
ings, the poor, and special salaries and fees. An examination 
of select budgets of five counties over the fifty-nine-year pe- 
riod of the old county court system reveals that these areas 
invariably consumed from approximately two-thirds to all 
of the annual county budgets.lg Roads and bridges probably 
accounted for the greatest single expense, especially when 
investment in turnpike companies is added to the routine 
amounts delegated to upkeep of local roads. Until the great 
era of turnpike building commencing after the War of 
1812, the courts were the principal agencies of road build- 
ing and repair; thereafter the counties shared these respon- 
sibilities with semiprivate companies especially chartered 
to carve out macadamized roads. 
The authority of the county courts to build and maintain 
roads derived from a systek adopted by Virginians from 
English practice and codified by the Kentucky legislature 
in the form of the Public Road Law of 1797. The philos- 
ophy of road planning on the county level was individual 
initiative; that of road construction, alteration, and repair 
was self-help. In all phases the courts mediated rather than 
planned. The  Public Road Law provided that the initiative 
for the proposal of local roads should come from the res- 
idents of the county rather than from the courts themselves. 
The statute specified that "when any person or persons" de- 
sired to have a road opened or altered to make more conve- 
nient "travelling to their county court house, or to any 
public ware-house, landing, ferry, mill, lead or iron-works, 
or the seat of government," they should apply to the county 
court, which would, in turn, appoint three or more fit 
persons to "view the ground along which such road is 
proposed to be conducted." They reported to the court 
19 The county budgets examined and the years of the budgets were: Fay- 
ette, 1801, 1806, 1811, 1816, 1821, 1838; Bourbon, 1801, 1811, 1821, 1834, 1835; 
Christian, 1819, 1830, 1840; Estill, 1820, 1835, 1846; and Woodford, 1829, 
1834, 1844. See the county court order books for these years. 
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which, if it decided the proposed road would be "conve- 
nient," summoned all "proprietors and tenants of the land" 
through which the proposed road would run to show cause 
why it should not be opened. The  court then heard the 
complaints of the interested parties and issued a ruling on 
whether or not the road would be opened. Landowners op- 
posing the road could demand that the court issue a writ of 
ad quod damnum, which initiated a common law procedure 
whereby a jury of twelve determined anew if the proposed 
road should be opened and, if so, what damages, if any, 
would be inflicted upon the complainant's property. If the 
jury determined that the proposed road was needed or if 
no one opposed the application and the county court found 
that a road was needed, the magistrates ordered the road 
built. If lando~vners affected by the approved road still felt 
aggrieved, they could appeal the county court's ruling to 
the Court of Appeals, which was empowered to try the case 
anew on both the facts and the law.20 
Although it was apparently only infrequently exercised, 
the right of appeal was not an ineffective one. The Court of 
Appeals ruled in Fletcher's Heirs v. Fugate that an order of 
the Nicholas County Court establishing a road should be re- 
versed since there had been no demonstration that public 
convenience would be served thereby. Furthermore, the 
court also determined that a county court could never with- 
hold a writ of ad quod damnum from a person over whose 
land a proposed road was to run and that an order altering 
a road was reversible if all interested parties were not sum- 
moned. Yet it limited somewhat the right of judicial review 
by holding in Taylor v. Brown that a person challenging the 
20 The basic road law was passed in 1797. Acts, 1796-1797, pp. 157--62. In  
1830 the legislature transferred the appellate jurisdiction under the road law 
from the Court of Appeals to the circuit courts, although the decision of the 
latter could, in most cases, be appealed to the former. Acts, 1829-1830, chap. 
355. 
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establishment of a road must have a "direct" interest in the 
cont ro~ersy .~~ 
The  method of building, altering, and maintaining local 
roads was also derived from English and Virginian custom. 
Each county court divided its county into precincts and 
over each appointed a "surveyor" or "overseer" whose duty 
it was to "superintend the road in his precinct." The  num- 
ber of surveyors varied from county to county and usually 
increased as the county court system matured. For example, 
in 1840 there were sixty-seven surveyors for Boone County, 
eighty-six for Washington, eighty-one for Garrard, and 
forty-five for Caldwell. The  court "allotted hands" from 
each precinct to each surveyor. The supply of labor was 
ample since most males, black or white, sixteen years of age 
or older, were bound to work the roads without pay for as 
many days as necessary. Persons owning two or more slaves 
and heads of families with two or more male tithables were 
exempted on the assumption that the slaves or tithables 
would work the roads. Exemptions were also granted to per- 
sons fifty years or older or infirm and persons who provided 
a substitute not living in the precinct. Whenever a road was 
in need of repair, the surveyor and his hands were bound to 
repair it. Whenever a new road was to be built or an estab- 
lished one altered, the county court appointed a new sur- 
veyor and allotted him hands to do the 
The  spirit of self-help manifested itself in other ways. 
Each laborer had to furnish his own tools. The  surveyors, 
who were bound to keep the roads thirty feet wide, in good 
repair, and properly marked, were empowered to impound 
timber, earth, and stone from adjacent landowners and to 
impress carriages, draft horses or oxen, and drivers when 
21 3 J. J. Marshall 631 (1830); Peck v. Whitney, 6 B. Monroe 117 (1845); 
Walker v. Corn, 3 A. K .  Marshall 167 (1820); Taylor v. Brown, 3 Bibb 78 
(1813). 
22 Acts, 1796-1797, secs. 3-6, pp. 158-60. 
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needed. Two housekeepers valued the impounded mate- 
rials and the court reimbursed the owner out of the county 
levy.% 
Not surprisingly, the county road system, especially the 
element of forced free labor, was extremely controversial. 
Critics cited numerous shortcomings and grievances. In his 
annual message to the General Assembly in December 18 10, 
Governor Charles Scott accused the county courts of estab- 
lishing too many roads and then neglecting them. The  rea- 
son for this, he argued, was a division of authority. While 
the county courts were authorized to establish roads and 
appoint surveyors, the circuit courts retained complete au- 
thority to punish surveyors who failed to maintain the 
roads. Others echoed and added to Scott's complaints. "A 
Citizen of Fayette" in 1817 described the road system as 
feudalistic, complained about being forced to work along- 
side slaves, and implied that compulsory labor was uncon- 
stitutional. He contended that the roads in Fayette County 
were impassable for six months of every year and advocated 
a complete reform of the system to relieve the county courts 
of the responsibility of establishing and maintaining roads 
since they had "too much" to do anyway. The  editor of the 
Lexington Kentucky Reporter, writing in December 1829, 
complained of "the wretched condition of our roads 
throughout the winter and spring seasons of the year" de- 
spite the "large amount in both money and labor" which 
was annually expended upon them. He accused the system 
of discriminating against nonslaveholders and those living 
near well-traveled roads, who were often required to spend 
as many as forty days a year working for the precinct 
23 Ibid., secs. 4, 6. 
24H.J., 18ro-18rr, pp. 11-12; Lexington Kentucky Gazette, 13 December 
1817 (hereafter cited as Gazette); Lexington Kentucky Reporter, g December 
1829 (hereafter cited as Reporter). 
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These rumblings of discontent were eventually trans- 
lated into efforts to reform. In 1830 the legislature enacted 
both a general law applicable to thirty counties and a spe- 
cific law pertaining to Fayette County. The former statute 
was optional, granting to each county court the right to 
accept or reject it. If adopted, it provided for the annual 
election of three road commissioners who would form a 
corporate body which would supplant the county court as 
the chief instrument of road establishment and mainte- 
nance. The  commissioners would be paid from $go to $100 
per year depending on the size of the county. Their salaries, 
plus funds for equipment and material, would be taken 
from an ad valorem tax on real property. Each white male 
adult over the age of sixteen would be liable to an annual 
poll tax not in excess of $ I  which had to be paid in labor at 
a rate of rjo$ per day. Thus the system as reformed elim- 
inated the impressment of supplies and material and cur- 
tailed sharply the period of forced labor.25 
Obviously a compromise between those who desired to 
retain the old system and those who favored more basic re- 
form, the general road law failed to alter profoundly and 
comprehensively the manner of establishing and maintain- 
ing roads because only a handful of county courts elected to 
adopt its provisions. Two counties, Bath and Woodford, 
adopted the law but soon after petitioned the legislature to 
revoke the new system and revive the old. Greenup County 
adopted the system, had the legislature revoke it in 1838, 
and then revived it again in 1845. Bracken, Mason, and 
Campbell were the only counties to adhere to the commis- 
sioner plan throughout the remaining twenty-one years of 
the old county court system.26 
I t  was appropriate that the senator from Fayette County, 
25 Acts, 1829-1830, chap. 332. 
26 Acts, 18jo-18j1, chap. 393; Acts, 1831-1832, chap. 605; Acts, 1837-18j8, 
chap. 638; Acts, 1844-1845, chap. 55. 
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Robert Wickliffe, Sr., successfully sponsored an act espe- 
cially for his county since for years his constituents had 
been particularly agitated about the state of their roads. 
The Fayette statute was not optional; it was to go into effect 
as soon as the eligible voters elected three road commission- 
ers at the annual election in August. The  commissioners 
would form a corporate body, the Board of Public Works, 
to establish and maintain the county roads. They would 
serve for one-year terms and be paid $loo annually. An ad 
valorem tax on real property and a poll tax of 50# on all 
tithables would finance the expenses of the Board. Al- 
though taxpayers could work off their tax if they chose, the 
Fayette plan envisioned the hiring of most of the road la- 
bor. The only role reserved for the county court was the 
filling of vacancies should two or more of the commission- 
ers resign from the Board.27 
Senator Wickliffe wrote enthusiastically of the new sys- 
tem's virtues soon after its passage in a letter "to the free- 
men of the county." He submitted that the savings which 
would accrue from the elimination of forced labor and the 
impressment of material would more than offset the added 
tax burden. He also predicted that all the roads of the 
county would be macadamized, thereby stimulating the 
economy. Thus he respectfully solicited the support of his 
"countrymen" and reaffirmed his own, even though the new 
law would substantially increase his taxes.28 
Wickliffe's entreaties were in vain, for although the Fay- 
ette citizenry harbored grievances against the old road sys- 
tem, it was soon apparent that they were unwilling to pay 
for a new one. The  August elections, which attracted over 
1,200 voters to the polls, produced only a handful of ballots 
for road commissioner. Wickliffe, upset and surprised by 
27 Acts, 1829-1830, chap. 272. 
28 Reporter, 17 February 1830. 
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the widespread opposition from a county which formerly 
had clearly voiced its dissatisfaction with the old road sys- 
tem, called for a meeting of his constituents for further 
"instructions." 29 
He must have gained new hope from that meeting, which 
was attended by the county's leading citizens-including 
Henry Clay, who normally remained aloof from county af- 
fairs-and which resulted in a statement of approbation for 
the new system. Some modifications to the plan were sug- 
gested, but they were slight: per diem rather than per an- 
num pay for the commissioners and a temporary suspension 
of the operation of the law. Strangely enough, these pro- 
posed modifications were ignored, and when the legislature 
finally changed the law in January 1833 it simply raised the 
salaries of the road commissioners from $loo to 150 an- 
nually and directed that the law, which had yet to go into 
effect, be further suspended until August 1 8 3 4 . ~ ~  
Meanwhile resistance to the new law accelerated, al- 
though isolated voices of support were heard. "Diogenes" 
wrote to the Kentucky Reporter in March 1832 that the 
roads in the county continued to be in poor condition and 
thus seriously disrupted the economy of the area. He de- 
picted the old road system as "Gothic," accused the precinct 
surveyors of being too powerful, and lamented the delay in 
implementing the new law. Diogenes was a voice crying in 
the wilderness, for the elections of August 1834 again pro- 
duced but a handful of votes for road commissioners. Soon 
afterward the justices of the county court in effect nullified 
the new road law by declaring that in their opinion the 
legislature had no constitutional authority to tamper with 
the road laws and that the court would "continue to exer- 
cise jurisdiction over the public highways of [the] county" 
29 Ibid., I I August, 8 September 1830. 
30 Ibid., 13 October 1830; Acts, 1832-1833, chap. 181. 
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until the new law was declared valid by the "Highest Judi- 
cial Tribunal1 of the State." 31 
In September the three men who had received the high- 
est number of votes for the office of road commissioner came 
into county court and refused to act in their new capacities, 
touching off a debate among the members of the tribunal 
and interested spectators on the validity of the new road 
law. Wickliffe led the fight for the law but obviously made 
little impression on the court, which voted unanimously to 
continue running the roads and did not suggest submitting 
the issue to a higher judicial body. The General Assembly, 
faced with a direct challenge to its authority by both the cit- 
izens and the court of Fayette County, capitulated at its 
next session and in short order approved a bill abolishing 
the new road system, which had never been implemented, 
and reviving the old. Thus ended the abortive effort to re- 
form the road laws of one of the state's most prosperous and 
influential counties.32 
The roads of Kentucky were not established exclusively 
by means of private initiative and application to the county 
courts. The  General Assembly, in an early example of gov- 
ernmental planning, was also instrumental in authorizing 
road construction. Yet while the legislature sometimes ap- 
proved proposed roads and occasionally funded parts of 
them, it normally relied upon the county courts to build 
and maintain them. 
Normally state-authorized roads were intercounty, some- 
times extending to the boundaries of the Commonwealth 
as part of an interstate route. The  legislature usually ap- 
pointed commissioners to view an authorized road and then 
delegated to the county courts the responsibility for fund- 
31 Reporter, 7 March 1832; Fayette County Court Order Book, 1833-1836, 
pp. 130-31 (U.K. microfilm, reel M366:5). 
32Fayette County Court Order Book, 1833-1836, p p  134-35, 141 (U.K. 
microfilm, reel M366:5); Gazette, 13 September 1834. 
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ing, building, and maintaining it. There were many vari- 
ations in this pattern. Sometimes the General Assembly 
appointed county surveyors as commissioners to view a 
proposed route for a road; at other times it delegated to the 
county courts the responsibility of appointing these com- 
missioners. In some plans the commissioners were to report 
to the legislature and in others to the county courts. Some 
statutes provided that the legislature should determine the 
expediency of implementing the commissioners' recom- 
mendations; others delegated this authority to the county 
courts; and still others made no provision, implying that 
the commissioners themselves should determine the expe- 
diency of building a road or that it had already been deter- 
mined by the legislators. Norma.lly once a route had been 
viewed, the county court was authorized to build the road, 
although occasionally state-appointed commissioners were 
assigned this task.33 
Almost always the legislature provided that the county 
courts were to rely on the existing system of forced free 
labor or employ workers. Usually when the legislature spec- 
ified that the work force was to be paid, it gave the courts 
the responsibility of funding the cost either out of the 
county levy or by means of private subscription, although 
on rare occasions the state paid for all or part of the con- 
struction. Even more rarely did the state assume the re- 
sponsibility of maintaining roads; usually when it did, 
turnpikes were established and funds for maintenance were 
derived from tolls. Occasionally the legislature allotted 
funds to repair a county road, usually by means of land 
grants, and delegated complete authority over the project 
to commissioners. This usually occurred when the road ran 
through an economically distressed area.34 
33 See, for example, Acts, 1830-1831, chap. 464; Acts, 1828-1829, chap. 99, 
sec. 2; chap. 130, sec. 4; Acts, 1826-1827, chap. 77, sec. 3. 
34 See, for example, Acts, 1821, chap. 330. 
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The power of the county courts in road building receded 
after 18 15 when state-chartered corporations began plan- 
ning and constructing turnpikes. Normally the county 
courts had little, if anything, to do with the administration 
of turnpike companies, which were usually financed by 
both public and private funds and operated by private busi- 
nessmen or local boards of internal improvements. Occa- 
sionally legislatively drawn company charters empowered 
certain county courts to condemn land for companies or to 
appoint and remove commissioners to sell stock subscrip- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  Even rarer was a provision such as the one in an act 
incorporating the Fayette and Madison Turnpike Com- 
pany, which authorized the Fayette County Court to inspect 
the company's construction within the county.36 Normally 
judicial supervision of private turnpike companies came 
from individual county magistrates or the circuit courts. 
In the case of state roads converted into turnpikes by the 
legislature the role of county courts was more pronounced. 
For example, when the General Assembly made the Sandy 
Road a toll road in 1831, it authorized the relevant county 
courts to appoint and remove commissioners to manage and 
repair the turnpike in conjunction with the tribunals. The  
relationship of the county courts to the Wilderness Road, 
running from the Cumberland Gap to central Kentucky, 
evidences both the greater extent of participation of the 
tribunals in state-controlled turnpikes and the pragmatic, 
though often inconsistent, nature of state road policy. By 
virtue of a statute passed in 1805, the courts of those counties 
through which the road ran were given practically full con- 
trol, including the duty to repair the road and the rights to 
appoint supervisory commissioners and to audit the ac- 
counts of the gatekeepers. In 1808 the legislature eliminated 
35 Acts, 1810--1811, chap. 247; Acts, 1834-1835, chap. 865, sec. 3. 
36 Acts, 1817-1818, chap. 284, sec. 13. 
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these powers and transferred the authority of the county 
courts to a board of directors to be appointed by the gover- 
nor. In 1825 the legislature once again vested full power in 
the county courts to supervise and repair the turnpike, while 
three years later it transferred this authority to a super- 
intendent to be appointed by the governor. In 1836 the 
legislature allowed certain county courts the privilege of 
appointing gatekeepers but revoked this authority two 
years later, giving it to state-appointed commissioners. Fi- 
nally, in 1844 the General Assembly restored full power 
over the road to the county courts. I t  is apparent that 
throughout its dealings with the Wilderness Road the 
principal concern of the legislature was the effectiveness 
of management and maintenance rather than ideology or 
constitutional  principle^.^^ 
Road surveyors and their allotted hands were bound to 
build and repair bridges and causeways, but it appears that 
most of them were unable to do so and that county courts 
contracted for much of this type of construction and main- 
t e n a n ~ e . ~ ~  Most frequently courts would appoint a special 
commissioner to "let and superintend" the building or re- 
pair of a bridge and would appropriate a specific sum of 
money to him for that purpose.3g During the era of turn- 
pike building some county courts contracted with turnpike 
companies or boards of internal improvements for the con- 
struction of bridges.40 
37 Acts, 1830-1831, chap. 500; Littell, Statute Law, 3:282-87,510-12; Acts, 
1824-1825, chap. 190; Acts, 1327-1828, chap. 161; Acts, 1833-1836, chap. 294; 
Acts, 18j7-1838, chap. 664; Acts, 1843-1844, chap. 328. 
38 Acts, 1796-1797, sec. 7, p. 160. 
39 In 1824 the Fayette County Court allocated $116 to a special commis- 
sioner to "let and supervise the rebuilding of the bridge across South Elk- 
horn." Fayette County Court Order Book, 1824-1827, p. 46 (U.K. microfilm, 
reel M366:3). 
40 In  1836 the Scott County Court contracted with the Scott County Board 
of Internal Improvements to build a bridge over the North Elkhorn River; 
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Although following the War of 1812  the county courts 
relinquished to turnpike companies much of their dom- 
ination over highway construction and had very little to do 
with the management of these enterprises, the local tribu- 
nals did contribute somewhat to their success. Not infre- 
quently county courts purchased stock from newly formed 
companies; thus, while the courts seldom possessed powers 
of judicial or governmental control over the new agents of 
internal improvement, they maintained some leverage as 
investors. 
The  General Assembly often expressly encouraged coun- 
ty courts to invest in turnpike companies. It  did this by in- 
corporating local boards of internal improvements which 
were empowered to build turnpikes and authorizing the 
courts of those counties through which the roads would run 
to purchase stock in the corporations. It  usually allowed 
the county courts to finance their stock purchases with an 
ad valorem tax on real property if the voters approved such 
a levy by petition. Some courts did not receive petitions and 
perhaps because of this chose not to purchase stock. Others 
purchased stock without receiving petitions, financing the 
investment either from the county levy or by assessing and 
collecting an ad valorem tax. Only a few levied an ad va- 
lorem tax and purchased stock after being duly petitioned. 
The legislature did not always authorize county courts to 
purchase stock. This did not deter certain courts from in- 
vesting, although there was some question about their con- 
stitutional right to do so. Some courts debated long and 
hard before deciding to purchase stock in turnpike com- 
panies and their decisions to do so sometimes generated 
considerable opposition. The  Fayette County Court de- 
bated for over a year and frequently voted to postpone final 
Scott County Court Order Book, 1831-1839, pp. 213, 382 (U.K. microfilm, 
reel M278: 1842-43). 
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consideration of the question before deciding in February 
183 1 to subscribe to $15,000 worth of stock in the famous 
Maysville and Lexington Turnpike C ~ m p a n y . ~ ~  
The  justices of Fayette were equally undecided over an 
effort between 1834 and 1836 by some of their members and 
other citizens of the county to have the court subscribe to 
substantial amounts of stock in five different turnpike com- 
panies. The  justices may have been hesitant to pled, we more 
of the county's funds to internal improvements since the 
Maysville Road had as yet failed to declare a dividend. In 
1834 at the July and August courts the Fayette magistrates 
defeated by one vote motions to appropriate money to buy 
the turnpike stocks. Finally in June 1836 the justices 
agreed, with only one member dissenting, to purchase 
$15,500 worth of stock. While one local Whig newspaper, 
the Lexington Intelligencer, praised the court for its ac- 
tions, William Boon, the senior magistrate of the court, who 
had cast the only negative vote, delivered a stinging crit- 
icism of the venture in the pages of the Democratic paper, 
the Lexington Kentucky Gazelte. Boon decried the action 
of his fellow justices, arguing that it had been taken with- 
out once consulting the voters of the county and was based 
upon a usurpation of the Constitution. He contended that 
such activity on the part of the court violated the separation 
of powers clause and the legislature's exclusive right of tax- 
ation. Furthermore, he submitted, the expenditures ille- 
gally plunged the county into debt at a time when economy 
was needed. Boon's attack apparently created some uncer- 
tainty in the minds of his fellow justices, for they petitioned 
the legislature early at its next session to validate by statute 
41 Reporter, 16 February 1831; Fayette County Court Order Book, 1827- 
1830, p. 304 (U.K. microfilm, reel M366:4). The courts of Nicholas and Bour- 
bon counties also purchased stock in this venture but exhibited none of the 
indecision which clouded the Fayette deliberations. H.J., 1832-1833, pp. 52- 
53. 
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their decision to invest. The  legislature complied in short 
order.42 
Turnpike companies were not the only agencies of in- 
ternal improvement aided by county courts. As railroads 
began to be proposed and built in Kentucky, county courts 
soon began purchasing stock in companies promoting this 
new form of transportation. Although many courts partici- 
pated in railroading ventures without undue controversy 
or reverses, some encountered intense opposition and ulti- 
mate losses. The Fayette County Court's relationship with 
the abortive Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston Rail- 
road during the years 1836 to 1840 illustrates some of the 
dangers of government assistance to private enterprise in 
this period. 
Backers of the Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston 
Railroad predicted that the construction of their line, 
which would connect the Ohio Valley with the Carolina 
coast, would produce new markets and wealth for both Ken- 
tucky and the South. Business and political leaders of Lex- 
ington, anxious to revitalize the city's economic position, 
which had been declining since the advent of the steam- 
boat, eagerly championed the railroad and urged the gov- 
ernments of the city and county to purchase a sizeable 
amount of the company's stock on the condition that the 
line would terminate in Kentucky at the capital of the blue- 
grass region rather than at Louisville. As inducement the 
Fayette representatives to the General Assembly secured an 
amendment to the company's charter providing that Lex- 
ington would be the railroad's Kentucky terminus.43 Fur- 
thermore, the directors of the railroad had promised that 
42Fayette County Court Order Book, 1833-1836, pp. 113, 122; Fayette 
County Court Order Book, 1836-1840, p. 28 (U.K. microfilm, reel M366:5); 
Lexington Zntelligencer, 14 June 1836 (hereafter cited as Zntelligencer); Ga- 
zette, 25 July 1836; Acts, 1836-1837, chap. 7. 
43 Acts, 1836-1837, chap. 387, sec. 2. 
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construction would begin at Lexington. Swayed by these 
diligent promotions, the Fayette County Court voted in 
December 1836 to subscribe to $ioo,ooo worth of railroad 
stock on condition of legislative approval and authorization 
to impose an ad valorem tax on real property, which was 
forthcoming in J a n ~ a r y . ~ ~  
The  enormity of the stock subscription, the fact that the 
venture was highly speculative and undersubscribed, the 
failure of either the court or the legislature to require an 
endorsement from the voters, and the unprecedented inau- 
guration of a county tax on real property perhaps made 
it inevitable that the court's action would arouse fierce 
opposition within the county.45 By late March 1837 the 
Kentucky Gazette, edited by Daniel Bradford, a county 
magistrate who had eagerly supported the court's promise 
to purchase the stock, could report that "much discontent 
[was] being manifested from different parts of Fayette, on 
account of the subscriptions by the county court, for stock 
in the rail road."46 Bradford speculated that the court 
would soon order a special election to ascertain the will of 
the people on the issue. 
Within three weeks organized opposition to the stock 
subscription had manifested itself at a meeting in Chiles- 
burgh, headquarters of one of the county's four election 
precincts. Participants in the meeting resolved that the 
stock subscription was "an outrage and usurpation of pow- 
er, unauthorized by the Constitution." They called upon 
two prominent citizens of the area, one of whom was 
Jacob Hughes, a large landholder, to become candidates for 
the legislature, an action which suggests that they wanted 
the two men to seek the repeal of the statute validating the 
court's subscription. They also urged citizens of the Athens 
44 Ibid., chap. 121. 
45 Gazette, 15 December 1836; Intelligencer, 8 August 1837. 
46 Gazette, 30 March 1837. 
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and Elkhorn precincts to meet and make known their views 
on the court's "unconstitutional appropriation." 47 
Meanwhile supporters of subscription rallied to the cause 
of the county court. In a letter to the Gazette "a Subscriber" 
accused certain "politicians" from the Chilesburgh precinct 
of attempting "to thwart the measure and to disgrace their 
county court" and argued that even if the subscription had 
been entered into illegally, it should be upheld because of 
the honor of the county and the reliance "interested par- 
ties" placed upon it. Nine days after the Chilesburgh meet- 
ing the citizens of the Athens precinct met and issued a 
series of resolutions endorsing the actions of the county 
magistrates. The  meeting "deemed it of vital importance 
to the prosperity of this State, that the great work, which is 
designed to connect the valley of the west with the Atlantic 
Ocean, . . . should be immediately commenced" and should 
receive not only the financial support of Fayette County 
but also of all counties through which the proposed rail- 
road was to run as well as the state itself.48 
Buoyed by these demonstrations of support, the county 
court justices at first rejected a proposed public vote on the 
issue. Nonetheless they were sufficiently uncertain about 
the soundness of their proposed investment to order a delay 
in levying the newly authorized tax on real property until 
it was determined that the railroad company had accepted 
the amendments to its charter passed by the recent legisla- 
ture and that all monies appropriated by the court would 
be expended within the county. At its June term the court, 
without apparent knowledge of the company's response to 
its inquiries, reversed itself and authorized both the collec- 
tion of the tax to make the first payment on the subscription 
and a public referendum in August "to take the sense of the 
people of the county, whether they are for or against forfeit- 
47 Ibid., 27 April 1837. 
48 Ibid., 4 May 1837. 
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ing the stock, after making the first payment." This was a 
shrewd political maneuver, for obviously the justices were 
attempting to force even the most frugal citizen to vote for 
the subscription by converting the question from one of 
honoring a contract to one of forfeiture of funds already 
expended. Not only the "honor" of the county was at stake, 
but also $5,000.~~ 
Between June and the August election these questions 
were hotly debated by the people of Fayette County. In an 
eloquent letter to the Gazette a farmer from Chilesburgh, 
signing himself "a Friend to the Constitution," defended 
his precinct's remonstrance, arguing that he and his neigh- 
bors were simply trying to stem the excesses of local govern- 
ment. "Lycurgus" replied that the economic welfare of the 
county was indeed at stake and called for the voters not only 
to endorse the subscription but also to reject Jacob Hughes, 
the legislative candidate of the opposition. Hughes, the 
only candidate who was identified with the antisubscrip- 
tion forces, equivocated when called upon to commit him- 
self by replying that while he generally favored the concept 
of the Charleston Railroad, he likewise warmly endorsed 
the right of the people to instruct their county court on such 
mattex50 
Shortly before the elections proponents of the railroad 
held a series of meetings throughout the county in an effort 
to rally their supporters. Their endeavors were not in vain, 
for the voters endorsed the subscription by a margin of 
more than two to one. Oddly enough, the Athens precinct 
voted nearly two to one against the county court, while 
Chilesburgh not surprisingly opposed the measure 87 votes 
to 6 1. The Lexington city precinct ultimately carried the 
question, voting 1,095 to 435 in favor of subscription. The  
49 Fayette County Court Order Book, 18361840, pp. go, 161 (U.K. micro- 
film, reel M366:5). 
50 Gazette, or June, 27 July 1837: Intelligencer, 25 July, 1 August 1837. 
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voters also elected the four prosubscription candidates to 
the legislature and rejected Jacob Hughes, the noncom- 
mital standard bearer of the o p p ~ s i t i o n . ~ ~  
This victory at the polls, however, did not make the Fay- 
ette County Court's investment any more secure. Robert 
Wickliffe, Sr., representing the court at the railroad's execu- 
tive meeting in November at Charleston, sounded a warn- 
ing when he wrote that federal support of the venture 
would not be forthcoming. In May 1838 the situation ap- 
peared so bleak that some advocated forfeiture. The  court 
voted to postpone the next levy until the railroad again 
produced satisfactory evidence that it intended to spend all 
Fayette funds within the county. In  August representatives 
from the railroad came before the court and made the 
requisite pledge. The  following month, apparently satisfied 
that the railroad was still viable, the justices voted to impose 
the tax and pay the second installment. Shortly thereafter 
Daniel Bradford exuded confidence in the project and 
called for the opposition to cease their bickering and "sub- 
mit like republicans to the wish of the county." 52 
Unfortunately Bradford's optimism proved ill-founded. 
In November 1838 the leaders of the city and county called 
a public meeting on the subject of the railroad. Although 
the proceedings were never publicized, it is apparent that a 
crisis was at hand. At the May term of 1839 the assembled 
magistrates once again heard a report by representatives of 
the railroad, but this time they rejected the company's 
pledge of good faith. The court informed the railroad that 
it would meet the next installment only when it was dem- 
onstrated conclusively that construction would soon com- 
mence within the county. There is no evidence that the 
51 Zntelligencer, 28 July, 1 1  August 1837. 
52 Gazette, 23 November 1837, l o  May, 13 September 1838; Fayette County 
Court Order Book, 1836-1840, pp. 268-69, 311-12 (U.K. microfilm, reel 
M366:5). 
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railroad ever reported to the court again. By September the 
situation was so hopeless that the court ordered over $1,000 
in a "surplus railroad fund" to be transferred to a fund for 
a new clerk's office. During the next three years the Fayette 
court made repeated but unavailing attempts to regain all 
or part of the $io,ooo it had invested in the railroad. Poor 
planning, formidable geographical obstacles, and lack of 
governmental and private financial support had rendered 
the Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston Railroad insol- 
vent and forever lifeless.53 
The  county courts performed vital functions for the 
Commonwealth in the levying and collection of taxes and 
the building and maintenance of roads. They also made 
a substantial financial contribution to the state's program 
of internal improvements. Yet their operation in these 
sensitive economic areas aroused considerable official and 
popular opposition, which contributed to the growing in- 
security of the courts in the political system of the state. 
The response of their members to the state's first two-party 
system was to have the same effect. 
53 Gazette, z z  November 1838; Fayette County Court Order Book, 1836- 
1840, pp. 389.415; Fayette County Court Order Book, 1840-1846, pp. 20, 108- 
9, 189 (U.K. microfilm, reels M366:5-6). 
Chapter 4 
T H E  POLITICS 
OF T H E  COUNTY COURTS 
I T IS NOT SURPRISING that spirited battles were fought to secure control of the county courts, whose power re- sided not only in their combination of executive, ju- 
dicial, and legislative functions but also in their ability to 
fill their own vacancies and in their domination of almost 
all local patronage. Indeed a major part of county political 
warfare was waged to secure appointments to the courts. I t  
will be recalled that whenever a vacancy occurred on a 
county court, the Constitution of 1799 provided that a ma- 
jority of the justices of the peace should recommend two 
persons to the governor and that he should select one of 
them as the replacement. Many appointments under this 
system were strictly routine matters taking place without 
controversy: normally governors selected the person rec- 
ommended first since he was usually the first choice of the 
tribunal. However, the governor was not constitutionally 
bound to commission the court's first choice, and this dis- 
cretionary factor gave dissident groups opportunities to 
challenge the action of county courts by promoting the 
merits of second choices. Early in the history of the old 
county court system extraconstitutional devices began to 
influence appointments to the courts. Petitions and letters 
were the two most frequently used means to put pressure on 
both courts and governors. Petitions to the courts normally 
P O L I T I C S  L63 1 
urged the recommendation of specific persons to fill vacan- 
cies. Petitions and letters to the governor not infrequently 
cited unusual circumstances which would allow the com- 
missioning of the candidate recommended second. 
The  germination of Kentucky's first two-party system in 
1827 increased the use of old methods and produced new 
and more sophisticated ways to influence decisions affecting 
the patronage of the county courts. Petitions and letters 
continued to be utilized and grew in quantity and quality. 
For example, one petition from Bracken County sent to 
Governor John Breathitt in 1833 included the party affili- 
ation of each of the signatories to establish its bipartisan 
flavor.' Letters grew longer and more detailed, and in some 
cases correspondents wrote more than once if the contest 
was especially crucial or heated. Letter writers wrote not 
only for themselves but also for relatives, friends, and in 
many cases allegedly for the "most respected" citizens of 
their communities. In some instances important men in 
Frankfort were used as references. Public meetings and 
party pollings were added to these traditional instruments 
of political pressure. Where competition for office was espe- 
cially keen, rival parties sometimes held meetings or elec- 
tions or both to furnish evidence of support for their 
respective candidates and then sent the results to both the 
county courts and the governor. Each camp inevitably 
branded as unrepresentative the other's meetings and poll- 
ings, yet these devices seem to have had some effect on the 
outcome of the most bitter patronage fights. The  courts 
themselves, or rather factions of them, and certain gov- 
ernors also devised novel methods to meet the new realities 
of two-party politics. Parties or factions occasionally used 
rump sessions of courts to seize power; since governors were 
generally unwilling to challenge apparently valid orders 
1 Petition to Governor John Breathitt (ca. 1833), Breathitt Papers (G.P., 
reel 37). 
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from county courts these tactics were often successful. Fur- 
thermore, courts and governors on occasion openly solicited 
public applications for court vacancies or expressions of 
public sentiment regarding persons recommended. 
Before 1827 most politicians of Kentucky were Jeffer- 
sonians or Democratic-Republicans. In 1820 two loosely 
knit factions emerged around the relief issue, a "Relief" or 
"New Court" party and an "Anti-Relief" or "Old Court" 
party, but they were too unorganized to be regarded as po- 
litical ~ a r t i e s . ~  Most of the battles over patronage which 
occurred before a well-defined two-party system emerged 
were conducted on an ad hoc basis and were essentially per- 
sonality contests. Candidates before the county courts and 
nominees of the courts were supported or opposed on the 
basis of their reputations, competence, or place of residence 
rather than their commitment to party or program. Yet 
there is some indication that in a few early instances factions 
or "party spirit" entered into patronage disputes in some 
counties. "Party prejudice" was so intense in Bracken 
County at the beginning of the nineteenth century that the 
two senior justices of the peace on the court refused to serve 
as sheriff, and a third person who had "not taken an active 
part in [the] county scuffle" was appointed. In 1815 oppo- 
sition was unsuccessfully raised to the first choice of the 
Warren County Court for justice of the peace on the 
grounds that the candidate possessed "federal or Tory prin- 
ciples" and had threatened to move to Canada rather than 
fight in the War of 1812. A correspondent of Governor 
John Adair writing in May 1820 revealed that "great ef- 
forts [were] made by a factious party in Todd county" to 
place its candidate first in nomination for justice of the 
peace and that for several weeks before the court met there 
2 Richard P. McCormick, T h e  Second American Party System: Party For- 
mation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hil l ,  N.C., 1966), pp. 212-16. 
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was much "planning and plotting." This activity was in 
vain, h ~ w e v e r . ~  
The presidential campaign of 1828 saw the commence- 
ment of the first viable two-party system in the state. In 
late 1827 and early 1828 supporters of John Quincy Adams 
and Andrew Jackson each held county and state meetings 
designed to drum up support for their candidates. The  
pro-Adams group, which was also partial to Henry Clay, 
referred to itself by a number of names, including "the 
People's Ticket," and the Jacksonians likewise claimed 
various appellations, including "Republican." In 1834 the 
anti-Jacksonian party became known as the Whig Party, 
whereas the Tacksonians were most commonly referred to 
as Democrats.* 
The  introduction of well-organized political parties 
changed the nature of patronage struggles in the counties. 
The  stakes of power began to increase; the problem of who 
would fill a vacancy on a county court came to be not only 
a matter of local personalities but also a question of which 
party would control the court. In many counties newly born 
political parties immediately seized control of county courts 
and assiduously maintained and solidified their domina- 
tion. Which party controlled a county court was often 
fortuitious, and not infrequently that control did not cor- 
respond to the wishes of the body politic. Indeed the courts' 
power of self-perpetuation immunized them in many ways 
from democratic pressures. In some counties parties which 
seldom won at the polls were firmly entrenched in the 
county courts. Thus even though they could not elect rep- 
3 Petition to Governor James Garrard (ca. 1802), Garrard Papers, jacket 28 
(G.P., reel 7); Obadiah Hendricks to Governor Isaac Shelby, 14 July 1815, 
Shelby Papers, jacket 128 (G.P., reel 16); (Unknown) to Governor John Adair, 
1 1  May 1820, Adair Papers, jacket 216 (G.P., reel 24). 
4 Leonard P. Curry, "Election Year: Kentucky, 1828," Register, Kentucky 
State Historical Society 55 (July 1957): 196212. 
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resentatives either to the state legislature or to Congress, 
they could control the local government and much of the 
local patronage. 
Fayette was a county wherein a political party largely 
unsuccessful at the ballot box, the Jacksonian Democrats, 
dominated the county court. This control originated large- 
ly by chance. In 1827 the Jacksonians happened to have a 
narrow majority on the court. Not wishing to risk a shift 
in the balance of power, during the next two decades they 
generally proscribed members of the opposition party. By 
1831 the Democrats had attained a solid majority and had 
caused a pro-Clay newspaper of the county, the Kentucky 
Reporter, to portray the county magistrates as an "irrespon- 
sible body of aristocrats," an epithet commonly thought to 
have been reserved only for anti-Jacksonians but in reality 
freely employed by members of both antebellum political 
parties. Although the Reporter threatened "a day of retri- 
bution" and predicted an outburst of "public indignation," 
the unperturbed Jacksonians continued to bolster their ma- 
jority until by 1845 only three Whigs were on the Fayette 
court of twenty-two justices of the peace.5 
The situation in Fayette County was hardly unusual. Of 
twenty sample courts, five were controlled by members of a 
party largely unsuccessful at the polls.6 In one county, Har- 
rison, the Whigs ruled the local tribunal, while Democrats 
normally won the elective offices. In four others, Fayette, 
Montgomery, Woodford, and Franklin, the Democrats 
dominated the county court while the Whigs customarily 
prevailed at the ballot box. The Franklin County Court 
was not only controlled by a Democratic party generally 
unsuccessful at the polls but also gave evidence of nepotism. 
5 Reporter, 27 July 1831. 
6The twenty counties studied were Bourbon, Clark, Estill, Fayette, 
Franklin, Garrard, Grant, Harrison, Henry, Jefferson, Jessamine, Madison, 
Mason, Montgomery, Nicholas, Pendleton, Scott, Shelby, Wayne, and Wood- 
ford. 
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The  McKee family and its in-laws at one time furnished 
four of the county court's thirteen justices of the peace and 
four of its nine constables, as well as the county surveyor. 
This political inbreeding finally provoked a public out- 
burst in 1843 in the form of petitions asserting that the 
McKee family had such a "preponderating influence in the 
county court that they nominate for magistrates and ap- 
point as constables their own relatives wholly disregarding 
the public interest or public wish." Nepotism was not an 
isolated characteristic of Franklin County. In a single year 
nine appointees to justice of the peace positions listed in 
Governor Joseph Desha's journal bore the same last names 
as their predecessors and James P. Hamilton, delegate from 
Larue County, declared at the Constitutional Convention 
of 1849 that "with very few exceptions, every magistrate had 
a son or a son-in-law riding under him." 
Unrepresentative party domination and nepotism were 
not the only cankers weakening the county court structure 
in Kentucky. Party bossism was also widespread. In Brack- 
en County, petitioners residing in the town of Augusta com- 
plained to the governor in the fall of 1833 that their pref- 
erence for justice of the peace was ignored by the county 
court because of the machinations of the county attorney, 
whom they characterized as having "almost unlimited in- 
fluence . . . with the majority of said Court." The  petition- 
ers went on to accuse the county attorney, the leader of the 
county's Clay party, "of putting in what men he chooses" 
and branded his choice for office as a man whose principles 
smacked of "Federalism." Apparently these charges of "aris- 
tocratic influence" sat well with Governor John Breathitt, 
a Jacksonian, for he commissioned the petitioners' first 
choice and the court's second, one Samuel Keene, a fellow 
7 Commonwealth, 8 August 1843; Petition to Governor Robert Letcher 
(ca. February 1843), Letcher Papers, jacket 482 (G.P., reel 73); Journal of 
Governor Joseph Desha, 1824-1828, pp. 295, 299-300, 303, 324, 339, 417, 450- 
51 (G.P., reel 27); Proceedings, p. 705; Convention, 6 March 1847. 
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Jacksonian. In 1835 Whigs accused Worden Pope, leader 
of the Democratic party in Louisville, of dominating the 
Jefferson County Court, an allegation which was hotly de- 
nied by the Demo~rats.~ 
While partisan control in most counties, such as Fayette, 
Franklin, and Clay, accompanied the beginning of the two- 
party system, some courts did not evidence one-party dom- 
ination until as late as the 1840s. In Campbell County, 
Democrats and Whigs on the court were evenly divided 
until November 1840. At that time the Democrats gained 
a majority by declaring a Whig seat vacant because of the 
prolonged absence of its occupant from the county and fill- 
ing it with a fellow Jacksonian. Although prominent Whigs 
protested, the Democratic coup in Campbell County was 
sanctioned by the governor, who, despite his allegiance to 
the Whig cause, was reluctant to tamper with the official 
proceedings of the court.g Six years later Breathitt County 
Democrats made an even more spectacular seizure of power. 
At the outset of their maneuverings in July 1846 Democrats 
were a minority of six, Whigs held seven seats, and there 
were two vacancies. All six Democrats assembled, with only 
one Whig in attendance, and proceeded to fill the two va- 
cancies with Jacksonians, notwithstanding the objections 
of the Whig. The recommendations were adhered to by 
the governor, although he himself was a Whig and despite 
the fact that the Constitution required a majority of the 
members of the court to agree to all recommendations. 
Again the reluctance of Kentucky's governors to counter- 
mand official-looking county court orders apparently ex- 
plains the success of the Democratic rump sessions.1° 
8 Petitions and letters to Governor John Breathitt, Breathitt Papers (G.P., 
reel 37); Louisville Public Advertiser, 13 February 1835. 
SBenjamin D. Beale to Governor Robert Letcher, lo November 1840. 
Letcher Papers, jacket 390 (G.P., reel 56). 
10 For an account of the Democratic coup in Breathitt County see the pe- 
tition of the seven Whig justices of the peace to Governor William Owsley 
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In light of the extent of one-party domination of county 
courts, it is not surprising that after 1827 most of the 
patronage battles of county government involved either en- 
trenched parties seeking to preserve their positions of dom- 
inance or "out" parties seeking to gain control of the court. 
Of course many one-party courts obviated interparty pa- 
tronage fights by taking care to recommend as their second 
choice for vacated magistracies candidates who were fully 
as acceptable as the first choice, but this was not always the 
case. Sometimes partisan tribunals recommended as second 
choices members of out parties, doubtless confident that 
their first choices would be commissioned. Such strategy 
could lead to interparty confrontation, especially when the 
court's first choice was vulnerable on ethical grounds. For 
example, not long after the Democrats seized control of the 
Campbell County Court by means of a rump session, a bit- 
ter dispute arose from their efforts to solidify their new con- 
trol by filling a vacancy with a loyal party member. The  
controversy opened at the June 1847 term of the court when 
the Democratic majority recommended that Robert D. 
Hayman, a former justice of the peace and an acting trustee 
of the town of Newport, be appointed a magistrate with an- 
other Newportian, A. Boyd, the second choice. Hayman's 
recommendation elicited a powerful objection from three 
citizens of Newport who, in a letter to Governor William 
Owsley, accused Hayman of being insane. They urged the 
appointment of Boyd, ostensibly a Democrat, or a third 
candidate, a Whig named H. A. Mayo, who had previously 
been rejected by the court. Owsley was apparently im- 
pressed by this accusation and named Boyd to the court. 
The  Campbell court was not to be permanently over- 
ruled, however. In December 1847 the court again picked 
Hayman to fill a recent vacancy, and this time it prepared 
(ca. July 1846) and a copy of the order of the county court in the Owsley Pa- 
pers, jacket 620 (G.P., reel 89). 
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itself for the challenges which were sure to come. Partisans 
for Hayman held meetings and elections, circulated peti- 
tions, and wrote letters upholding his sanity and denounc- 
ing his detractors. His enemies adopted similar tactics, 
holding their own rallies and polls and circulating contrary 
petitions. This time their letters to the governor accused 
Hayman not only of being insane but also of beating his 
wife and children, of being so dangerous and feared that 
defendants would default rather than appear before him in 
magistrate's court, and of being so partisan that no Whig 
could ever obtain a fair trial from him. Although his en- 
emies sometimes pretended that their candidate for the 
vacancy and the court's second choice, one L. M. Eckert, 
was a Democrat, it was frankly admitted by some that he 
had turned Whig in recent years. It  also became clear that 
Boyd was really a Whig. Thus strong overtones of partisan 
politics as well as personalities unquestionably influenced 
the struggle. This time Governor Owsley gave in to the 
Democrats and commissioned Hayman, the alleged "mono- 
maniac." " 
Usually governors would reject first choices for justice of 
the peace only on moral grounds or proof of incompetence. 
In  1841 the Whig voters of the Ghent region of Carroll 
County endeavored to secure the commissioning of their 
court's second choice, also a Whig, to fill a vacancy. The  
governor rejected this attempt and commissioned the tri- 
bunal's first choice, a Democrat, since the petitioners could 
offer no reason for overturning the court's preference other 
than partisan  feeling^.'^ 
Often parties in control of county courts did not attempt 
to counteract public pressure on the governor to overturn 
partisan first choices for justice of the peace. They simply 
11 Ibid., jackets 651, 705. 
12 Notation by Governor Robert Letcher on petition from citizens of 
Carroll County, 2 March 1841, Letcher Papers, jacket 408 (G.P., reel 59). 
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relied on the authority of their orders and on precedent, a 
strategy which usually proved successful even under the 
most vigorous opposition. In 1846 the Democratic majority 
on the Green County Court ignored pleas of residents of the 
Brush Creek region to recommend a justice of the peace 
from their area, which had long been unrepresented. In- 
stead the court successfully suggested the appointment of a 
fellow Democrat who, although he lived far from the Brush 
Creek area, had campaigned assiduously for the office. The  
decision of the Jacksonians was undoubtedly made easier 
by the fact that the Brush Creek residents supported a Whig 
for the office.13 
On other occasions parties firmly in control of county 
courts unwittingly provoked patronage fights by adopting 
procedures normally utilized by out parties. In February 
1843 the solidly Whig Mason County Court offered to allow 
a neighborhood in which a vacancy on the court had oc- 
curred to indicate its preference for a replacement by means 
of an election. The court was doubtless confident that the 
voters of the area, overwhelmingly Whig, would choose one 
of the party faithful, especially since two of the three candi- 
dates were Democrats. Much to the court's chagrin, one of 
the Democrats, David R. Bullock, received more votes than 
the other Democrat and the Whig together. At the April 
term the court indicated that it would ignore the results of 
the election, an action which prompted Bullock's followers 
to submit a petition of support allegedly signed by nearly 
every eligible voter, including all those not participating in 
the election. At its May term the court remained adamant 
and overwhelmingly endorsed the Whig candidate, "titter- 
ing in a jocular manner" that Bullock "was a good Demo- 
crat." Bullock himself then wrote to Governor Letcher 
denouncing the court's action and characterizing his Whig 
13 Owsley Papers, jacket 566 (G.P., reel 84). 
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opponent as most unpopular because of "his profanity and 
gamblin habits." Despite these protestations, Letcher com- 
missioned the court's first choice.14 
Party infighting was so rampant in some counties that ef- 
forts were occasionally made to seek apolitical appoint- 
ments to the court. In 1843 certain members of the Clay 
County Court, believing that the presence of excessive 
"party spirit" on the tribunal made it "impossible some- 
times to do any business at all," convened secretly to nomi- 
nate for vacancies "men who [were] both independant and 
independant in their manner of doing business." Despite 
objections from those undoubtedly infected with excessive 
"party spirit," Governor Letcher acquiesced in the court's 
purge.15 
Some disputes over patronage on the county level did not 
involve partisan conflict. This was generally true of at- 
tempts by people living in unrepresented areas of counties 
to secure justices of the peace. The  problem of geographical 
apportionment of magistrates was acute in many counties, 
and not a few so-called districts of counties claimed to be 
underrepresented or not represented at a11.16 It  was gener- 
ally believed that there was no constitutional obligation on 
the part of county courts to distribute magistrates in an 
equitable geographical fashion, and one governor vetoed a 
bill which would have compelled the Ohio County Court 
to name a justice of the peace from a certain district in the 
county.17 Faced with this constitutional obstacle and with 
the necessity of settling the many petty legal disputes which 
14 David R. Bullock to Governor Robert Letcher, 5 May 1843, Letcher 
Papers, jacket 471 (G.P., reel 70). 
15 Samuel Ensworth to Governor Robert Letcher, 6 July 1843, and other 
relevant documents in the Letcher Papers, jacket 481 (G.P., reel 73). 
16 Regions of counties calling themselves "districts" were evidently re- 
ferring to their constabulary districts, subdivisions of each county. Littell, 
Statute Law, z:35. 
17 H.J., 1844-1845, pp. 146-47. 
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plague all civilized societies, and possessed of the desire for 
representation on the principal agency of county govern- 
ment, many regions were forced to beseech both court and 
governor to fill their needs for local magistrates. 
Most of these requests for magistrates were void of ref- 
erences to party politics, confining themselves to the issue of 
representation. Typical is the response of a citizen living in 
the western end of Anderson County. In a letter to Gover- 
nor Letcher written on March 15, 1842, John Wash com- 
plained that his region had never had a magistrate since 
the formation of the county in 1827. He recounted that 
after several petitions to the court had failed to gain relief, 
the inhabitants sought a law from the General Assembly 
creating two additional justices of the peace for the county. 
The  legislature granted this request but of course could not 
specify the location of the new magistrates. Predictably, citi- 
zens of the town of Lawrenceburg, the population center 
and county seat, pressured the court into recommending 
men from their locale to fill the new offices. Residents of the 
western end protested to both the court and the governor, 
but to no avail.ls 
In Logan County the sins of the county court were even 
more serious. In 1845 when a vacancy occurred on the court 
after its senior magistrate, David T. Smith, was named sher- 
iff, a region in the county petitioned for a justice of the 
peace, claiming none had resided there for many years. In- 
stead of granting the petition, the court delayed filling the 
vacancy until two years later, when Smith's term as sheriff 
expired, and then in a rump session recommended that he 
be appointed a justice of the peace again. Irate residents of 
the unrepresented district threatened to support a consti- 
tutional modification of the entire county court system if 
redress were not forthcoming. On this occasion Governor 
18 John Wash to Governor Robert Letcher, 15 March 1842, Letcher Pa- 
pers, jacket 433 (G.P., reel 63). 
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Owsley refused to abide by the court's recommendation and 
ultimately commissioned the preference of the aggrieved 
neighborhood.lg 
Regional disgruntlement over lack of representation on 
a county court sometimes led to measures more extreme 
than simple petitions to the governor for reapportionment. 
Citizens of the southern part of Mercer County in and 
around Danville were so chagrined by the alleged discrimi- 
nation of their county court that in 1834 they commenced 
petitioning the legislature to create a new county out of 
their region so that they might manage their own affairs. 
They accused the Mercer court of fostering taxation with- 
out representation, conducting fraudulent elections, and 
favoring in fiscal matters the county seat of Harrodsburg at 
the expense of Danville. Underlying the frustration of those 
in south Mercer was their overwhelming sympathy to- 
ward the anti-Jacksonian party, while their more numerous 
brethren in the north were equally partisan toward the 
Democrats. This "basic disagreement politically . . . on the 
leading topics of national policy" had produced "frequent 
and violent altercations" and a proscription of the south 
Mercerians from membership on the county court.20 After 
eight years of petition and counterpetition, in which the 
dissidents advocated constitutional secession, the legisla- 
ture finally authorized the divorce of the south from the 
north and the formation of Boyle County.21 
Complementing the tendency of Kentucky's county 
courts to be dominated by a political party or faction was 
IsGeorge J. Blakey to Governor William Owsley, 22 March 1847, and 
E. A. Hawkins to Owsley, 24 May 1847, Owsley Papers, jacket 650 (G.P., reel 
94); see also Convention, 22 May 1847. 
zolntelligencer, 23 September 1834, 23 January 1835. 
21 Acts, 1841-1842, chap. 189. The convoluted story of the origins of Boyle 
County may be traced in the Commonwealth, 18 February 1842; H.J., 1834- 
1835, pp. 63, 69, 144, 181, 201, 208, 301, 360; S.J., 1835-1836, p. 157; H.J., 
1837-1838, pp. 66,80,103,211,231; H.J., 1840-1841, p p  177,390; H.J., 1841- 
1842, P P  74. 135,167, 171; S.J., 1841-1842, p p  213, "3,253,260,275,283,287. 
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the inclination of their members to serve actively in party 
politics during the formative years of the state's two-party 
system. Newspaper accounts of political meetings in twenty 
of the state's counties and newspaper lists of delegates to 
state political conventions from the same counties indicate 
that in sixteen of them, from one-half to all of the county 
court's members were active participants in one of the two 
major partiesz2 In half of the counties studied, from two- 
thirds to all of the members of the courts as of 183'7 had 
taken part in one or more county political meetings and 
state political conventions. In six other counties from one- 
half to two-thirds of the members were similarly involved. 
In only four counties did fewer than half of the magistrates 
actively participate in party matters. 
Not infrequently county magistrates were outright lead- 
ers of local party organizations. For example, a justice of the 
peace was either chairman or some other officer of all ten 
Democratic party meetings held in Fayette County from 
1827 to 1848. Fifteen of twenty-five members of the county's 
Democratic vigilance committee in 1840 were either cur- 
rent or former members of the county court. In Woodford 
County acting or retired magistrates chaired five of six 
reported Democratic meetings and five of eight Whig meet- 
ings from 1827 to 1848. At a meeting in 1831 of the Jack- 
sonian partisans of Montgomery County, twenty of fifty 
delegates were either retired, active, or future magistrates, 
and at the 1827 conclave of Jacksonians in Scott County 
22 See note 6 for a list of the counties studied. These were the only coun- 
ties in the state for which a sufficient number of party lists were available 
for both Jacksonians and anti-Jacksonians. Newspapers containing lists of 
participants at county political meetings and state conventions and accounts 
of other party events include: Frankfort Argus of the Western World, 1830- 
I 831, 1835-1836; Commonwealth, 1834-1836, 1839, 1843, 1846-1848; Gazette, 
1827-1828, 1834-1836, 1839-1840, 1842-1843; Reporter, 1827-183 I;  Lexing- 
ton Observer and Reporter, 1834, 1836, 1839-1840, 1847-1848 (hereafter cited 
as Observer and Reporter); Yeoman, 1847-1848; and Louisville Daily Jour- 
nal, 1842. 
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nine of the twenty-one delegates and members of the com- 
mittee of correspondence were or soon would be justices of 
the peace.23 
Those justices who were the most vigorous politicians 
tended to be members of a county court dominated by 
one of the two major parties. The  courts of Bourbon, 
Fayette, Franklin, Garrard, Grant, Harrison, Jessamine, 
Montgomery, Scott, and Woodford counties were con- 
trolled by either Whig or Democratic majorities, all of 
whom were energetic members of their county and state 
party organizations. In contrast, members of bipartisan 
county courts tended to be politically inactive. The  justices 
of the peace in Nicholas, Jefferson, and Madison counties 
were only moderately active, while those of Henry, Clark, 
Estill, and Wayne were relatively inactive-the only inac- 
tive counties among the twenty examined.24 Finally, it 
should be noted that in four of the seven county courts with 
bipartisan membership, neither political party monopo- 
lized the elections, while in the thirteen counties in which 
courts were controlled by one party the elections were also 
clearly one-sided. 
Not only were many of the justices of the county courts 
political leaders in their own right, but also they controlled 
much of the state's election machinery. Throughout the 
period of the old county court system, the local tribunals 
appointed a majority of the county's principal election offi- 
23 Gazette, 12 October, 23 November, 28 December 1827; 15 March, 12 
April, 14 June, 22 November 1834; 17 October 1839; 12 March 1840; 15 
October 1842; 18 November 1843. Frankfort Argus of Western America, 24 
September 1828; 14, 21 December 1831; lo  February 1836. Reporter, 14 
November 1827; 17 November 1830; g November 1831. Commonwealth, 15 
June, lo November 1847; 18 February 1848. 
24An active court is defined as one in which from two-thirds to all of the 
members were publicly involved in the party system, a moderately active 
court as one in which from one-half to two-thirds of the membership were 
involved, and a relatively inactive court as one in  which fewer than half of 
the members were involved. 
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cials, including two judges and a clerk. Partisan feelings 
doubtless influenced the execution of responsibilities by 
courts and judges alike since at least during the two-party 
period some counties regularly reported more votes than 
legal voters. In 1842 the legislature sought to remedy this 
practice by declaring that wherever possible county courts 
were to choose one judge from each party, yet complaints 
of undue partisanship persisted.25 
Both antebellum political parties, the Jacksonian Demo- 
crats and the Whigs, defended and profited from the es- 
sentially oligarchical structure of county politics. Both sides 
had their share of "aristocrats," a term defined here in part 
as an epithet used by a member of one party coveting a 
county office held by a member of the other party. This tra- 
dition of bipartisan oligarchy seriously undercuts the no- 
tion of a spirit of democracy which supposedly prevailed 
during the age of Jackson and which was allegedly monop- 
olized by members of his party. 
County court politics provides colorful evidence of the 
ingenuity of politicians in the area of extraconstitutional 
creativity. The  abundance of petitions, letters, public meet- 
ings, unofficial elections, and even rump sessions of court 
created a significant expansion of the formal appointive 
procedures established for county government. This same 
spirit, of course, prevailed in national politics and was most 
spectacularly evidenced when supporters first of Calhoun, 
then of Jackson, sought to evade the state and congressional 
caucuses in 1823 and 1824 by inventing the device of party 
conventions. Indeed, recourse to extraconstitutionality is a 
never-ending theme of American politics. 
25 Acts, 1792, 1st sess., chap. 4, sec. 4; Frank F. Mathias, "The Turbulent 
Years of Kentucky Politics, 1820--1850'' (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Ky., 1966), pp. 
7-12; Acts, 1841-18gz, chap. 377, sec. 14; Commonwealth, 1, 8, 15 August 
1843. 
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Political behavior at the county court level also demon- 
strates the continual fruitful interaction which exists be- 
tween men and the constitutional system created by them. 
Men certainly interpret Constitutions; conversely, Consti- 
tutions influence men. While the county political leaders of 
Kentucky sought to alter in meaningful ways the formal 
structure of county government by petitions, meetings, 
rump sessions, and informal elections, they were nonethe- 
less bound by the formal constitutional framework in which 
they operated. County politicians were therefore oligarchs 
largely because the state Constitution required them to be. 
All this suggests that the county court system in Kentucky 
was ripe for constitutional change. After 1827 it produced 
far too many frustrated citizens to survive for any length of 
time. Every county party leader who could win at the polls 
but could not influence his own local government became 
an enemy of the system. So too did the thousands of county 
residents who found their districts without magistrates be- 
cause of deliberate regional proscription. Inequities in the 
form and practice of politics at the county level contributed 
a powerful impulse for constitutional reform of the old 
county court system. 
Chapter 5 
COUNTY COURT 
PATRONAGE 
T HE POLITICAL BATTLES of local government in ante- bellum Kentucky were not waged exclusively over control of the county courts themselves. Politicians 
also regularly warred over the dispensation of county court 
patronage. Under the Constitution of 1799 the court 
appointed virtually every officer of the county: clerk, con- 
stables, jailer, coroner, surveyor, sheriff, and county at- 
torney, all of whom served for life except the latter two, who 
served for two- and one-year terms respectively, and the 
jailer, who served at the pleasure of the court. Most of the 
conflict concerned the office of sheriff, the most powerful 
position in the county. Financially the office offered rewards 
in the form of commissions for collecting county and state 
taxes and fees for executing the orders of various courts- 
circuit, county, or military. Politically the office held official 
and unofficial power. In a formal sense the sheriff had po- 
tential influence since he was chief election officer of the 
county; not infrequently sheriffs became embroiled in local 
election disputes, and charges of fraud were not uncommon. 
Informally the sheriff maintained even greater political le- 
verage by virtue of his position as chief executive officer of 
the local courts. Most sheriffs were active political partisans, 
and it was not unusual to see one of them drifting through 
the crowd at a polling place, his pockets filled with sum- 
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monses and judgments which he would threaten to serve or 
execute upon wavering voters unless votes were cast for the 
"proper" candidates. Since during the period of the second 
Constitution voting was done by voice rather than by secret 
ballot, a strict accounting of campaign "promises" was en- 
tirely possible. 
Although the relatively short-lived first Constitution pro- 
vided for the election of sheriffs, the second Constitution 
gave the county courts a direct role in their selection. It  
provided that every two years each county court should 
meet and recommend to the governor two of its members 
for the sheriffalty, paying "a just regard to seniority in office 
and a regular rotation." If the court made a prompt recom- 
mendation, the governor was bound to commission one of 
the two magistrates selected; if not, he was empowered to 
fill the office with the advice and consent of the state Senate. 
As the drafters of the Constitution foresaw, county courts 
not infrequently either failed completely to recommend 
magistrates for the sheriffalty or were dilatory. As a result 
an aura of extraconstitutionality grew up around appoint- 
ments to this important office. While most omissions to rec- 
ommend were attributable to lack of quorums or prolonged 
contests, some were deliberate. For example, the Breckin- 
ridge County Court declined to choose a nominee in 1821 
because its senior justice of the peace was a convicted per- 
jurer. Likewise the Lawrence County Court refused to 
make a recommendation in 1846 because its senior magis- 
trate "too freely indulged in the use of ardent spirits" and 
was otherwise unstable. Sometimes the senior justice, 
obviously miffed at missing his opportunity for formal rec- 
ommendation, solicited the sheriffalty directly from the 
governor, to whom the principal task of selection had fallen. 
At other times members of the court, apologetic for their 
neglect, offered to petition the governor in behalf of the 
senior magistrate. Occasionally a person (or persons) not 
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associated with the county court solicited a commission 
from the governor and legislature; this was most likely to 
occur when the senior justice of the peace was in bad repute. 
There were also instances in which the governor reap- 
pointed an incumbent sheriff, especially when it was obvi- 
ous that the county court hoped for such a result.' 
Usually when county courts sent recommendations to the 
governor after the November deadline he chose to accept 
the nominee, even when the office was contested by groups 
not affiliated with the court. In early 1848 Governor Owsley 
commissioned John M. Austin sheriff of Butler County, al- 
though the court's recommendation of Austin was late and 
a third party, one N. Harreld, secretly sought the office. 
Owsley likewise commissioned Jonathan C. Langston sher- 
iff of Cald~vell County in June 1846, although his rec- 
ommendation had been received seven months after the 
deadline.* 
County court members also sought to influence appoint- 
ments to fill vacancies in the sheriffalty resulting from 
death, resignation, or removal, even though by statute this 
privilege was reserved to the governor and the state Senate. 
At times courts claimed the power to furnish the governor 
with a binding recommendation, as in the case of the Adair 
County tribunal, which in late 1840 sought to secure the 
sheriffalty for the next magistrate in rotation after the se- 
nior member of the tribunal had refused the commission. 
This effort failed, for Governor Letcher appointed William 
1 Copy of Breckinridge County Court Order, November term, 1821, Adair 
Papers, jacket 219 (G.P., reel 25). Z. Cushing to Governor William Owsley, 
31 December 1846; James Richard and Isaac Botts to James M. Rice, 31 De- 
cember 1846; James M. Rice to Owsley, 7 January 1847; and George F. 
Hatcher to Owsley, 22 February 1847, all in Owsley Papers, jacket 651 (G.P., 
reel 94). 
2 John M. Austin to Governor William Owsley, 25 December 1847, Owsley 
Papers, jacket 704 (G.P., reel 98). Austin's commission is noted on the front 
of the letter. Copy of Caldwell County Court Order, June term, 1846, Owsley 
Papers, jacket 568 (G.P., reel 84). 
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G. Lobban, who was not a member of the court and who 
successfully challenged the right of the tribunal to dictate 
the governor's choice. In other instances, delegating their 
statutory duty, governors expressly left the decision up to 
county courts. Most often certain members of local tribu- 
nals sought to act informally by sending to governors peti- 
tions purporting not to be binding recommendations but 
mere suggestions. Thus in July 1833 three members of the 
Christian County Court wrote to Governor John Breathitt 
that they had heard that the present sheriff would soon re- 
sign and presented John Buckner as a "suitable person to 
fill the vacancy." 
One of the most controversial aspects of this appointment 
process concerned the constitutional provision obliging 
courts to "pay a just regard to seniority in office and a regu- 
lar rotation." For many years it was supposed that this 
clause required the county courts to nominate the two mag- 
istrates ranking highest in seniority, and any failure to do 
so aroused quick protest. In  certain instances county courts 
deliberately passed over senior magistrates, sometimes on 
the pretense that they were unfit for the sheriffalty. This 
happened in Franklin County early in the nineteenth cen- 
tury when the county court refused to recommend Henry 
Bartlett for the office, even though he maintained that he 
was the senior magistrate. Bartlett had earlier secured a writ 
of mandamus from the Court of Appeals temporarily re- 
straining the county court from removing him from office 
on the grounds of insanity. When the court failed to recom- 
mend him, he appealed directly to the governor and even- 
tually was commissioned. The tradition of recommending 
senior magistrates was so entrenched in the state's constitu- 
3 Z. Wheat to Governor Robert Letcher, 7 December 1840, Letcher Pa- 
pers, jacket 390 (G.P., reel 56). C. Sakin, A. Wilson, and Linah Minz to Gov- 
ernor John Breathitt, i z  July 1833, Breathitt Papers, jacket 325 (G.P., reel 
37). 
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tional practice that in late 1829 when the Monroe County 
Court failed to adhere to this custom, Governor Thomas 
Metcalfe ignored the tribunal's nominee and nominated 
the senior justice of the peace to be sheriff. The  Senate over- 
whelmingly endorsed Metcalfe's a ~ t i o n . ~  
The  custom of seniority also produced disputes over 
which member of a court had served the longest. By statute 
the magistrate who had first been commissioned ranked 
highest in seniority, but the county records did not always 
make this clear.5 Usually county courts attempted to resolve 
disagreements by making a recommendation to the gover- 
nor. The  man who ranked second in the recommendation 
sometimes then appealed to the governor, but he seldom 
overturned the decision of the county court. On occasion 
courts were evenly divided over whom to recommend, forc- 
ing the governor to solve the dilemma in a de novo capacity. 
Several events occurred during the later decades of the 
old county court system which served partially to under- 
mine the assumption that only senior magistrates could be 
recommended for the sheriffalty. In 1833 Governor Breath- 
itt in effect ruled that a senior justice of the peace who had 
been commissioned sheriff could waive his right to the office 
by failing to qualify. In 183 1 the senior magistrate of Camp- 
bell County, William Anderson, was commissioned sheriff 
after being duly recommended by the county court but was 
unable to furnish security and therefore did not take the 
4 Henry Bartlett to Governor James Garrard, 15 April 1803, Garrard Pa- 
pers, jacket 29 (G.P., reel 5); Franklin County Court Order Book, 1801-1805, 
pp. 175, 219 (U.K. microfilm, reel M:430:1486-87); S.J., z829-18j0, pp. 132- 
34. Soon after the second Constitution went into effect, John Snoddy com- 
plained to Joseph Hamilton Daveiss that the Madison County Court had 
failed to appoint him sheriff even though he was the senior justice of the 
peace and requested Daveiss "to take such steps and measures as your good 
Judgment may direct agreeable to the laws of our County" to force the mag- 
istrates to live up to their duties. Snoddy to Daveiss, 30 October 1800. Daveiss 
Papers, AD 2551 (Filson Club, Louisville, Ky.). 
5 Acts, 1801, chap. 56, sec. 3. 
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oath of office. Two years later the Campbell County Court 
passed over Anderson for the sheriffalty, prompting him to 
appeal to Governor Breathitt for redress. Breathitt ruled 
that Anderson was not entitled to the office, presumably 
concluding that he had waived his right by failing to qualify 
two years before. Governor Owsley solidified this precedent 
in 1846 when he refused to commission as sheriff the senior 
magistrate of Jefferson County on the grounds that he had 
waived his right to that office some ten years earlier by con- 
senting to be passed over by the county court, even though 
at that time he was first in ~eniori ty .~ 
In October 1840, 0 .  G. Cates, state attorney general, ren- 
dered the most potentially damaging blow to the tradition 
of seniority by ruling that county courts could recommend 
any two justices of the peace to be sheriff regardless of 
length of service. Such seemed to Cates to "have been the 
intention, spirit and meaning of the constitution." He be- 
lieved that any other policy could result in the recommen- 
dation of senior magistrates who might be incapacitated 
by "mental imbecility or moral depravity." Cates's opin- 
ion appears not to have found much currency during the 
remaining eleven years of the old county court system, 
perhaps because it was not well publicized. Magistrates con- 
tinued to argue over who had served the longest, and county 
courts continued to adhere to the slightly tarnished tradi- 
tion of seniority. 
Only rarely, as when the first choice was shown to be 
morally unsound or incompetent, did governors fail to com- 
6 William Anderson's petition to Governor John Breathitt, n.d.; copy of 
Campbell County Court order respecting the sheriffalty, 25 November 1833; 
William Wright Southgate to Breathitt, 5 December 1833, all in Breathitt 
Papers, jacket 338 (G.P., reel 37); Owsley Papers, jacket 610 (G.P., reel 89). 
7 O.G. Cates to James Harlan, 17 October 1840, Letcher Letter Book, pp. 
2-5 (G.P., reel 54). Harlan, secretary of state, had asked Cates for his opinion 
on the validity of a recommendation of the Jefferson County Court which 
did not pay "just regard to seniority." 
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mission magistrates listed first in the recommendations of 
the courts. Thus in 1845 opponents of George W. Kouns 
successfully blocked his nomination for the sheriffalty of 
Carter County on the grounds that he was under indictment 
for rape. Yet their victory was only temporary, for as soon as 
Kouns was cleared of rape charges and had barely survived 
an attempt by the General Assembly to remove him from 
office, the county court recommended him again for sheriff, 
and this time he was commissioned. In another instance 
Governor Charles Scott refused to commission either choice 
of the Pulaski County Court even though the two magis- 
trates were the ranking members of the court. Scott de- 
fended his action by asserting that both candidates had dis- 
qualified themselves by being members of the legislature 
which had voted to increase the fees of the ~heriffalty.~ 
Party politics does not seem to have influenced signifi- 
cantly patronage battles over the sheriff's office. In part this 
was because the method by which sheriffs were selected did 
not allow much opportunity for party manipulation. I t  was 
more crucial and rewarding for political parties to fight 
over control of county courts since they controlled the ap- 
pointment of sheriffs. In addition, most recommendations 
were beyond contest. Only when senior magistrates were 
vulnerable on legal or moral grounds did out political 
groups intervene, and even in these cases the potential re- 
wards were normally not great since the magistrates next in 
seniority were often members of the entrenched faction. 
Furthermore, it was usually easy for well-to-do politicians 
to become sheriffs by simply purchasing the office from its 
newly commissioned occupant. 
The  widespread practice of selling public offices in Ken- 
tucky doubtless accounts in large part for the absence of 
partisan political battles over the office of sheriff. I t  also 
8 Owsley Papers, jackets 612, 651 (G.P., reels 84, 94); Charles Scott Jour- 
nal, 17 December 1808 (G.P., reel 8). 
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helps explain why there appear to have been few patronage 
fights over other offices of the local constitution, such as 
deputy sheriff, county clerk, and the constable. Further- 
more, the tradition of bargain and sale explains why party 
control of the county court did not always mean that all the 
patronage went to members of the same party, although 
frequently this was the case. In all the transactions involv- 
ing the sale of county office, money, not political affiliation, 
was the paramount consideration. Thus, for example, a 
Whig could easily buy a sheriffalty in a county run by a 
Democratic court. This happened often in Fayette County, 
where, from 1833 to 185 1, although there was always a pre- 
ponderance of Democratic magistrates, half of the sheriffs 
and approximately half of the constables were Whigs. The  
Democratic justices of the peace, who presumably sold the 
offices, were more interested in profit than in  politic^.^ 
The system of rotation and seniority encouraged the 
farming or selling of the sheriffalty since by the time a jus- 
tice of the peace reached a position of seniority on the court 
he was often too old and feeble to carry out the duties of 
office. These duties were onerous and, as one newspaper 
put it, unless the sheriff-designate was equipped "to be mov- 
ing continually on horseback, or on foot, in all sorts of 
weather, over all sorts of roads, and sometimes at night, as 
well as during the day . . . he is unfit for the office." Many 
farmed or sold the office because they were unfit. For ex- 
ample, by the time Price Nuttall, a leading citizen and 
magistrate of Henry County, had served long enough to be- 
come sheriff, he was "quite an old man and in a very 
feeble state of health and apprehend[ed] that he [would] 
9 Because of the lack of evidence it is impossible to determine the party 
affiliations of all the constables of Fayette County from 1833 to 1851. Each 
party claimed the other had a majority. See, for example, the Democratic 
claim in the Gazette, 7 December 1844, and the Whig claim in the Obseruer 
and Reporter, 2 December 1844. From the available evidence it is estimated 
that each party "bought" its fair share, approximately one-half. 
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live but a short time." Upon being commissioned sheriff in 
1843, he promptly sold the office to a deputy and resigned. 
Physical infirmity was not the only reason for selling the 
sheriffalty. Sometimes a newly commissioned sheriff or a 
senior magistrate sold his office or right thereto because he 
needed money. In early 1829 former United States Senator 
John Brown sold the office of sheriff of Franklin County 
even before he had received it to raise money for his son 
Orlando, a struggling young lawyer in Alabama. Custom 
also was a powerful stimulus to sell the office of sheriff. In- 
deed it was almost assumed that the senior justice of the 
peace in a large and prosperous county would sell the sher- 
iffalty rather than serve in office so that he might reap im- 
mediately the financial reward for his long and generally 
unprofitable service on the county court.1° 
A newly appointed sheriff could sell all or part of his of- 
ficial responsibilities. He could sell his office, usually to a 
deputy, and resign, or he might simply refuse to post bond 
and thus not qualify. In either case he would have taken 
care to ensure that his vendee would be commissioned his 
successor by the governor. Apparently all that this required 
was a letter of resignation to the governor recommending 
the purchaser, although not naming him as such, as suc- 
cessor. If the sheriff-designate did not wish to abdicate his 
post entirely, he might farm all or part of it to one of his 
deputies. No matter if the office was sold, farmed out, or 
partially leased, those who did business with the sheriff had 
to idemnify him for losses he might suffer as a result of 
their conduct. 
I t  was not uncommon for the sheriffalty to be auctioned 
off at a public sale. One critic accused senior magistrates of 
allowing "the office to be hawked about the streets, and sold 
10 Convention, 20 February 1847; Thomas B. Posey to Governor Robert 
Letcher, 15 March 1843, Letcher Papers, jacket 469 (G.P., reel 70); John 
Brown to Orlando Brown, 17 March 1829, folder 4, Orlando Brown Papers 
(Filson Club, Louisville, Ky.). 
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like a horse in the public market, so that he who had the 
most money might get the office." One such auction took 
place in Jessamine County in January 1847 and another in 
Marion County only a few months earlier.ll 
Prices paid for farming or buying the sheriffalty varied 
from county to county. That of a populous and prosperous 
county would normally command a larger price since the 
amount of collectible taxes and hence the commission 
would be greater. Furthermore, there would be more liti- 
gation, more papers to serve, and more judgments to exe- 
cute. The sheriffalty of Fayette County, second only to 
Jefferson in population and wealth, sold for around $2,000 
per two-year term. In Jefferson County the office probably 
sold for twice that amount. In Jessamine County it was sold 
in the streets of Nicholasville, the county seat, for $1,000 in 
January 1847, while the price was $1,200 in Clark County 
some two years earlier. The  sheriffalty of Montgomery 
County customarily brought from $1,000 to $1,200 per 
term. Estimations of the average price paid for a sheriffalty 
ranged from $500 to $800.'~ 
It is difficult to determine how many sheriffalties were 
either sold or farmed during the fifty-one-year life of the 
second state Constitution. Certainly in some counties, such 
as Bourbon or Montgomery, where the economy was rela- 
tively prosperous, the office was nearly always sold by the 
senior justice of the peace upon receiving his commission. 
The  competition was so intense in Bourbon County that the 
office was frequently sold one or two years in advance of the 
time in which the seller would receive his commission. A 
11 Remarks of Beverly L. Clarke, delegate from Simpson County, at  the 
Constitutional Convention of 1849, Proceedings, p. 387; Convention, 30 Jan- 
uary 1847. 
12 Convention, 30 January, 20 March, 17 July 1847; Report of the Special 
Committee on the Sale of Public Office, H.J., 1845-1846, pp. 338-39; speech 
of Francis M. Bristow, delegate from Todd County, at  the Constitutional 
Convention of 1849, Proceedings, p. 715. 
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special committee established in January 1846 by the state 
House of Representatives to investigate the buying and 
selling of public office in Kentucky concluded that the sher- 
iffalty was probably sold in nearly every county, but this 
determination was made after studying only one county in 
depth and seems exaggerated. In  many of the poorer and 
more sparsely settled counties the sheriffalty seems not to 
have been solicited. J. C. Roundtree resigned as sheriff of 
Edmonson County in 1845, writing to a friend that the 
office was so worthless he could not even afford the services 
of a deputy. The  fact that some county courts simply ne- 
glected to recommend magistrates for the sheriffalty sug- 
gests that the office was often not coveted. It  is perhaps safest 
to surmise that the office of sheriff was frequently bought or 
farmed in those counties with strong economies and active 
court systems but was seldom the object of the govern- 
mental entrepreneur in the less wealthy counties.13 
A senior justice of the peace who accepted a commission 
to the sheriffalty automatically vacated his magistracy and 
his place on the county court. Most who thereafter sold the 
sheriffalty retired permanently from county government, 
but a few sought reappointment to the county court, and 
some of these produced considerable controversy as well as 
interesting constitutional problems. In late 1842 John Mc- 
Kee as senior justice of the peace was commissioned sheriff 
of Franklin County. Soon afterward McKee sold his office 
and then secured the county court's recommendation to fill 
the seat he had vacated-a simple task since the McKee fam- 
ily controlled much of county government in Franklin. Mc- 
Kee's move elicited an outburst from the residents of the 
county, especially the Whigs, who had generally been pro- 
13 Yeoman, 21 January 1847; Report of the Special Committee, H.J., 
1845-1846, pp. 338-39; J. C. Roundtree to W. John Burnam, 17 January 
1845, Owsley Papers, jacket 568 (G.P., reel 84); Christopher Greenup Jour- 
nal, 22 January 1808 (G.P., reel 8). 
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scribed from the court and who saw this effort at self- 
perpetuation as an opportunity to strike a blow at the 
entrenched opposition. Petitions poured into Governor 
Robert Letcher's office protesting the recommendation of 
McKee and promoting the court's second choice, Samuel B. 
Scofield, who lived in an area without a justice of the peace. 
Letcher was in a quandary; after deliberating for more than 
a week he wrote an eight-page letter to McKee denying him 
reappointment to the county court. He informed McKee 
that although it was his normal practice "to confer the ap- 
pointment upon the person first named in the order of rec- 
ommendation" and while he believed that McKee was well 
qualified to be a magistrate, on this occasion he was appoint- 
ing the court's second choice to avoid a possible violation of 
the Constitution. T o  do otherwise, he argued, would be to 
allow McKee to serve as justice of the peace while enjoying 
the profits of an incompatible office, the sheriffalty. The  
court, Letcher concluded, would be converted "with its 
self-perpetuating power" into "an ever-lasting power." l4 
In contrast to such spirited battles over the sheriffalty, 
political entrepreneurs seldom, if ever, fought over the 
deputy sheriff's office. Aspirants usually confined their poli- 
ticking, if any was needed, to the support of individual 
candidates for sheriff since the sheriff appointed his own 
deputies with the approval of the county court. Such an 
occasion presented itself in Washington County in 1846. 
Two justices of the peace, one a Democrat and the other a 
Whig, sought the office of sheriff, both claiming to be the 
senior magistrate. The Democrat received the active sup- 
port of two Whig constables by promising to name them as 
his deputies. This show of strength, added to a slim Jack- 
14 John McKee to Governor Robert Letcher, 17 July 1843, and six peti- 
tions to Letcher, Letcher Papers, jacket 482 (G.P., reel 73); Letcher to 
McKee, 28 August 1843. Letcher Papers, jacket 466 (G.P., reel 70). 
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sonian majority on the court, prompted endorsement of the 
Democrat ahead of the Whig, and the governor acceded to 
this recommendation.15 
The role of the county court in the appointment of depu- 
ty sheriffs was limited both because it merely approved the 
nominations of the high sheriff and because these offices 
were inevitably the objects of agreements to purchase or 
farm part of the total profits of the sheriffalty. Normally a 
sheriff sold deputyships to the highest bidder, and unlike 
those for the sheriffalty, the transactions for deputyships 
seem always to have been carried on in private. In some 
instances groups purchased a deputyship, and although the 
duties of the office would be carried out by only one of the 
buyers, the profits would be divided among them. There 
appears to have been a tendency on the part of certain senior 
justices of the peace who executed the office of sheriff them- 
selves to sell deputyships to their former constables, the 
executive officers of the magistrates.16 
Although the county courts were empowered by the Con- 
stitution to appoint their own clerks, they appear in prac- 
tice to have shared this task with outgoing clerks and, in 
many cases, judges of the circuit courts, as a part of trans- 
actions of bargain and sale. Many clerkships of both the 
county and circuit courts were sold, often to the same man. 
Since both the members of the county court and the judge 
of the circuit court were given the exclusive right to name 
their own clerks, presumably the justices and judges either 
delegated their responsibilities to outgoing clerks for a 
15 (Unknown) to Governor William Owsley, 28 October 1846, and Rich. 
ard Brown to Owsley, 26 October 1846, Owsley Papers, jacket 611 (G.P., reel 
89). 
16 Yeoman, 8 October 1846; Convention, 20 February 1847; Report of the 
Special Committee, H.J., 1845-1846, pp. 338-39; Richard Brown to Governor 
William Owsley, 26 October 1846; (Unknown) to Owsley, 28 October 1846, 
Owsley Papers, jacket 611 (G.P., reel 89). 
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share of the profits of the sale or sold the office themselves 
when the incumbent had died or had been involuntarily 
removed from his position. 
County clerkships were more offices of profit than of po- 
litical power, although on occasion clerks were able to aid 
entrenched political groups.I7 Sometimes a transaction con- 
cerning the clerkship involved leasing as well as selling, as 
in the case of John D. Young, clerk of the Fayette County 
Court, who in 15 16 farmed his office to Abner Fields for one 
year, receiving $1,000 for the lease. Before the end of the 
period of the lease, Young sold the office to James C. Rodes 
for $6,000. Rodes thereupon paid Fields $400 in the form of 
eight $50 notes in return for the latter's promise to execute 
all the clerk's business until the expiration of Fields's one- 
year lease. On other occasions the clerkship was simply 
leased, as evidenced by the statement of one Newton P. 
Reed before a committee of the state House of Representa- 
tives in 1846. Reed testified that the clerkship of the Mont- 
gomery County Court had recently been leased at $250 per 
year for a period of four years.I8 
Of the remaining county offices which were filled by the 
county court, only the constabulary appears to have been 
sold during the antebellum period, although it would have 
been quite natural for others, such as the coroner's office 
17 The duties of the clerk of the county court included the recording of 
various legal documents such as deeds and wills, the selling of various li- 
censes including those to operate billiard tables and sell watches, and the 
keeping of the county court order book. For most of his services the clerk 
received fees, the abundance of which made the office one of substantial 
profit. On occasion clerks intervened in political warfare, as in 1844 when 
the clerk of the Morgan County Court refused to copy an order of the court 
to expedite a frustrated office seeker's petition to the governor. William 
Ragland to Governor William Owsley, 23 November 1844, Owsley Papers, 
jacket 568 (G.P., reel 84). 
18 Outon v. Rodes, 3 A. K .  Marshall 432 (18~1); Commonwealth v. Rodes, 
1 Dana 595 (1833); Report of the Special Committee, H.J., 1845-1846, pp. 
338-39. 
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and the jailer's office, to have been the object of private 
bidding. Perhaps the relative insignificance of the latter 
positions explains why there is no evidence that they were 
sold or farmed. The  constabulary, however, was an office 
not only of some profit but of political power as well. Con- 
stables were the executive officers of justices of the peace 
serving their summonses and other papers and carrying out 
their orders and judgments. Although constables had no 
formal political functions such as overseeing elections, they 
unofficially exercised influence on election day in much the 
same way the sheriff did, by waving summonses and unexe- 
cuted judgments in the faces of voters to coerce them to sup- 
port a certain candidate.lg Thus the political and appointive 
nature of this office made it attractive for sale. Although very 
little data is available on the mechanics of such transactions, 
constableships were apparently sold by individual justices 
of the peace or groups of them to the ever-present govern- 
mental enterpreneurs for prices as high as $400. 
Legislators, judges, and prosecutors responded to these 
practices inconsistently and ineffectively. The  General As- 
sembly prohibited the buying of office in 1801; yet in 1820 
it declared bonds of indemnity binding even when executed 
in consideration of a sale of a deputyship. Between 1817 
and 1822 the Court of Appeals, in three civil actions, voided 
two such bonds and held a lease of a county clerkship 
invalid, but seemingly reversed itself in 1829 when it up- 
held a bond issued to indemnify the vendor of a deputy 
sheriffalty. For the most part prosecutors did not prosecute, 
and the first indictment against a buyer of office was not is- 
sued until 1 8 4 3 . ~ ~  
1gRemarks of Elijah F. Nuttall, delegate from Henry County, a t  the 
Constitutional Convention of 1849, Proceedings, p. 385. 
20 Acts, 1801, chap. 57, sec. rg; Acts, 1820, chap. 149; Love v. Buckner, q 
Bibb 506 (1817); Davis v. Hull, I Littell g (1822); Outon v. Rodes, 3 A. K .  
Marshall 432 (1821); Baldwin v. Bridges, 2 J .  J .  Marshall 7 (1829); Charles 
[g4 ]  County Courts i n  Antebellum Kentucky 
The acquiescence and in many cases participation of the 
county courts in the selling and leasing of county offices 
not only were often products of corruption but tended to 
generate and perpetuate further corruption and incompe- 
tence. The buying and farming of the sheriffalty led to 
many other abuses and generally degraded the office from 
its already low status in 1800. Naturally a buyer of the office 
was eager to make as much profit as possible from his ven- 
ture; frequently he extracted all possible fees and engaged 
in the corrupt practice of "shaving," that is, accepting a 
portion of a judgment in return for executing it. In addi- 
tion to these harsh and illegal practices, selling or farming 
often produced incompetent sheriffs. So inept was the 
deputy sheriff of Hickman County, who had farmed the 
office from the sheriff, that Thomas James, a leading Demo- 
cratic politician of the county, felt compelled to denounce 
him even though he was a fellow party member. James ac- 
cused the deputy of being insolvent, corrupt, and a leader 
of lawless mobs assembled "for the purpose of putting down 
the civil authorities." 21 
As in the case of the sheriffalty, the sale of clerkships, 
deputy sheriffalties, and constableships contributed to 
abuses. Clerks were wont to extract as much revenue as 
possible from their investment even if it meant further cor- 
ruption. James C .  Rodes, who bought the clerkship of 
Fayette County in 18 16 for $6,000, was acquitted of charges 
of malfeasance in 1833 before being removed from office in 
1845 for embezzlement, extortion, and fraud. Deputy sher- 
iffs and constables not infrequently augmented their in- 
come by unlawful activities such as forcing creditors to 
G. C. Wintersmith to Governor Robert Letcher, 21 May 1843, Letcher Pa- 
pers, jacket 468 (G.P., reel 70). 
21 Thomas James to Governor William Owsley, 7 March 1845, Owsley Pa- 
pers, jacket 508 (G.P., reel 77). 
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share the proceeds of an executed judgment or simply 
purchasing a judgment at a discounted price, then exe- 
cuting it at its face 
Ultimately the collusion of county courts in these venal 
practices prompted efforts at reform. At first specific at- 
tempts, all unsuccessful, were made to enact more effective 
statutes outlawing the selling or farming of office. Governor 
Gabriel Slaughter recommended the passage of such a law 
in his annual message of 1816. When a bill outlawing the 
sale of office was finally introduced into the legislature in 
1832 the Senate rejected it. In the following decade re- 
formers turned their efforts away from measures aimed spe- 
cifically at abolishing the sale of public office and instead 
cited the practice as only one reason to alter the entire 
structure of county government. In 1846 a group of seventy- 
eight Whig and Democratic legislators issued a call for a 
constitutional convention, citing the sale of public office as 
a primary cause for their action. The courts' powers of self- 
perpetuation and the widespread practice of selling the 
offices of the court contributed significantly to growing pub- 
lic disenchantment over county go~e rn rnen t .~~  
Problems and political struggles resulted not only from 
efforts to gain offices but also from attempts by county 
courts to remove officers. By statutory provision the county 
courts were empowered to remove for cause the jailer and 
any of the constables and to declare vacant the offices of 
justice of the peace, surveyor, and sheriff and move to ini- 
tiate the commissioning of replacements; they could also 
22Commonwealth v. Rodes, 1 Dana 595 (1833); Fayette County Court 
Order Book, 1840-1846, pp. 513-14 (U.K. microfilm, reel M311:2031-32); 
Speech of James Guthrie, delegate from Louisville, at the Constitutional 
Convention of 1849, Proceedings, p. 374. 
23 Message of Governor Gabriel Slaughter, 2 December 1816, H.J., 1816- 
1817, p. 18; S.J., 1832-1833, pp. 174-77; Yeoman, 8 October 1846. 
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block efforts by newly commissioned sheriffs to secure the 
appointment of certain men as their deputies.24 
One of the most dramatic instances of removal occurred 
in 1845 in Franklin County. In its June term that year the 
Democratic county court sought to remove from office the 
Whig county jailer, William Gorham, precipitating a full- 
blown constitutional crisis involving conflicts with the 
Court of Appeals, the circuit court of the county, the Gen- 
eral Assembly, and the Whig party, as well as the jailer him- 
self. The political ambitions of certain members of the 
Franklin County Court underlay its decision to remove 
Gorham from office. Two justices of the peace, Benjamin 
Luckett and an unidentified magistrate, had applied for the 
office of deputy postmaster of Frankfort. Although Luckett 
possessed "a respectable recommendation for the office," his 
fellow magistrate was the choice of the Democratic State 
Central Committee. Furthermore, Luckett was the third 
senior member of the county court and as such would soon 
be entitled to the sheriffalty. Because of the need to remove 
him as a candidate for the deputy postmastership and be- 
cause of the alleged desire on the part of some junior mag- 
istrates to advance up the ladder of succession to the 
sheriffalty, pressure was put upon Luckett to resign from 
the county court and accept the office of jailer. Luckett 
agreed to this, but probably not without some misgivings 
since the position of jailer was rather insignificant, especially 
when contrasted with that of sheriff, which was selling 
for approximately $1,300 a term. It  may well be that his 
Democratic rivals on the court promised to give Luckett a 
percentage of the proceeds when they sold the office of 
sheriff in return for his promise to resign. The  scheming 
magistrates of Franklin County also approached Gorham 
in private and urged him to resign to make way for Luckett, 
24Acts, 1802, chap. 53, sec. so (jailer); Acts, 1803, chap. 1 ,  sec. 6 (con- 
stables). 
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but he would not comply.25 His obstinance did not deter 
the conspirators, and on the first day of the June term, with- 
out any appearance of deliberation, they handed the clerk 
of the court an order removing Gorham for unspecified 
"divers good causes" and appointing Luckett, who had 
shortly before resigned from the court, in his stead.% 
Later in the day both Gorham and Luckett appeared in 
court with their attorneys, Gorham's counsel to offer a 
motion to set aside the court's order and Luckett's to argue 
against this move. The  gist of Gorham's argument was that 
a proceeding to remove a county jailer was judicial, not 
ministerial, and that he had to be formally charged and 
tried to be removed from office. The  court allowed Gor- 
ham's attorney to produce one witness, a member of the 
court, who was said to have been involved in the conspiracy 
of removal and who would prove that no charges had been 
preferred against the jailer. This offer of proof must have 
shocked the Democratic justices since apparently one of 
their number was betraying them. But the court quickly re- 
covered its composure and dismissed the witness midway in 
his testimony, ostensibly on the grounds that as a member of 
the court he was an incompetent witness, but in reality, ac- 
cording to a Whig observer, because the assembled magis- 
trates feared the revelation of the "real motive of dismissal." 
Having discharged the witness, the court dismissed Gor- 
ham's motion, prompting the aggrieved jailer to obtain a 
writ of error from the Court of Appeals. 
On the following day the Democratic majority of the 
court revealed that it was not altogether confident of the 
legality of its decision in the Gorham case by striking out 
the entry in its order book accepting the resignation of 
25 The best review of the political aspirations underlying the Franklin 
County jailer dispute is in the Commonwealth, 23 June 1846. 
26 Franklin County Court Order Book, 1839-1848, p. 262 (U.K. microfilm, 
reel M430: 1488-89). 
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Luckett as justice of the peace. However, the Democratic 
magistrates apparently regained their confidence by No- 
vember 1845, when they chose to defy an order of the Court 
of Appeals invalidating the attempted removal of Gorham 
as jailer. Gorham's counsel had convinced the high court in 
October that a proceeding to remove a jailer was judicial in 
nature and that the actions of the Franklin County Court 
violated due process. He appeared before the county court 
at its November term, filed the mandate of the Court of 
Appeals with the cooperative clerk, a Whig, and then 
moved that the magistrates obey the decree by returning the 
jailer's keys to his client. The court not only overruled the 
motion, the only two Whig magistrates dissenting, but 
entered a lengthy defense of its defiance in the order book. 
In their manifesto the justices argued that the Court of Ap- 
peals had usurped the "power confided by the constitution 
of the state to the county court relative to the office of 
Jailer" and had acted illegally in decreeing that Gorham 
be restored to office. The  magistrates felt dutybound to 
resist this "intermeddling" and "declare[d] to the world" 
that they would not abide by the ruling of the higher 
court. In short, the Democratic justices of the peace of 
Franklin County were nullifying the decision of the Court 
of  appeal^.^^ 
Predictably the Whigs of Franklin County denounced the 
county court's intransigence. The  Whig newspaper of the 
county, the Frankfort Commonwealth, which had earlier 
applauded the opinion of the Court of Appeals and printed 
it in full, accused the Democratic magistrates of attempting 
"a civil revolution." The  Democrats defended the court's 
action. The  Democratic newspaper of the county, the Ken- 
tucky Yeoman, proposed that there was a higher law than 
that which emanated from the Court of Appeals and that 
27 Ibid., pp. 267,290-97; Gorham v. Luckett, 6 B. Monroe 146 (1845). 
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the Franklin County magistrates had acted in the name of 
that law, which was grounded in "the people." 28 
Meanwhile, both the Whig party and Gorham's attorney 
were busy trying to force the Franklin County Court to 
yield to the Court of Appeals. In January 1846 the Whigs 
introduced a bill in the legislature outlawing the usurpa- 
tion of a public office in defiance of a decree from a court of 
competent jurisdiction and enacted the proposal into law 
after successfully warding off Democratic efforts to make 
the act inapplicable to the controversy in Franklin Coun- 
t ~ . ~ ~  In May 1846 Gorham's lawyer obtained a summons 
from the Court of Appeals requiring the justices of the 
peace of Franklin to appear at the June term to show cause 
why they should not be held in contempt of court.30 
Still Luckett and his cohorts refused to submit. No ac- 
tions were brought against them under the newly enacted 
state law which made their conduct theoretically criminal. 
When Gorham successfully brought an action of trespass 
against his rival jailer in the Franklin County Circuit Court, 
Luckett refused to comply with the court's decree and give 
up the keys to the jail which he was occupying unlawfully. 
A short time later six of the Democratic justices of the 
peace-rather than accede to the summons of the Court of 
Appeals, which had indicated informally that it was in a 
conciliatory mood-subjected themselves to incarceration 
in Benjamin Luckett's jail. There they resided for four 
days; then on June 2 0  they held magistrate's court for one 
another and reciprocally issued writs of habeas corpus re- 
quiring their ally, Luckett, to show cause for holding them 
2s The charges and countercharges are in the Commonwealth, 25 Novem- 
ber 1845. 
29 Acts, 1845-1846, chap. 133. There is a clear party breakdown in all the 
relevant votes on the bill in both houses of the General Assembly. S.J., 1845- 
1846, pp. 93.95, 159-60; HJ.,  1845-1846, pp. 246-47. 
80 Commonwealth, 5 May 1846. 
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prisoners. When he answered that they were being held be- 
cause they had violated a decree from the Court of Appeals, 
they ruled that his response was inadequate and ordered 
themselves released. The  Whiggish Lexington Observer 
and Reporter commented that the resistance seemed ever- 
lasting.31 
Finally, on or about June 27, the Jacksonian magistrates 
announced through counsel and in a written pledge that 
they would consent to the mandate of the Court of Appeals. 
At the July term of the court the surrender seemed com- 
plete when the court voted to enter the decree and then 
set aside the order removing Gorham and appointing Luck- 
ett. Yet this appearance of abdication was short-lived, for 
the very next item of business concerned the receipt of a 
letter from William A. Gorham resigning from the office 
of jailer of Franklin County. Needless to say, the court ac- 
cepted the resignation and almost immediately thereafter 
appointed Luckett jailer. There is no evidence of why Gor- 
ham resigned. Possibly he believed that it was the only way 
he could obtain an admission from his magisterial oppres- 
sors that they had in theory been wrong when they had 
removed him without just cause one year before. So ended 
the attempt of the Franklin County Court to nullify a de- 
cree of the Court of  appeal^.^^ 
The Gorham incident not only reveals the realities of 
the politics of county government in antebellum Kentucky 
but also demonstrates the sometimes vitriolic relationships 
between the county courts and various county officials, 
higher courts, and the state legislature. It  also suggests the 
immense power of the county courts. The  Franklin magis- 
trates successfully defied the authority of a circuit court, 
31 Ibid., 23 June 1846; Obsertrer and Reporter, 27 June 1846. 
32 Commonwealth, go June 1846; Franklin County Court Order Book, 
1839-1848, pp. 325-26 (U.K. microfilm, reel M430:1488-89). 
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the Court of Appeals, and the General Assembly. Some of 
them made a farce out of a mandate of the highest judicial 
tribunal of the state. It  appears that they yielded very little 
when they agreed to enter the decree of the Court of Ap- 
peals since at the same time they secured what they had de- 
sired all along, the resignation of the Whig jailer. At no time 
during the episode did the countervailing constitutional 
forces of the state-the jailer, the circuit court, the Court of 
Appeals, the legislature, or, implicitly, the commonwealth's 
attorney and the grand jury for Franklin County, who were 
equipped with a new statute making Luckett's obstinence a 
crime-appear able to deter nullification. 
Other county officers more successfully resisted attempts 
of county courts to remove them. One of the most prolonged 
conflicts was between the court and the surveyor of Perry 
County. The  magistrates attempted to remove the surveyor, 
John Duff, in August 1843 for failure to post a bond to 
secure the performance of the duties of his office. Duff re- 
fused to vacate his office and appealed for redress both to the 
governor and to the Perry County Circuit Court. In a letter 
to Governor Letcher, Duff asserted that he had been the 
victim of a "violent and unconstitutional proceeding of the 
county court" and of the malfeasance of the county clerk, 
who had refused to record the execution of his bond. De- 
spite his allegations, the governor denied Duff's plea for 
relief. The  surveyor then took his case to the circuit court 
where, after a delay of almost three years, the judge ruled 
for the county court. Despite these adverse developments, 
Duff refused to vacate his office. His conduct became so ob- 
noxious that in October 1846, one month after the action of 
the circuit court, the bar of Perry County assembled to en- 
dorse Circuit Judge William B. Kinkead's opinion uphold- 
ing the county court and requested that a copy of the 
decision be furnished for publication. Yet Duff remained in 
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office for another year and a half and resigned only after the 
legislature impeached him and found him guilty of miscon- 
duct in office.33 
Not all county officials who were subjected to removal 
proceedings by county courts were as tenacious as William 
Gorham and John Duff. In December 1811 the County 
Court of Bourbon charged Thomas J. Glass with certain 
malfeasances and sought to remove him from his constable- 
ship. Glass allegedly had extracted bribes from would-be 
defendants in return for promises not to serve warrants, 
had sold a debtor's property prior to an advertised public 
sale, and had served an unexecuted warrant in order to ob- 
tain a fee. Rather than face trial on these counts, Glass 
resigned in early January 18 12  .34 
Although they were not empowered to remove their fel- 
low members, county courts could declare seats vacant 
and move to fill them by nominating two candidates to the 
governor. This proceeding frequently occurred, especially 
during the early years of the county court system when 
Kentuckians were highly mobile and not a few justices of 
the peace, without notice, moved out of the county or even 
the state. Sometimes a justice of the peace left his county 
only temporarily, but when he returned to take his seat on 
the court, found it occupied by a new appointee. In  1801 
George Elliott, a member of the Garrard County Court, took 
his wife to Lexington for medical treatment and remained 
there for several months. When Elliott returned to Garrard 
in May 1801 and attempted to take his place on the county 
court, he was denied his seat on the pretense that he had 
vacated it. Rather than appeal to a court for redress, Elliott 
33 John A. Duff to Governor Robert Letcher, 17 September 1843, Letcher 
Papers, jacket 466 (G.P., reel 70); Commonwealth, 17 November 1846; H.J., 
1847-1848, p. 371; Convention, 22 February 1848. 
34 Bourbon County Court Order Book, 1808-1812, pp. 452,464,468 (U.K. 
microfilm, reel M277: 1738-39). 
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petitioned the legislature to pass a special law restoring his 
place on the court. Elliott was apparently able to work out 
a settlement with the county court before the assembly 
considered his petition, for he was recorded as sitting on 
the tribunal in April 1 8 0 2 . ~ ~  
County courts did not declare vacancies solely because 
of unannounced withdrawals from the county. In  1844 
the Spencer County Court declared Alexander Harcourt's 
seat vacant because he had accepted the postmastership of 
Mount Eden, a position which was, by express constitu- 
tional provision, incompatible with any state or county 
office. Harcourt obtained a writ of mandamus from the 
Spencer Circuit Court ordering his seat on the county court 
restored on the grounds that the justices had sought to re- 
move him and thereby to exercise a power reserved ex- 
clusively to the legislature and the governor. The  Court of 
Appeals upheld the county court's action by dismissing the 
circuit court's writ. While recognizing that the county 
court had no power of removal, the Court of Appeals en- 
dorsed its action in this case by asserting that Harcourt had 
no standing to secure a writ of mandamus since he could 
not demonstrate that he was in law a justice of the peace, 
having accepted an incompatible office.36 
Sometimes county courts declared the office of sheriff 
vacant because its newly appointed occupant failed to post 
bond securing the performance of official acts. Normally 
those who failed to furnish security were sincere in their 
desire to vacate office, but occasionally sheriffs did not desire 
to forfeit their responsibilities and resisted the county court 
when it attempted to nominate a new candidate. In 1847 
the Bullitt County Court declared the sheriffalty vacant af- 
ter James Samuel, newly appointed to that office, failed to 
35 HJ. ,  1801, pp. 61--62; Garrard County Court Order Book, 1797-1808, 
p. 240 (U.K. microfilm, reel Mzq: 1939-40). 
36 Justices of Spencer County v. Harcourt, 4 B.  Monroe qgg (1844). 
[ 1041 County Courts i n  Antebel lum Kentucky 
execute bond as the county tax collector. Since the statutory 
period for nominations had passed, the county court simply 
recommended that Thomas J. Joice be nominated by the 
governor to the Senate as Samuel's replacement. Samuel, 
pleading imminent financial embarrassment, resisted the 
county court's action and succeeded in blocking the gover- 
nor's nomination in the Senate, which rejected the notion 
that Samuel had vacated his post.37 Samuel died soon there- 
after, rendering moot the constitutional question. 
County courts also retained the power to reject appoint- 
ments of certain county officials. In 1842 the court of Flem- 
ing County refused to administer the oath of office to 
William S. Emmons, one of the sheriff's duly appointed 
deputies. The  magistrates grounded their refusal on the fact 
that they had removed Emmons from a constableship only 
four years earlier because of malfeasance in office. Both the 
Fleming County Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals 
upheld the county court's decision, the high tribunal aver- 
ring that the magistrates had "some discretion in guarding 
the public against a glaring and reckless abuse of power." 38 
The patronage battles of Franklin and Perry counties, 
although uniquely spectacular and protracted, helped to 
undermine public confidence in Kentucky's local govern- 
ment. The  clumsiness which pervaded many of the more 
routine incidents of removal also contributed to the de- 
teriorating posture of the county courts. By the mid-1840s 
reformers were seriously considering alternative ways to 
select and reject county officers. 
37S.J., 1846-1847, pp. 301, 373, 401-2. 427; Commonwealth, 16 March 
1847. 
38 Day v. Justices of the Fleming County Court, 3 B. Monroe 198 (1842). 
Chapter 6 
T H E  COUNTY COURTS 
A N D  T H E  LEGISLATURE 
T HE COUNTY COURTS were not only the nucleus of local government but also a major agent of state government. In addition to such perennial tasks 
as maintaining roads and collecting taxes, the courts per- 
formed special missions for the state such as procuring and 
surveying land for seminaries of learning. Indeed the courts 
almost always acted as agents of the state. 
Almost all the powers of the county courts were legisla- 
tively granted, for although they were of constitutional 
origin during most of the antebellum period, their juris- 
diction was dependent upon the General Assembly. 
Their powers seemed to increase steadily as the legislators 
delegated more and more responsibility to their "county 
agents." The initial statute concerning county courts mere- 
ly granted to them the power to hear "all cases respecting 
wills, letters of administration, mills, roads, the appoint- 
ment of guardians and settling of their accounts and the 
admitting of deeds and other writings to record." l There- 
after the assembly added such powers as those to establish 
uniform weights and measures, franchise ferries, license 
sundry businesses, and establish gates and passways, while 
it expanded other responsibilities. 
So extensive were the responsibilities of the courts that 
even their supporters began to denounce the legislature for 
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delegating so much of its authority to them. During the 
debates in 1837-1838 on the desirability of amending the 
state Constitution, Robert Nelson Wickliffe, a Lexington 
attorney and editor of the Observer and Reporter, accused 
the assembly of having "heaped upon the county court pow- 
ers and required them to perform duties, in the exercise of 
which they became odious." R. D. Letcher of Garrard 
County asserted that "the inordinate power of the county 
court [was] given not by the Constitution but by the Legis- 
lature which had made it what it is." 
Not only did the legislature continuously expand the au- 
thority of the county courts, but it repeatedly overlooked 
and even ratified their abuses. Between 1808 and 1828, for 
example, the General Assembly enacted nineteen statutes 
either ratifying or permitting delinquent levies, eight stat- 
utes either ratifying or permitting delinquent appoint- 
ments of tax commissioners, seven statutes ratifying the 
business of courts held on the wrong days, one statute per- 
mitting an extra session of a court, and ten miscellaneous 
acts either ratifying or permitting acts of dubious legality 
or of an extraordinary nature. 
Yet the legislature was not altogether the compliant de- 
fender of the county court system. It  did not always endorse 
dubious or extraconstitutional actions by the courts; out- 
raged citizens petitioned it to overturn controversial orders 
of their county tribunals. The  General Assembly passed a 
law in 1820 rescinding an order of the Greenup County 
Court establishing a two-dollar levy per tithable to ap- 
propriate funds for a county jail. On the other hand, the leg- 
islators often resisted efforts to annul the actions of local 
tribunals. For example, in 1809 they rejected a petition of a 
group of Clark County citizens to set aside an order of the 
county court to lay a levy for the building of a jail, and in 
1 Acts, 1792, 1st sess., chap. 35, sec. 4. 
2 Gazette, 18 January 1838; Intelligencer, 25 July 1838. 
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i 8 16 they denied redress to petitioners from Allen County 
seeking the voidance of contracts for the construction of 
certain public  building^.^ 
Deepening the relationship of the legislature to the coun- 
ty courts were its continuous and usually unsuccessful at- 
tempts to regulate more effectively the proceedings of the 
tribunals and the conduct of various county officials, includ- 
ing the justices of the peace. The assembly made repeated 
efforts to increase the jurisdiction of the county courts and 
magistrates. Indeed it was always dealing with county 
government in one way or a n ~ t h e r . ~  
Since justices of the county courts were eligible for mem- 
bership in the General Assembly, they were at least theo- 
retically in a position to influence strongly the proceedings 
of the legislature, especially those concerning county gov- 
ernment. Substantial numbers of them took advantage of 
their opportunity to serve in the state legislature. Records 
for most of the fifty-nine years from 1792 to 1851 indicate 
that nearly a fourth of the total membership of the House 
of Representatives and slightly less than a fifth of the Senate 
were acting county court  justice^.^ Generally speaking, the 
number of justices of the peace serving in the House was 
3 Acts, 1820, chap. 168; H.J., 1808-1809, p. 166; H.J., 1815-1816, pp. 123- 
24 (petition never reported out of committee). 
4 During its session of 1840-1841 alone the House of Representatives con- 
sidered well over seventy-five bills dealing with county courts. H.J., 1840- 
1841, Index, pp. 14-16. 
5 See Table 1. Justices of the peace who served on the courts of quarter 
sessions and were in the legislature are not included in this list since they 
were not members of the county courts. Lists of legislators can be found in 
Lewis Collins and Richard H. Collins, History of Kentucky, 2 vols. (Coving- 
ton, Ky., 1874). vol. 2, passim, H.J., 1792-1851 and S.J., 1792-1851 and the 
Frankfort Palladium; names of magistrates are located in the Journals and 
Papers of the Governors of Kentucky, 1792-1850, Registers of the Justices of 
the Peace, 1815-1820, 1835-1844, and 1845-1850 (G.P.), and county court 
order books. For the years not covered by the Registers, statistics are esti- 
mates since governors' journals and papers do not always indicate termina- 
- - 
tion of magisterial tenure and not all county court order books are extant. 
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greatest during the early years of statehood and gradually 
but unevenly decreased as time passed. In the Senate the 
pattern is even more erratic, although there were propor- 
tionately more county court magistrates in this body during 
the first half of the period of the old county court system 
than in the last. 
I t  is evident that for the fifty-nine-year period under 
study the percentage of magistrates in the lower house was 
moderately greater than in the Senate. What is not so clear is 
why this was so or why the relative numbers of county court 
justices in both houses declined during the last fifteen years 
of the system. One explanation is that public opposition to 
the county courts, which intensified after 1835, translated 
itself into votes against magistrates running for the legisla- 
ture. Except for this tentative supposition the decline re- 
mains mysterious. 
There is data to establish the party affiliation of the legis- 
lative magistrates. While a majority of the county court 
justices serving in the legislature were members of the 
dominant Whig party, a substantial minority were Demo- 
crats. Statistics reveal that from 1827 to 1851, the earliest 
period of an organized and documented two-party system in 
the state, nearly 58 percent of the House magistrates were 
Whig and slightly over 42 percent were Democratic, while 
the Senate was divided almost equally between the two ma- 
jor parties. Democrats were actually more numerous among 
the magistrates of the assembly than in the membership at 
large. Through the legislature of 1850-1 85 1 only 37 percent 
of the general membership of the House and Senate were 
Democrats, which means that proportionately there were 
almost 13 percent more Democrats among the justices of 
the peace in the House and 32 percent more among those in 
the Senate.6 
6 See Table 2. Lists of legislators and their party affiliations can be found 
in the following newspapers: Reporter (1827-1829, 1831); Argus of the West- 
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It  is not surprising that the presence of so many county 
court justices in the General Assembly, which dealt so exten- 
sively with county government, produced periodic spasms of 
opposition. Complaints were especially prevalent during the 
early decades of the county court system and during the 
years immediately preceding constitutional reform in 1849. 
In March 1794 a "Farmer," writing to the Kentucky Ga- 
zette, denounced the practice of allowing justices of the 
peace, whom he characterized as "petty tyrants," to serve 
as both "makers and judges of the law." William Henry 
echoed "Farmer's" sentiments in October 1794 and urged 
the defeat of all magistrates running for the General As- 
sembly. Both pleas apparently fell on deaf ears because 
substantial numbers of magistrates were elected to the legis- 
lature in 1794 and 1795 .~  
Failing to defeat significant numbers of the justices at 
the polls, critics turned to the device of constitutional re- 
form. "Cassius," writing to the Gazette in May 1798, ac- 
cused Kentuckians of "surrendering" their rights to the 
county magistrates, whom he pictured as controlling the 
legislature, and called for constitutional reform of this al- 
leged grievan~e.~ Although a new constitution was pro- 
duced in the following year, county magistrates were not 
prohibited from serving in the legislature, and criticism 
of the practice continued into the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century. 
Humphrey Marshall was especially caustic in his com- 
plaints about the legislative magistrates. He accused them 
ern World (1828, 1832): Russellville Weekly Messenger (1828); Gazette 
(1830, 1835-1838); Louisville Daily Focus (1831); Commonwealth (1833-1835, 
1838-1850); and Observer and Refiorter (1839). 
7 Gazette, I ,  8 March, 4 October 1794. In 1795 both houses resolved that 
justices of the courts of quarter sessions were ineligible for the legislature; 
p t  in 1799 the House defeated a similar resolution. H.J., 1795, pp. 9-10; S.J., 
1795, p. 7; H.J., 2799, p. 11. 
8 Ibid., 2 May 1798. 
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of imposing on Kentuckians in 1792 and 1805 substantial 
fee schedules for justices of the peace and generally of 
voting to increase the powers of single magistrates and 
county courts. Other critics agreed. "Rusticus," writing to 
the Gazette in 1806, charged the legislative magistrates with 
increasing the fees of both justices of the peace and sheriffs. 
One detractor unsuccessfully attacked the validity of an 
1805 statute that enlarged the jurisdiction of single magis- 
trates by alleging that the presence of so many justices in 
the legislature rendered the law invalid because it violated 
the separation of powers doctrine. Twice early in the nine- 
teenth century unsuccessful attempts were made to prevent 
House magistrates from voting on their own fee bills, and 
in 1808 Governor Scott refused to appoint either of two 
recommended justices to the sheriffalty of Pulaski County 
because both had voted as legislators for a sheriffs' fee bill.9 
Voting records suggest that in part the charges of these 
critics were correct. On occasion legislative magistrates pro- 
tected their fee schedules, supporting increases and-op- 
posing reductions. They also resisted attempts to prohibit 
magistrates from voting on such matters. For example in 
1805 they voted overwhelmingly against an attempt to pre- 
vent legislative justices from voting on a magisterial fee 
bill and then supported the legislation, although less sub- 
stantially. In 1808 they resisted a similar attempt of pro- 
hibition and generally opposed an attempt to reduce their 
fees. Senate justices were equally on guard, voting, for ex- 
ample, six to one in 1819 against an attempt to lower rates.1° 
Yet this pattern is not uniform. In 1799 House magis- 
trates voted fifteen to ten in favor of a key section of a bill 
substantially eliminating magisterial fees and in 1806 they 
9 Marshall, History of Kentucky, 2:33-37; Gazette, 19 July 1806; Head v. 
Hughes, 1 A. K .  Marshall 372 (1818); H.J., 1805, pp. 92-93; H.J., 1807-1808, 
p. 129; Charles Scott Journal, p. 15 (G.P., reel 8). 
10 H.J., 1805, pp. 92-93; H.J., 1807-1808, pp. 129, 141; S.J., 1818-1819, p. 
262. 
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voted eleven to ten to repeal in part the fee statute enacted 
the year before. Likewise, the assemblies of 1793 and 1798 
lowered fees, and although votes were not recorded, the low- 
er houses were heavily populated with justices of the peace. 
Recorded voting on other fee bills manifests significant 
- 
division among the magistrates." 
With regard to bills enlarging the jurisdiction of single 
magistrates and county courts, critics of legislative justices 
clearly exaggerated both the extent and nature of the 
alleged conspiracy. In fact a majority of magistrates £re- 
quently voted against bills which would have extended the 
individual magistrates' powers or expanded the jurisdiction 
of their courts. In eighteen sample votes between 1792 and 
1849 a majority of House justices voted thirteen times 
against bills which would have increased jurisdiction or for 
bills restricting jurisdiction, and in only four instances did 
they support increased jurisdiction; the remaining vote re- 
sulted in a tie. But in most cases a substantial minority of 
justices opposed the decision of the majority, undermining 
the notion that there existed a "magistrates' bloc" on this 
question. Although Senate magistrates were more apt to 
favor bills increasing jurisdiction of county government, 
they also on occasion evidenced substantial division on 
these questions.12 
11 H.J., 1799, p. 105; H.J., 1806, p. 59; Marshall, History of Kentucky, 
2:33-37. For example, legislative magistrates divided almost equally on  fee 
bills in 1809, 1810, 181 1 ,  and 1819. H.J., 1808-1809, pp. 262-64; H.J., 1809- 
1810, p. 187; H.J., 1810-1811, pp. 162-63; H.J., 1819--1820, p. 140. 
12 H.J., 1792, 2d sess., pp. 67-68; H.J., 1801, p. 96; H.J., 1804, p. 34; H.J., 
1805, p. 97; H.J., 1810-1811, pp. 149-50; H.J., 1815-1816, p. 87; H.J., 1821, 
p. 269; H.J., 1822, p. 302; H.J., 1826-1827, pp. 3-31; H.J., 1829-1830, pp. 
106-8; H.J., 1838-1839, pp. 554-55; H.J., 1840-1841, pp. 382-84; H.J., 1841- 
1842, pp.  209-12; H.J., 1844-1845, pp .  223-25; H.J., 1845-1846. pp. 109-10; 
H.J., 1846-1847, pp. 187-91; HJ. ,  1847-1848, pp. 183-85; H.J., 1848-1849, pp. 
136-39. For examples o f  Senate voting see S.J., 1805-1806, p. 71; S.J., 1810- 
1811, pp. 184-85; S.J., 1811-1812, p. 156; S.J., 1818-1819, pp. 262-63; S.J., 
1819-1820, pp. 160-61; S.J., 1829--1830, pp. 1 6 4 1 ;  and S.J., 1835-1836, pp. 
324-26. 
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Furthermore legislative magistrates were far from a self- 
conscious and powerful voting bloc when it came to two 
other categories of business affecting local government: at- 
tempts to remove errant justices of the peace and to regulate 
more effectively county government and its personnel. The  
General Assembly of Kentucky from time to time consid- 
ered petitions calling for removal of one or more county 
court justices. The  Constitutions of both 1792 and 1799 
provided two methods to remove justices of the peace-im- 
peachment by the House and conviction by the Senate, or 
an address to the governor approved by two-thirds of each 
house. The legislature normally utilized the latter method. 
The  House dealt with most of these cases, the majority of 
which occurred before 1820. Nine of them afford some idea 
of how the legislative justices of the peace reacted when try- 
ing one of their brethren. In  only two instances did a ma- 
jority of magistrates in the House act decisively to prevent 
a fellow justice of the peace from being removed from office. 
In 1792 the House voted twenty-three to seven to reject a 
petition calling for the removal of John Waller, a magis- 
trate and member of the court of quarter sessions of Bour- 
bon County. The  assembled justices of the peace voted six 
to one in Waller's favor. In 1810 the House voted thirty-six 
to nineteen to disapprove a recommendation from a select 
committee recommending the removal of David Logan, a 
justice of the peace from Fayette County, for packing a jury 
and other alleged malfeasances. The  magistrates voted fif- 
teen to five in favor of this action, forming a significant 
element of the majority.13 
This vote of the justices of the peace was more than offset 
by their actions in other cases of alleged misconduct. On 
seven occasions a majority of voting county court justices 
13 Constitution of 1792, Art. 3 and Art. 5, sec. 2; Constitution of 1799, Art. 
4 ,  sec. 6, and Art. 5; H.J., 1792, 2d sess., pp. 61-62; H.J., 1809-1810, pp. 161- 
62. 
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supported efforts to secure conviction of magistrates ac- 
cused of malfeasance. For example in 1793 they voted five 
to three to remove William Lamb, a magistrate from Mason 
County, and in 1795 they were instrumental in overturning 
a committee recommendation to reject a petition seeking 
the removal of John McHatton, a magistrate from Scott 
County. On four other occasions a majority of justices voted 
with a majority of other legislators to recommend the 
unseating i f  a delinquent county magistrate. In another in- 
stance seven of ten voting justices supported a motion de- 
signed to expedite the removal of a magistrate.14 
The  Senate did not vote on as many resolutions to re- 
move county magistrates as did the House because seldom 
did citizens petition it to initiate such action; sometimes 
the representatives to whom the petitions were first directed 
refused to endorse them and other times accused magis- 
trates resigned rather than prolong the humiliation of a 
public hearing. In three sample votes on such matters re- 
corded in Senate journals before 1850, the participating 
magistrates were inconsistent: in 1818 most of them voted, 
and all who did supported the resolution of removal; in 
1836 most of them did not vote, but the two who did fa- 
vored removal; and in 1846 one supported removal, one 
opposed it, and the other did not vote.15 In these three in- 
stances all but one of the justices voted against their fellow 
magistrates, hardly the reaction of a self-interested bloc. 
Thus the record of the legislative justices of the peace in 
cases of allegedly wayward magistrates is not that of a spe- 
cial interest group acting to protect one of its own. Instead, 
their record manifests a spirit of independent thinking free 
of undue loyalty to professional cohorts or concern for the 
14H.J., 1793, p. 60; H.J., 1795, pp. 3. 5, 7; H.J., 1808-1809, pp. 253-54; 
H.J., 1817-1818, p. zoo; H.J., 1835-1836, pp. 358-60; H.J., 1845-1846, pp. 
265-67; H.J., 1801, pp. 109-10. 
15S.J., 1817-1818, p. 170; S.J., 1835-1836, p. 443; S.J., 1845-1846, pp. 298- 
301. 
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establishment of institutional immunity. Similar patterns 
emerge from an analysis of the magistrates' reactions to ef- 
forts to regulate the conduct of the county courts and their 
personnel. In 18 13 the justices in the House voted thirteen 
to seven against a bill to control more effectively the con- 
duct of county magistrates, while at the same session they 
supported reform by voting thirteen to seven in favor of 
legislation expediting the legislative trials of allegedly cor- 
rupt court justices. Although a majority of House justices 
voted against bills introduced in 1828 to prevent justices 
of the peace from becoming securities in certain cases be- 
fore local tribunals and to define more precisely the duties 
of the county courts, many of them supported the reform 
efforts. Again in 184'7 they were evenly divided on a motion 
to table legislation aimed at curtailing fraud and embezzle- 
ment on the part of some of their fellow court members; 
later in the session they voted nine to seven to defeat such 
a measure. Only with regard to an effort to limit the num- 
ber of justices in each county did the magistrates turn in an 
overwhelmingly negative vote, fourteen to three, a decision 
supported by most other legislators. Senate magistrates ex- 
hibited substantial disunity in five attempts to regulate 
justices of the peace, county courts, or sheriffs, while gen- 
erally opposing such measures on four other  occasion^.'^ 
Justices of the peace in the assembly voted on one other 
category of legislation which indirectly affected their posi- 
tion as governors of the counties: bills "to take the sense of 
the people as to the propriety of calling a constitutional 
convention." The  Constitution of 1'799 provided that a con- 
vention could be called only if the legislature passed a law 
calling for a referendum and the people approved a call in 
16H.J., 1813-1814, pp. 77-78, 193; H.J., 1827-1828, pp. 207-8, 297; H.J., 
1846-1847, pp. 283,505; S.J., 1828-1829, pp. 291-92; S.J., 182p-18j0, pp. 162- 
63; S.J., 1830-1831, pp. 1 0 2 ,  130-32; SJ., 1831-1832, pp. 237-39; S.J., 1832- 
1833, pp. 174-78; S.J., 1834-1835, pp. 325-27; S.J., 1839-1840, pp. 272-73: S.J., 
1844-1845, p. 125. 
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two successive elections. Since during the last two decades 
of the system reform of the county courts was generally 
recognized as a probable objective of a constitutional con- 
vention, the justices of the peace of the legislature, had they 
acted through self-interest, might have been expected to 
vote against bills authorizing referendums. However, they 
did not respond in a uniformly negative fashion but mani- 
fested the same independence and disunity that they often 
evidenced with regard to legislation directly related to 
county government. In seven recorded votes on such bills 
between 1828 and 1847, House magistrates voted six times 
narrowly and a seventh time decisively in favor of au- 
thorizing a convention vote. As with legislation on county 
government, the senatorial justices of the peace treated con- 
vention bills with more unanimity, decisively opposing 
bills on three occasions, narrowly supporting bills twice, 
overwhelmingly approving a bill in another vote, and di- 
viding on the question on still another.17 
Probably because there were fewer magistrates in the 
legislature and almost no bloc-voting, criticism of justices 
serving in the General Assembly abated after 1825 until 
shortly before the Constitutional Convention of 1849. In 
1846 the bipartisan committee of seventy-six legislators spe- 
cifically complained that justices of the peace were allowed 
to serve in the legislature. In early 1847 "Bourbon" sub- 
mitted that the presence of magistrates in the legislature 
violated the separation of powers doctrine, a chant taken 
up by the Frankfort Convention, a reform-minded news- 
paper, in March of the same year.ls 
If the magistrates were not generally influenced by con- 
17H.J., 2828-1829, p. 81; H.J., 1833-1834, pp. 9-1; H.J., 1834-1835. p. 
138; H.J., 1835-1836, p. 86; H.J., 1837-1838, pp. 122-23; H.J., 1845-1846, p. 
loo; H.J., 1846-1847, pp. 72-73; S.J., 1828-1829, p. 76; S.J., 1833-1834. p. 72; 
S.J., 1834-1835, p. 97; SJ., 1835-1836, p. 135; S.J., 18j6-18j7, p. 130; S.J., 
1845-1846. p. 92; S.J., 1846-1847, p. 53. 
1s Yeoman, 8 October 1846; 2 1  January 1847; Convention, 27 March 1847. 
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siderations of professional loyalty (except when voting on 
their fees), they were equally unmoved by party allegiance. 
Some semblance of party regularity can be seen in only one 
of twelve relevant House votes and two of thirteen Senate 
votes. Moreover, in two of the three indications of party 
allegiance the loyalty involved only one party, with mem- 
bers of the other party dividing their votes. Finally, on one 
of the two occasions on which the legislators voted exclu- 
sively along party lines, only three magistrates participated 
in the balloting.Ig 
Even though the General Assembly was not ruled by a 
solid voting bloc of magistrates, it was unwilling to reform 
the county court system or its officers. It repeatedly rejected 
bills which would have made the county courts less cumber- 
some and defeated similar proposals which would have 
regulated more effectively the activities of sheriffs and con- 
stables. If this failure to reform was not the result of a 
conspiracy of legislative justices of the peace, neither did it 
stem from concerted efforts of the allegedly more conserva- 
tive Whig Party, which dominated the General Assembly 
for all but one session between 1827 and 1851. Fifteen 
sample votes indicate that with the exception of bills in- 
volving constables, Whig legislators favored stricter regu- 
lation of county government than did their Democratic 
adversaries. The Jacksonians appear to have been more will- 
ing to reform the local constitution early in the history of 
the state's two-party system when their popular strength was 
greatest. As their numbers in the legislature decreased, so 
did their enthusiasm for regulation. This trend may reflect 
the fact that many Jacksonian politicians were able to domi- 
nate county courts in the 1830s and 1840s while losing out 
at the polls.20 
19 H.J., 1844-1845, p. 225; S.J., 1825-1830, pp. 160--61, 163. 
2oThe fifteen sample votes concerned four bills to make the county 
courts less unwieldy and more dependable (H.J., 1827-1828, pp. 207--g; S.J., 
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In sum, two grievances emanated from the relationship 
of the legislature to the county courts. The  first, objection 
to the presence of magistrates in the General Assembly, 
diminished as the numbers of legislative justices of the 
peace declined. The second, the failure of the legislature to 
remedy any of the deficiencies of the county court system, 
was more serious and helped produce an atmosphere which 
prompted constitutional revision in 1849. 
1834-18j5, pp. 325-27; S.J., 18j7-1840, pp. 272-73; S.J., 1844-1845, p. 125); 
three bills to regulate justices of the peace (H.J., 1827-1828, p. 297; S.J., 
1828-1829, pp. 291-92; H.J., 1846-1847, p. 505); two resolutions to remove 
justices of the peace from office (S.J., 1835-1836, p. 443; S.J., 1845-1846, p. 
301); a bill to regulate sheriffs (S.J., 1830-1831, p. 132); a bill to outlaw the 
selling of the sheriffalty (S.J., 1832-1833, pp. 174-78); a bill to compensate 
a buyer of a sheriffalty for his losses while in office (S.J., 1827-1828, pp. 136- 
38); two bills to regulate constables (S.J., 1829-1830, pp. 16243; S.J., 1831- 
1832, pp. 238-39); and a bill to prevent fraud and collusion between sheriffs, 
constables, and defendants (S.J., 1830-18j1, pp. i3c-32). Most of the measures 
were defeated; only the bills to compensate the buyer of a sheriffalty and 
one of the resolutions to remove a justice of the peace from office passed. 
Chapter 7 
TOWN AND COUNTRY 
T HE COUNTY COURTS had a substantial and sometimes abrasive connection with the towns and cities of antebellum Kentucky. Specific statutes enacted by 
the legislature between 1796 and 1828 and more general 
grants of authority enabled the courts and their members 
to mingle significantly and often provocatively in the affairs 
of towns. After 1827 some of the larger towns began to gain 
constitutional immunity from county court interference, 
yet on several occasions this state of semiautonomy served 
to heighten rather than reduce tensions between the two 
local governmental bodies. 
A statute of 1796 authorized county courts to establish 
towns upon petition, to set their boundaries, and to fill 
vacancies on their boards of trustees should the towns them- 
selves neglect to hold elections. A statute of 1800 apprecia- 
bly increased the powers of the county courts over towns. 
The  courts were authorized to fix the number of trustees in 
all towns save fifteen of the largest, to select annually a new 
board of trustees should any town neglect to hold elections, 
and to settle annually with the town tax collectors, placing 
all surplus monies in a special trust fund. Although courts 
evidently audited the tax accounts of towns within their 
jurisdiction only rarely, they did periodically appoint town 
trustees. Finally, a statute of 1828 empowered the county 
courts to force town trustees to account for all receipts 
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and expenditures in the event they failed to do this on 
their 0wn.l 
By virtue of more general grants of authority the county 
courts opened all new streets within towns and owned and 
operated the public square, which was the geographical and 
political center of towns. This ownership produced rela- 
tionships of both cooperation and controversy between 
courts and towns. Finally, members of county courts, acting 
in their capacities as justices of the peace, constituted the 
principal judicial agents of towns, and other county officials 
such as the sheriff, the constables, the jailer, and the coroner 
performed services for them. 
An excellent way to determine the realities of the polit- 
ical and constitutional links between county courts and 
towns is to examine the relationship between Fayette 
County and its seat, Lexington, commencing in 1782 and 
culminating with the fight to repeal the city charter in 
1836. Such an examination is appropriate because through- 
out the antebellum period Lexington was one of the prin- 
cipal cities of Kentucky, and Fayette was one of its foremost 
counties. Although its early predominance in the economy 
of Kentucky receded in the 1820s, Lexington continued to 
be the intellectual, political, and social center of the state. 
Fayette County possessed a government notable for its far- 
reaching powers and political influence. 
The relationship between Fayette County and Lexing- 
ton between 1782 and 1831 was clearly characteristic of the 
dominant position of counties in local constitutions. As in 
most counties, the Fayette court opened all new streets in 
the county seat, Lexington, and owned and operated the 
public square upon which the courthouse and other public 
buildings were located. The  court allowed the town to con- 
' Acts, 1796-1797, pp. 39-41; Acts, 1800, chap. 4,  secs. I ,  3, 4; A&, 1827- 
1828, chap. 71, sec. I .  
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struct a market house and an engine house on the public 
square and to utilize the courthouse for its trustee meetings 
and the county jail and workhouse for its criminals. In ad- 
dition, certain members of the court, all of whom acted in- 
dividually as justices of the peace, constituted the principal 
judicial officers of the town. These county-town magistrates 
also occasionally assumed other responsibilities for the 
town, such as supervising elections. Furthermore, other 
officials of the county government, such as the sheriff, the 
constables, the jailer, and the coroner, performed services 
for Lexingtom2 
The intimate relationship between Lexington and Fay- 
ette County produced dissension as well as cooperation. In 
1817 the county court ordered the trustees of Lexington to 
tear down the dilapidated town market house. When the 
trustees resisted, the members of the court set a deadline 
for the observance of their order and threatened to instruct 
the sheriff to do the necessary razing, authorizing him to 
"summon the strength of the county if required." After this 
show of determination the trustees acquiesced. Tensions 
were renewed when at their November court the justices 
of the peace ordered the town to raze "the old engine 
house" and made known their intention to petition the 
legislature for permission to lease that part of the public 
square upon which the market house had stood. The trus- 
tees responded vigorously, voting to send a committee 
before the court to express their "disapprobation." This ma- 
neuver apparently succeeded, for there is no evidence that 
the town removed the engine house or that the county court 
petitioned the legislature for permission to lease part of the 
2 Littell, Statute Law, 3 : 1 7 v 1 ;  Record Book of the Town of Lexington, 
1780-181 i (Lexington Municipal Building), pp. 29,209,213-15, 235; Lexing- 
ton Record Book, 1811-1817, pp. 14g3188,216,236,241-42,25g, 267, 278,288, 
336,363,373,385: Lexington Record Book, 1830-1836, p. 91; Acts, 1795, chap. 
33, sec. 2; Acts, 1828-1829, chap. 114, sec. 2. 
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public square. However, the question of what to do with 
the vacant ground in the square was still a debated issue 
during the next decade. In 1822 the town trustees unsuccess- 
fully attempted to persuade the county court and the legis- 
lature to permit the ground to be used for a town hall, and 
in 1826 the justices of the peace again contemplated seeking 
legislative permission to dispose of the unoccupied area.3 
Townsmen grumbled over other matters also. They com- 
plained that they were forced to pay the county levy as well 
as city taxes and received few benefits from the county in 
return. They were especially annoyed when the county 
court refused in 1817 to contribute to the construction of 
a mental hospital to be located within the town  limit^.^ 
At times they charged the county magistrates and con- 
stables with shirking their duties as the principal judicial 
and police officers of the community, and on other occasions 
they accused them of being overly zealous. 
The  relative weakness of the town in Kentucky during 
its early history was due not only to the superior constitu- 
tional power of the county court but also to the lack of 
authority vested in town government. This was especially 
true for Lexington, which was until about 1825 the largest 
community in the state. Only gradually during the first fifty 
years of its existence as an established town, from 1782 to 
1831, did Lexington attain those powers basic to a viable 
town government. And for these grants of authority Lex- 
ington, like other towns, was dependent upon piecemeal 
consideration by the legislature. Thus in 1792 the General 
Assembly, largely incorporating a law enacted by the Vir- 
ginia legislature two years earlier, granted to the town of 
3 Fayette County Court Order Book, 1811-1817, pp. 520,535 (U.K. micro- 
film, reel M366:2); Lexington Record Book, 1811-1817, pp. 359, 366-69, 375; 
Fayette County Court Order Book, 1817-1821, pp. 63, 68 (U.K. microfilm, 
reel M366:2); Lexington Record Book, 1811-1817, p. 382; Lexington Record 
Book, 1818-1830, pp. 1gg,3og. 
4 Gazette, 14 April, 26 May 1817. 
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Lexington the right to govern its streets, establish and con- 
trol a town market house, abate nuisances, and levy taxes 
not to exceed £loo. During the next decade the legislature 
authorized the town trustees to prohibit horse racing in the 
streets, impound loose swine within the town limits, hire 
day and night watchmen, increase the tax base by £50, pave 
certain streets, and exempt all able-bodied residents from 
working on county roads.5 
From 1802 to 1830 the legislature further broadened the 
still rudimentary powers of the trustees by granting them 
greater police powers, providing more effective means to 
prevent fires, expanding their taxing powers, authorizing 
them to license theaters and tippling houses, and permitting 
them to borrow up to 9$2o,ooo upon the town's   red it.^ 
However, by 1830 the government of Lexington still lacked 
a judiciary and a chief executive, as well as other attributes 
of a semi-independent urban government, such as the right 
to open new streets and to license taverns, groceries, and 
other such establishments. 
In light of the constitutional deficiencies of town govern- 
ment in Lexington, as well as the inadequacies of those 
services which the county officials furnished, it is not sur- 
prising that efforts were made by the trustees and townsmen 
to secure greater autonomy. In 1812 the trustees sought 
partial relief by petitioning the General Assembly for the 
creation of an independent judiciary. The  effort failed. In 
1792 they unsuccessfully petitioned the assembly for a char- 
ter establishing Lexington as a municipal corporation, and 
in 18 15 they again contemplated such a move but took only 
preliminary action. Although the legislature could grant 
charters to towns making them cities and bestowing upon 
5 Acts, 1792, 1st sess., chap. lo; Acts, r793, chap. 27, sec. 2; Acts, 1795, 
chap. 33, sec. I ;  Acts, 1796-1797, pp. 111-14; Littell, Statute Law, 2:171, 
3:35-36. 
6 Littell, Statute Law, 3:411-12; Acts, 1810-18x1, chap. 257, sec. 5; Littell, 
Statute Law, 5:512; Acts, 1822, chap. 437; Acts, 182p1830, chap. 284. 
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them more general and complete powers of government, 
no such grant was made until 1828, when the assembly 
incorporated Louisville, by then the largest city of the Com- 
monwealth. The success of Louisville's leaders prompted 
Lexingtonians to petition again for a charter in 1831, and 
this time they were suc~essful.~ 
Two of the most important provisions of "An Act to In- 
corporate the City of Lexington," passed by the General 
Assembly on December 7, 1831, were in section seven, estab- 
lishing an independent judiciary, and section seventeen, 
granting city residents immunity from county taxes. The  
former provision freed the city fathers from dependence 
upon the county for law enforcement, while the latter not 
only expanded significantly the city's taxing potential but 
also eliminated a major grievance which had persisted 
throughout the period of Lexington's status as a town, 
namely that town residents paid taxes to the county without 
receiving significant benefits. Other provisions of the char- 
ter practically eliminated the role of the county court in 
the administration of what had been town business. For 
example, the city was now authorized to appoint its own 
food inspectors and to license its taverns, whereas before 
the county court had taken care of these responsibilities for 
the entire county. Furthermore, to open new streets the city 
would now apply to the circuit court, not the county court. 
Finally, the city fathers were given the authority to elimi- 
nate another form of dependence upon the county by a 
provision empowering them to erect "buildings for a poor- 
house and a work-house." 
The emancipation of Lexington from the constitutional 
grip of Fayette County and the commensurate invigoration 
of city government did not eliminate friction between city 
7 Lexington Record Book, 181 1-1817, pp. 16, 271; H.J., 1792, pp. 78, 93; 
Acts, 1827-1828, chap. 172; Acts, 1831-18j2, chap. 633. 
8 Acts, 1831-1832, chap. 633, secs. 7, lo, 13, 17. 
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and county but merely changed the sources of dissension 
and complaints. Before incorporation Lexington had done 
most of the remonstrating and Fayette County allegedly 
had committed most of the grievances; thereafter the roles 
were reversed. For example, in 1833 the county court un- 
successfully sought to curtail some of Lexington's financial 
independence by petitioning the legislature for a law which 
would have applied all fines received by the city court "to 
the use of the county of Fayette in lessening the county 
levy." In November 1835 residents of the county, already 
discontented about certain rulings by the city council, 
staged an open revolt over a wood ordinance which sought 
to insure uniformity and honesty in the weighing and selling 
of wood. Branding themselves as "slaves to the rulers of Lex- 
ington" and the wood ordinance as unconstitutional, coun- 
ty residents held a meeting on December 14 and resolved to 
cease selling wood to Lexington until the "obnoxious ordi- 
nance . . . be repealed." 
Yet these outbursts of friction between county and city 
were only preludes to a basic confrontation which occurred 
in 1836 when dissidents from the county combined with 
those from the city and attempted to repeal the charter of 
Lexington. The  occasion for the challenge was a decision 
by Thomas Hickey, judge of the Fayette Circuit Court, 
holding that the judicial system of Lexington was uncon- 
stitutional. In 1831 the General Assembly had granted an 
independent judiciary to Lexington in a rather peculiar 
manner. Instead of creating a separate court to be run by 
a judge, the legislature had vested the city's judicial au- 
thority in the mayor, who was also the chief executive of 
the community. He was given exclusive original jurisdic- 
tion in all cases involving violations of city ordinances and 
concurrent jurisdiction in those civil and criminal cases 
9 H.J., 1832-1833, pp. 197-98, 208; Obseruer and Reporter, 30 December 
1835. 
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heard by justices of the peace. His decisions were apparent- 
ly to be final in cases involving city ordinances but could 
be appealed to the circuit court in cases involving other 
civil and criminal matters. The legislature had created a 
constitutional problem by vesting judicial authority in the 
mayor. Section twenty-four of the city charter provided 
that ballots should be cast for at least two candidates for 
mayor and that the governor should commission, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, one of the two candidates 
receiving the highest number of votes. Since the Constitu- 
tion provided that all judges were to be commissioned by 
the governor with the consent of the Senate and were to 
hold office for life and since the city charter provided that 
the mayor was to be chosen annually and in large part by 
the voters of Lexington, it was questionable whether the 
city court had been constitutionally established.1° 
Oddly enough, no one challenged the validity of section 
twenty-four until Nelson Turner did so in December 1835, 
although its shortcomings, as a Lexington newspaper ad- 
mitted soon thereafter, were glaring. James E. Davis, the 
mayor, had tried Turner, a farmer and resident of the coun- 
ty, for breach of the peace and had fined him fifty dollars. 
Turner failed to pay the fine and was imprisoned. In an 
action brought before Judge Hickey he subsequently de- 
nied the validity of his conviction and imprisonment, con- 
tending that section twenty-four of the city charter was 
unconstitutional. In  a carefully reasoned and lengthy opin- 
ion issued in the latter part of December 1835, Judge 
Hickey agreed with Turner's contentions, freed him, 
and rendered invalid and inoperative the City Court of 
Lexington.ll 
I t  soon became apparent that this successful challenge to 
10 Acts, 1831, chap. 633, sec. 7; Constitution of 1799, Art. 4,  sec. 3. 
11 Intelligencer, 4 March 1836; Observer and Reporter, 23 December 
1835; Gazette, g January 1836. 
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the validity of a cornerstone of the Lexington city charter 
was premeditated. A local newspaper reported that Turner 
had gone to jail in order "to test the constitutionality of 
the charter."12 The motives behind this belated test case 
probably lay in city and county partisan politics as well as 
in broader constitutional and political rivalries between 
the two agencies of local government, for it came at a time 
when the first state two-party system was firmly established 
and had already produced antagonisms within and between 
the county and the city. In order to understand the possible 
motivations underlying In  re Turner and at the same time 
to comprehend the more serious questions raised by the 
case, the realities of party politics in Fayette County and 
Lexington must be explored. 
Judge Hickey was a Democrat and as such was a member 
of the political party which had dominated the Fayette 
County Court almost from the inception of a two-party sys- 
tem in Kentucky. The  Democratic justices of the peace, 
whose majority on the court was at first very small, had 
solidified their hold on county government between 1827 
and 1835 by recommending only Jacksonians to fill vacan- 
cies. Fayette Democrats were less successful in their efforts 
to control the government of Lexington, their strength at 
the polls declining between 1827 and 1835. The  annual 
elections, first for trustees of the town and after 1831 for 
mayor and councilmen of the city, inevitably resulted in 
the victory of almost totally anti-Jacksonian slates. This did 
not mean, however, that campaigns were not spirited. After 
the town election of January 1829 Democratic politicians 
accused their political opponents of using fraudulent tactics 
to win an overwhelming majority of the town's trustees.13 
In terms of the proportion of votes, if not of winners, 
the Democrats staged something of a comeback in the town 
12 Observer and Reporter, 23 December 1835. 
13 Gazette, 9 ,  16 January 1829. 
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elections of 1830. But after 1831 the Democratic vote pro- 
portionately declined, and in 1834 the Whigs, like the 
Democrats at the county level, moved to tighten their 
control over the city council by eliminating ward voting, 
thereby capitalizing on their overall strength in the city and 
minimizing the Democratic domination of the first ward. 
By the end of 1835 the Jacksonian Democrats controlled the 
government of Fayette County and the Whigs dominated 
the government of Lexington, and each party vowed that 
the other would not preserve its constitutional power with- 
out challenge. The  Whigs promised "retribution" in the 
face of proscription by the Democratic county court, and 
the Jacksonians pledged not to "stand idly by and see the 
rights of the citizens trampled upon" by the Whigs. Thus 
partisan politics may have prompted Turner's preconceived 
testing of the constitutionality of Lexington's judicial arm 
in the courtroom of Democratic Judge Hickey.14 
After Judge Hickey's decision striking down the Lexing- 
ton City Court, the Whigs, or at least those who dominated 
city government, immediately petitioned the legislature 
for an amendment to the charter reestablishing a city court 
on constitutional grounds. In short order the General As- 
sembly enacted a law divorcing the mayor's office complete- 
ly from the council or any other administrative-legislative 
agency and making it exclusively the repository of the ju- 
dicial power of the city. In effect the mayor was now the 
equivalent of a city judge, to be appointed for life by the 
governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. Soon 
after the amendment passed, Governor James T. More- 
head, a Whig, not surprisingly commissioned the recently 
reelected mayor of Lexington, James E. Davis, also a Whig, 
as the first judicial mayor of the city. The  amendment also 
provided that the city council would elect one of its number 
14 Acts, 1833-1834, chap. 508, sec. 3; Reporter, 27 July 1831; Gazette, g 
January 1829. 
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president, who would in effect assume the executive re- 
sponsibilities of the old mayor's office. The heavily Whig 
council elected as its president Thomas Hart, a nephew 
of Henry Clay's wife and an active member of the Whig 
party.15 
The decision of the circuit court, the amendment to the 
city charter that it produced, and the unique features of 
that revision obviously provided the Democrats of Fayette 
County with considerable political ammunition to fire at 
their opponents entrenched in the halls of government in 
Lexington. Shortly after the amendment was announced, 
the Democrats, led by General John McCalla, a leader of 
both the county and the state party and a federal marshal 
since Andrew Jackson's accession to the White House, be- 
gan circulating a petition to the legislature calling for the 
complete repeal of the Lexington city charter. At the same 
time the Democratic newspaper of the county, the ven- 
erable Kentucky Gazette, published and edited by another 
leading Jacksonian, Daniel Bradford, began castigating the 
city government. Bradford had a special ax to grind, as his 
enemies would later make clear. A member of the county 
court, he had unsuccessfully opposed James Davis for 
mayor in the January elections. As one of the magistrates 
residing in Lexington, he would stand to gain judicial busi- 
ness if the legislature abolished the chartered government 
and with it the city court. On February 6 Bradford's paper 
carried news of the petition, a letter from certain "Tax 
Payers" accusing the city fathers of pocketing public funds, 
and an editorial denouncing the manner in which the 
amendment to the charter had been secured. The  fight to 
repeal Lexington's charter had begun.16 
At first the proposal to amend the charter had aroused 
15 Observer and Reporter, 13 January 1836; Acts, 1835-1836, chap. 44; 
S.J., 1835-1836, p. 201; Gazette, 6 February 1836. 
16 Gazette, 6 February 1836. 
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little, if any, controversy in the state legislature. But the 
attempts of the Democrats to annul it quickly produced 
fireworks. In the end Democratic efforts to enact the Fayette 
petition into law were easily thwarted since the Whigs, as 
always, outnumbered their opponents in both houses. What 
finally emerged from the legislature was something of a 
compromise: it provided by statute for a special election 
to be held in Lexington on May 6 and at which time the 
voters of the city would determine the fate of the charter.17 
It  was apparent that one of the primary confrontations 
in the prereferendum campaign was between the Demo- 
cratic county court and the Whig city government as well as 
between the Democratic and Whig parties. Indeed the 
power structure of the Democratic party in Fayette County 
and that of the county court were virtually synonymous; a 
Whig newspaper commenting on this fact some years later 
branded the county court a Democratic nominating con- 
vention. Bradford provided the propaganda for the battle, 
and the evidence suggests that some of his colleagues on 
the county court probably contributed their services, too. 
Likewise, the Whig leadership of Lexington and Fayette 
County was in many ways identical to the hierarchy of city 
government, and this junto was reported to be campaigning 
actively to retain the city's corporate status.18 
The theme of city versus county government was thrust 
into the open when shortly after the charter was amended, 
several Democratic magistrates tried in vain to oust from 
the county court James Davis, who was by the end of Jan- 
uary both a justice of the peace and judge of the reestab- 
lished city court. Davis had been appointed to the county 
court before the emergence of the two-party system in the 
state and was one of the few anti-Jacksonian magistrates re- 
17 Ibid., 20 February 1836; Acts, 1835-1836, chap. 448. 
18 Obseruer and Reporter, 2 6  July 1845; Gazette, 13 February, 16 June, 25 
July 1836. 
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maining. Supporters of the move to replace him argued 
that he could not constitutionally serve two masters. The  
expediency of their argument is apparent when one realizes 
that Davis, first elected mayor in January 1855, had been 
serving two masters for over a year without complaint.l9 
Furthermore, much of the debate carried on in public 
meetings and in the newspapers emphasized that the central 
issue of the conflict was county versus city government. Ad- 
vocates of the charter continually referred to this theme by 
predicting dire consequences for Lexingtonians if the bal- 
ance of power once again shifted in favor of the county 
court. At a public meeting held shortly before the special 
election, a prominent Whig lawyer, Daniel Mayes, de- 
fended the charter by noting that a return to town status 
and the abolition of the mayor's court would place "the 
administration of the laws, and the peace and good order" 
of the city into the hands of the county court, whose re- 
sponsibilities were at best "divided and diluted." T o  those 
who complained that under the amended charter the peo- 
ple had no voice in the selection of the city judge, Mayes 
retorted that at least the judge was selected by the governor 
with the consent of the Senate, whereas the county court was 
almost exclusively self-perpetuating. He also warned that 
the county court would once again begin taxing Lexing- 
tonians should they voluntarily give up their corporate 
Detractors of the charter denounced the alleged severity 
of punishments meted out by the mayor while acting in his 
judicial capacity. They argued that the slightest breach of 
the peace often resulted in confinement in the city work- 
house and heavy fines, implying that the county magistrates 
were more just. I t  was suggested that the court costs of the 
19Fayette County Court Order Book, 1833-1836 (U.K. microfilm, reel 
M366:5), p. 431; Gazette, 13 February 1836. 
20 Zntelligencer, 3 May 1836. 
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mayor's tribunal were much higher than those extracted by 
justices of the peace, and familiar charges were heard de- 
nouncing the mayor and his police for their inability to cur- 
tail an increasing number of crimes committed within the 
city. Supporters of the city charter countered these argu- 
ments by suggesting that their opponents were inconsistent 
in complaining on the one hand about stiff penalties and 
on the other about a soaring crime rate. In fact, they argued, 
county law officers had been lax in enforcing town or- 
dinances, and since incorporation and the establishment of 
an independent urban judicial force, the incidence of crime 
had receded.21 
The  partisan nature of the struggle was apparent, too. 
Of eleven identifiable leaders of the fight to preserve the 
charter, nine were Whigs. Of six avowed leaders of the 
movement to repeal the charter, all but one were Dem- 
ocrats. The two Democrats who helped lead the procharter 
movement had vested interests in their cause, being the only 
two Democratic members of the city council. Conversely, 
the only Whig who belonged to the leadership opposing the 
charter had been defeated in January for a position on the 
city council and soon thereafter had failed to secure reap- 
pointment as the city tax assessor, a post he had held for 
seven years. 
It  was also evident that party considerations had caused 
certain anticharter leaders to take stands which were incon- 
sistent with former positions. Daniel Bradford, for one, had 
earlier opposed an abortive effort to repeal the city charter 
stemming from dissatisfaction with the administration of 
Mayor Davis. Bradford had condemned that move by dis- 
sident Democrats as an extreme way to oust an unwanted 
mayor. Why not wait, he had asked rhetorically, until the 
coming elections? This was the same argument used by 
21 Gazette, 27 February, 5, 26 March 1836; Observer and Reporter, 16 
March, 4 May 1836; Intelligencer, 3 , 6  May 1836. 
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proponents of the charter during the prereferendum cam- 
paign. Nor had Bradford ever voiced opposition to the 
charter during his unsuccessful campaign for the mayoralty 
the preceding year. Furthermore, he had served as city clerk 
in 1835, drawing a salary of $250 and, according to his crit- 
ics, relying almost completely on his deputy to perform the 
duties of his office.22 Another leading repealer, Dr. Caleb W. 
Cloud, had served for many years on the board of trustees 
and later the city council of Lexington. He had introduced 
a motion in 1822 protesting the attempt of the county 
court to dispose of part of the public square.23 Ironically, 
he had sponsored the resolution calling for amendments to 
the charter following Judge Hickey's decision invalidating 
the city judiciary. But he had failed to win reelection to the 
council in January 1836 and his defeat, doubtless coupled 
with his active membership in the Democratic party, placed 
him in the front ranks of those seeking to abolish the city 
charter. 
Although both sides claimed to have support from the 
residents of the county, who would not vote in the election 
but whose sympathy was undoubtedly of psychological 
value, it is clear that many of Fayette County's farmers sided 
with the repealers. Doubtless the recent city ordinances 
which sought to regulate the selling of butter and wood and 
the other activities affecting the agrarian entrepreneur, who 
was dependent upon Lexington for his market, had created 
a hostility which was easily preyed upon by the leaders of 
repeal. Throughout the campaign preceding the refer- 
endum, residents of the county aired their frustrations in 
letters to the Gazette. One "Citizen of Fayette County" 
wrote that the interests of county and city were "insepara- 
bly united" and that the "country people" were deeply 
22 Gazette, 2 2  August 1835; Observer and Reporter, 16 March, 4 May 
1836; Intelligencer, q May 1836. 
23 Lexington Record Book, 1818-1830, p. 199. 
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offended by the extravagances of the amended city charter. 
Another correspondent denounced the amended charter as 
well as the recent city ordinances and predicted that Lex- 
ington's "aristocrats" would soon pass "an ordinance re- 
quiring the farmer to take off his hat, and make his bow to 
the honorable Mayor and Councilmen when he chanced 
to meet them." A third commentator from the country 
argued that "the cause of the confusion and loss of good 
feeling and harmony among the inhabitants of the city and 
country, have arisen from the power either given to your 
Charter of Incorporation" or to those who had obtained 
"high places of authority" under it.24 
On May 6 the debating stopped and the voting com- 
menced, carrying over into the next day. In its issue of May 
g Bradford's Gazette announced that the "agony is over" 
and conceded defeat. Lexingtonians had voted to retain 
the charter, 379 to 323. Although Bradford expressed some 
bitterness and predicted that the citizens of his city would 
be "harassed by weekly Mayor's courts," he nonetheless 
pledged to "cease active operations against the Charter." 25 
Despite Bradford's declaration, he and his fellow Dem- 
ocrats did not end their efforts to change the constitution 
of the city. They simply tempered their demands by stressing 
the need for revisions rather than outright repeal. On June 
16 William Stanhope, a leading county Democrat and a 
member of the county court, announced his candidacy for 
the legislature, expressing his intention, if elected, to seek 
amendments to Lexington's charter. He particularly cited 
the need to reform the urban judiciary by curtailing court 
costs and unnecessary personnel and to restore ward repre- 
sentation on the city council, a system which would allow 
the Democratic first ward more leverage on election day. On 
July 2 5  Bradford published a letter from William Boon, 
24 Gazette, 5, 12, 19 March 1836. 
25 Ibid., g May 1836. 
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senior member of the county court and a leading Democrat, 
despairing that the breach between the county and city had 
not been healed. Boon complained of the high cost of do- 
ing judicial business in the city court and went so far as to 
contrast the humane treatment of stray animals by county 
officials with the allegedly harsh practices perpetrated by 
city empl~yees .~~  
On August I Bradford and others endorsed Stanhope 
and other candidates for the legislature who proposed 
amendments to the charter. In the same issue the editor 
accused the Whigs of refusing to meet with General Mc- 
Calla and the leaders of reform to discuss charter revisions, 
which he contended had been promised by charterites dur- 
ing the prereferendum campaign to secure wavering votes. 
Bradford persisted in making this claim even after the 
legislative candidates whom he supported had been de- 
feated. Finally, on August 15, the Gazette published a letter 
from "Amicus" announcing the formation of a committee 
of charterites whose purpose it would be to discuss needed 
revisions to the city constitution. Shortly thereafter the two 
sides met and agreed upon certain reforms to be submitted 
to the legislature as amendments to the charter. Without 
apparent controversy the General Assembly enacted the 
proposals into law early in its next session. The  act of De- 
cember 14, 1836, created a separate judge of the city court, 
returned the responsibilities of chief executive to the mayor 
rather than to a president of the council, an office which was 
abolished, eliminated the jurisdiction of the city court over 
civil matters, and restored the ward system of representa- 
tion to the city c~unci l .~ '  
The  reforms of December 1836 certainly obviated many 
of the grievances harbored by opponents of the Lexington 
charter. The  ease with which they were agreed upon by 
26 Ibid., 16 June, 15 July 1836. 
27 Ibid., I ,  8, 15 August 1836; Acts, 1836-1837, chap. I .  
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political leaders of the city and county and then converted 
into law by the legislature suggests that had both sides been 
more conciliatory and less ambitious at an earlier time, the 
fight to repeal the charter could have been avoided. On 
the other hand, there were basic conflicts in the beginning. 
The  transformation of the mayor of Lexington into a judge 
for life had presented the leaders of Fayette County govern- 
ment and certain out politicians in the city with a rare op- 
portunity to strike a deadly blow at the growing autonomy 
of Lexington and simultaneously to regain political and 
constitutional power. Compromise was really not possible 
until the prolonged confrontation between competing pol- 
iticians, parties, and governments had been resolved behind 
the scenes, in the newspapers, and at the polls. 
These frictions between Lexington and Fayette County 
were not unique in the history of the relations between 
county and city government during the period of the old 
county court system. An even mightier struggle involved the 
state's largest city and county. In early 1835 certain ambi- 
tious politicians sought to capitalize on disharmony between 
city and county officials by attempting to have Louisville 
secede from Jefferson County and secure legislative au- 
thorization to form a separate county. The disagreement 
between the Jefferson County Court and the city of Louis- 
ville stemmed from the dilapidated condition of the build- 
ings in the city shared by the two governmental agencies 
and owned by the county as custodian of the public square. 
Both the city and the county recognized the need to erect 
new structures, but they could not agree on how to fund the 
project. The  magistrates favored construction on the site of 
the old buildings to be financed jointly and equally by the 
city and the county. The  councilmen rejected this proposal 
and instead demanded either that the county alone pay for 
the new buildings or that the magistrates transfer to the 
city the title to the public square, with the city then paying 
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for the construction. The  magistrates denounced both of 
these plans, arguing that the first was inequitable and that 
the second was a veiled attempt to usurp control of the 
public buildings and drive the county court off the public 
square.28 
The  inability of local officials to settle their differences 
increased the frustration of the public and prompted efforts 
in January 1835 to secure a legislative act making Louis- 
ville a separate county. I t  is apparent that supporters of this 
move had more in mind than constitutional reform. The 
Louisville Public Advertiser, a Democratic newspaper, 
charged that the separatist movement was inspired by frus- 
trated officeseekers who, having failed to secure positions in 
Jefferson County, were now seeking to create new offices 
which they themselves would fill. Furthermore, the Ad- 
vertiser asserted, these conspirators desired to oust from 
office the Pope family and its allies, whom they falsely ac- 
cused of controlling the county and circuit courts.29 
Regardless of whether they dominated the county court, 
the Popes and their friends did control the leadership of 
the Jacksonian party of Jefferson County, the clerkships 
of the circuit and county courts, the deputy clerkship of the 
county court, the offices of county jailer and common- 
wealth's attorney, and the postmastership of Louisville. 
Since most of the Popes resided within the city, they would 
either have to move or resign their offices if Louisville were 
made a separate county. The Whig newspaper, the Louis- 
ville Journal, provided evidence that the Advertiser's ac- 
cusations were correct when it expressed its "regret" that 
the Pope family was "not prolific enough to furnish a great 
28 The best summaries of the background to the Louisville-Jefferson 
County dispute are in the Louisville Public Advertiser, 3 January, 6, 14 
February 1835; see also Jefferson County Court Order Book, 1831-1834 (U.K. 
microfilm, in process), pp. 313-14; Jefferson County Court Order Book, 
1834-1838 (U.K. microfilm, in process), pp. 28, 38-40, 48-49, 5658, 74. 
ZSIbid., 3, 12 January 1835; H.J., 1834-1835, pp. 143, 290. 
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lazy, lubberly boy for every office, not only in the city and 
county, but throughout the state," and then less facetiously 
endorsed city-county separation and the notion that the 
Popes should move or compete with the rest of the city 
politicians for places in the new county g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  
Throughout the latter part of January and the early part 
of February debate raged in the two newspapers over the 
merits and motives of the proposed separation. The  Dem- 
ocratic .journal accused the city politicians of attempting 
to steal the public square, the courthouse, and the county 
records by unconstitutionally destroying Jefferson County. 
The  newspaper further argued that separation would only 
heighten tensions between city and county and would great- 
ly augment the tax burden of Louisvillians. The  Whig pa- 
per countered that the proposed separation was valid and 
that the public square and its buildings ~trould rightfully 
belong to the newly created county.31 
In the face of this challenge to their very existence, mem- 
bers of the county court strove for compromise with the city 
councillors. The two bodies appointed a joint committee to 
study the problem of new facilities and on February 14 
announced an agreement whereby a building to be funded 
equally by the city and the county would be constructed 
either on the public square or on another site. The House 
of Representatives was apparently unimpressed by this de- 
velopment and on February 25 narrowly passed the bill to 
make Louisville a separate county. However, the Senate 
averted a potential constitutional and political crisis when 
it allowed the bill to lapse.32 
30 Public Advertiser, 13 January 1835; Louisville Journal, quoted in Pub- 
lic Advertiser, 13 January 1835. 
31 Public Advertiser, 12, 13, 14, 15 January 1835; Louisville Journal, 
quoted in Public Advertiser, 12, 13,  14, 15 January 1835. 
32 Public Advertiser, 14 February 1835; H.J., 1834-1835, pp. 367-68; S.J., 
183411835, p. 385. The bill reached the Senate on February 25, was read 
twice and ordered read a third time, but never again was considered. 
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Between 1833 and early 1849 the legislature incorpo- 
rated two cities and fifteen towns and gave to each govern- 
mental powers which had formerly been exercised by the 
county courts. The  city of Maysville, incorporated in early 
1833, was given the same privileges as Louisville and Lex- 
ington, including an independent judiciary, immunity 
from county taxation, and the rights to license various re- 
tail establishments and to appoint food inspectors. The  city 
of Covington, incorporated one year later, was granted the 
same powers and benefits save tax immunity. Thereafter 
the General Assembly incorporated fifteen towns, giving to 
each an independent judiciary and to many powers to li- 
cense retail stores and to construct their own public build- 
ings. Furthermore, during the last decade of the old county 
court system the legislature granted independent judiciaries 
to twenty other towns.33 
Even though each of these legislative bequests repre- 
sented an encroachment upon the power of county courts, 
they produced no outbursts like those in Lexington and 
Louisville. Indeed the other recorded disputes between 
county courts and towns in antebellum Kentucky were 
minor in comparison with the attempts to revoke the char- 
ter of Lexington and to separate Louisville from Jefferson 
County. Between 1838 and 1848, for example, the Bracken 
County Court and the trustees of Augusta waged a legal 
battle over the ownership of the public square of the for- 
mer county seat, a confrontation hardly approaching the sig- 
nificance of attempted secession or r e v ~ c a t i o n . ~ ~  
The fight to repeal the charter of Lexington and the bat- 
tle to make Louisville a separate county are significant in 
several ways. Both represent basic conflicts between city 
33 Acts, 1832-1833, chap. 197; Acts, 1833-1834, chap. 505. 
34Bracken County Court Order Book, 1835-1845, pp. 128, 143, and 
Bracken County Court Order Book, 1846--1851, p .  150 (U.K. microfilm, reels 
M478:ini-22); Trustees of Augusta v. Perkins, 3 B.  Monroe 437 (1843) and 
8 B. Monroe 207 (1848). 
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and county government and between ambitious men at- 
tached to those governments. The struggle in Lexington 
demonstrates how competing politicians in control of sepa- 
rate constitutional vehicles used those vehicles to further 
their own political goals. The crisis in Louisville illustrates 
how out politicians seized on intergovernmental conflict to 
further their own designs. Both illuminate the recurring 
theme in American history of tension between country folk 
and city folk. And finally, both reveal that struggles over 
the local constitutions of antebellum Kentucky involved 
much more than institutional bickering and were insepara- 
ble from political intrigue and personal aggrandizement. 
Chapter 8 
DEFICIENCIES 
AND REFORM 
T HE COUNTY COURT SYSTEM of antebellum Kentucky was replete with institutional deficiencies, which along with the frictions of politics caused its down- 
fall at midcentury. Inattentiveness, cumbersomeness, dis- 
orderliness, and inexpertness pervaded the local tribunals. 
The  ever-increasing numbers of justices of the peace and 
county courts and the lack of a general requirement that 
each member of the court be present at terms other than 
those set aside to certify claims and district roads produced 
widespread complaints that many of the magistrates fre- 
quently failed to attend their monthly courts or were not 
punctual. One critic argued that it was necessary to "hunt 
[the justices] down in the courtyard" to get them to hold a 
court. A correspondent to the Frankfort Kentucky Yeoman 
in 1848 wrote that it was frequently difficult for courts to 
summon a quorum when it was necessary to have a ma- 
jority present to transact business. W. C. Marshall, delegate 
from Bracken County to the Constitutional Convention of 
1849, reiterated this complaint, suggesting that the failure 
of the state to pay the magistrates for their services on the 
court accounted for their inattention to duties.l 
Although such complaints were probably exaggerated, 
there is no question that county courts sometimes could not 
transact business because of a lack of a quorum. In January 
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1834, for example, the Fayette County Court was forced to 
postpone action on an application for a renewal of a tavern 
license because a majority of its members was not present. 
The  problem was chronic in Barren County. Thomas A. 
Edmunds attempted for eight consecutive months to renew 
his tavern license with the county court but failed because 
at all the terms save one the court lacked a majority of its 
membership; at the court of claims, when such a quorum 
was present, the tribunal was so pressed with business that 
it did not have time to accede to his request. As a result the 
circuit court fined Edmunds for operating a tavern with- 
out a l i cen~e .~  
A few courts fined members who were absent without 
cause; more often, however, the delinquent justices were 
summoned and promptly excused or fined and subsequently 
released from the fines. Some courts encouraged inattentive 
and nonattending magistrates to resign and recommended 
replacements who, it was hoped, would better serve their 
neighbors. At least one court which had been sorely ham- 
pered by the persistent lack of a quorum went so far as to 
advertise in the local newspaper calling on its missing mem- 
bers to appear. Most courts, however, seemed content to 
ignore the p r ~ b l e m . ~  
One further judicial check should be noted. The circuit 
courts were empowered to fine members of the county 
courts should the latter not perform certain duties, such as 
fixing tavern rates and districting the public roads. Like 
the others, this restraint seems not to have been effective 
since circuit courts seldom fined magistrates, and when they 
1 Yeoman, 28 September 1848; Proceedings, p. 697. 
2Fayette County Court Order Book, 1833-1836, p. 21 (U.K. microfilm, 
reel M366:5); petition of Thomas A. Edmunds to Governor John Breathitt, 
20 March 1833, Breathitt Papers, jacket 335 (G.P., reel 37). 
3Bourbon County Court Order Book, 1808-1812, pp. 464, 468 (U.K. 
microfilm, reel M277: 1738-39). 
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did, governors, exercising their constitutional power, £re- 
quently remitted the fines. 
Compounding the problems of attendance were those 
caused by the enormous expansion of membership on the 
courts. Even the smallest courts usually had at least ten 
members, while most had from fifteen to twenty-five. The 
tendency of the legislature to increase the number of jus- 
tices of the peace did meet the needs of the people for ad- 
ditional representation and more single magistrates but 
at the same time rendered the county courts even more 
cumbersome. This caused many problems, as did the lack of 
a requirement that members attend court except on a few 
specified occasions and their tendency to sit for only part of 
a session. One correspondent to the Yeoman pictured a 
typical county court as a scene of "confusion and disorder," 
and when Francis M. Bristow, delegate from Todd County 
to the Constitutional Convention of 1849, announced that 
"every gentleman knows that the court is unwieldly," no 
one protested. The  "duty of all to attend, but the special 
duty of none-the business of every one, and no one in par- 
ticular" meant that individual magistrates often heard only 
portions of cases before rendering judgments or voting on 
orders. An even number of justices sitting on a court some- 
times produced split decisions and further delayed final 
action. In order to avoid this confusion most lawyers and 
clients preferred to appear before a sparsely populated 
bench than a particularly well-attended ses~ion .~  
Such strategy could aid individual litigants but did very 
little to ameliorate the problem. Members of the legislature 
attempted from time to time to deal with these grievances, 
but to no avail. In 18 10 the House of Representatives re- 
jected a bill which would have authorized each county court 
4 Yeoman, 28 September 1848; Proceedings, pp. 697-99, 711; Fayette 
County Court Order Book, 1833-1836, p. 292 (U.K. microfilm, reel M366:5). 
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to appoint one of its members president in order to afford 
some sort of executive direction to the unwieldy institu- 
tion. In 1828 the House defeated a much more compre- 
hensive attempt at reform; the rejected measure provided 
that each county court should annually divide its members 
into three classes, each of which would be alternately re- 
sponsible for holding court except for those terms during 
which the statutes required the presence of a majority of 
the magistrates. Stiffer penalties for nonattendance would 
also have been provided. In 1835 and 1840 the Senate voted 
down bills which would have required each county court 
to allocate annually almost all its duties to just three of its 
members, reforms which might have obviated a major cause 
of unwieldiness. Finally, in 1837, the lower house con- 
curred in the report of its committee for courts of justice 
that it was "inexpedient" to draft and consider a bill "com- 
pelling by law the attendance of each and every member" 
of the county courts at "each and every term of said courts." 
Another grievance closely related to the awkward nature 
of the county court system was the inability of its personnel 
to maintain order in the courtroom. A foreign correspon- 
dent to the Kentucky Gazette styling himself " A  Hibernian 
Visitor" and touring the state in the spring of 1804 found 
that the county courts exhibited "an unfavorable example 
of republican order." He characterized their proceedings as 
scenes of lawyers "wrangling and disputing among them- 
selves," litigants "of ten clamorous," witnesses "pertinacious 
and contemptuous," and droves of spectators "drawn to- 
gether [more] from a spirit of curiosity, than on an account 
of business . . . of their own . . . , some sober and others 
drunk, laughing, talking, sometimes shouting, and not un- 
frequently brawling and fighting." The Irish observer 
H.J., 1809-1810, p. 209; H.J., 1827-1828, pp. 207-9; S.J., 1834-1835, PP. 
325-27; S.J., 1839--1840, pp. 27273; H.J., 1837-1838, pp. 68, 127. 
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blamed this excessive display of the "democratick notions 
of independence" on the permissiveness of the justices and 
suggested that in Europe "such disorder and .  . . licentious- 
ness" would not be tolerated. John Bradford, editor of the 
Gazette, endorsed these remarks and lamented that Ken- 
tucky's courtrooms were "among the worst examples of 
republican 'order and decorum.' " 
A few courts moved to correct this deficiency. At the 
first meeting of the Boyle County Court in March 1842, 
the assembled justices issued the following rules of pro- 
cedure and decorum: 
1. The senior justice shall preside in court and in his 
absence the next eldest and so on in regular order 
throughout. 
2. The presiding justice for the time being shall decide 
points of order. All motions shall be addressed to 
him, and all orders, judgments or appointments shall 
be announced through him. 
3. All motions shall come from the bar and shall be 
made in the following order. The  attorney for the 
county shall be first called upon; the next attorney 
on the list shall be next called upon and so on to the 
foot of the list, and lastly citizens or other persons 
having business in court and choosing to make their 
own motions. 
4. T o  enable the court to carry into effect the 3rd rule 
the clerk at the commencement of each term shall 
furnish the presiding justice for the time being with 
a list of names of the lawyers admitted to practice at 
this bar; which list shall be made out in order of ad- 
mission the first admitted standing first on the list 
after the county attorney and so on throughout. 
6 Gazette, 27 March 1804. 
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5. Any member of the court wishing to address the court 
shall rise to his feet and address the presiding jus- 
tice for the time being. 
6. In the appointment of officers when there are more 
than one person in nomination the court shall vote 
by ballot delivered to the presiding justice who shall 
count the votes and announce the appointment and 
when the court are equally divided shall give the 
casting vote in which case alone he shall be entitled 
to vote. 
7. This Court will appoint no one to office who en- 
gages in the practice of electioneering and tampering 
with the members of the court for such appointment. 
8. The  clerk shall keep a regular docket of all motions 
and appeals pending which shall at each term be reg- 
ularly called and each case tried, dismissed or con- 
tinued. 
9. No member of this court after taking his seat on the 
bench at any term will be allowed to absent himself 
without leave. 
lo. No member of the court while in session will be al- 
lowed to converse either publickly or privately with 
persons other than members of the court and with 
them only in consultation as to the matter before the 
court and shall give their attention exclusively to the 
business before the court.7 
It  is evident that these rules were designed to keep order 
on the bench as well as in the courtroom, but it is not known 
whether they were successfully implemented. 
Despite the relatively high socioeconomic status of most 
of the justices of the peace, it is apparent that many of them 
lacked the kind of dedication necessary for a system of 
7 Boyle County Court Order Book, 1842-1847, pp. 7-8 (U.K. microfilm, 
reel M311:2031-32). 
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county government such as theirs to succeed. Indeed the 
quality of their performance was at issue throughout the 
antebellum period. Discussion of this situation was especial- 
ly intense during the years preceding the second and third 
state constitutional conventions and at the latter conclave. 
Many of the commentators argued that the county magis- 
trates were at best mediocre and at worst inept. "A Farmer," 
agitating in the Gazette in 1794 for a new state Constitu- 
tion, contended that the members of the county courts were 
poorly educated and implicitly inferior in terms of "nature, 
acquired abilities [and] worth or intelligence." While he ad- 
mitted that a few were gentlemen whose "philanthropy, 
politeness and intelligence do honor to human nature," he 
argued that most were mediocre. The "Hibernian Visitor" 
- 
corresponding to the same newspaper in 1804 blamed the 
sorry condition of the state's judiciary in part on the fact 
that the justices were men "not generally selected from the 
most respectable and best informed citizens." He found that 
"many of them are very ignorant, some of them are not re- 
spected in their neighborhood, and [there are] others whose 
moral character will not bear scrutiny or investigation." 
Nearly half a century later delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention of 1849 seconded these views. Larkin J. Proctor, 
delegate from Lewis County, submitted that the county 
courts were "composed of men, many of whom were in- 
competent to discharge the duties of their office" and that 
the probability of obtaining justice before such a tribunal 
was about as certain as "a game of chance." Ira Root, del- 
egate from Campbell County, condemned "the ignorance 
of the magistracy," and W. C. Marshall, delegate from 
Bracken County, compared them to ja~kasses.~ 
Not all the analysts of the county courts wholly con- 
demned them, however. An anonymous critic who was gen- 
erally disparaging of the courts in a letter to the Kentucky 
8 Gazette, 1 March 1794, 27 March 1804; Proceedings, pp. 699, 703, 709. 
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Yeoman in 1848 conceded that "the best men in the com- 
munity may be, and generally are, [their] members," while 
G. W. Johnston, delegate from Shelby County to the Con- 
stitutional Convention of 1849, asserted that the members 
of the courts were usually "well qualified." Others saw an 
unfortunate unevenness in the caliber of the magistrates. 
One delegate, Francis M. Bristow, observed that while some 
of the justices of the peace were "wholly unqualified to dis- 
charge [their] duties," others were "excellent men"; and 
Charles Chambers, delegate from Boone County, submitted 
that the justices of his own county were "all men of good 
character, fair capacity and sound integrity," implying that 
this was not always true in other parts of the state.g 
It is, of course, impossible to judge the relative intel- 
ligence of the magistrates. A few petitions and other doc- 
uments written by magistrates are scattered throughout the 
governors' papers; some are obviously the products of semi- 
literate minds, but others were certainly drafted by the 
well-educated. Beyond these few examples there is only 
peripheral information. Certainly, if the county court 
judges were willing and able, they could usually draw upon 
adequate courthouse libraries to bolster their knowledge of 
the law. Most of these depositories were as well supplied as 
any of the judicial tribunals in the state, usually containing 
full sets of the legislative acts and journals, the printed de- 
cisions of the Court of Appeals, digests of state law, and in- 
complete collections of the acts of Congress.l0 Yet it is 
apparent from much of the criticism directed at the magis- 
trates that they were too often unwilling to perform their 
responsibilities, no matter what their capabilities and re- 
sources might have been. 
9 Yeoman, 28 September 1848; Proceedings, pp. 697, 709, 712. 
10 For inventories and other papers relating to county court library hold- 
ings see Isaac Shelby Papers, jacket 115 (G.P., reel 16); Thomas Metcalfe Pa- 
pers, jacket 302 (G.P., reel 34); William Owsley Papers, jacket 570 (G.P., 
reel 84). 
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Too few of the magistrates, most of whom were not 
lawyers, were willing to engage in the requisite study and 
reflection necessary to familiarize themselves with the many 
legal specialties within the jurisdiction of the county courts. 
Their performance as judges was at best uneven. All 
too often, as the Court of Appeals announced in 1829, 
the record of the local tribunals upon review revealed nu- 
merous blunders. Indeed critics averred that litigants ap- 
pealed decisions of county courts more often than those of 
any other tribunal. During the twilight of the second state 
Constitution, county courts were especially castigated for 
their allegedly inept implementation of the probate laws. 
"Philodemos," writing in the Y e o m a n  in December 1846, 
found the existing probate system far too complex and 
cumbersome. Executors and administrators had to wait 
weeks, even months, before gaining authority to administer 
estates, and thereafter devisees and heirs had to wait even 
longer before receiving their distributions. "Bourbon" 
reiterated the complaints of "Philodemos" shortly after- 
ward and queried, "How long shall it be before a villainous 
county court system shall give way to an enlightened pro- 
bate court!" The  editor of the Flemingsburg Fleming  Flag 
denounced the county court probate system, saying that its 
extravagance and abuse exhausted small estates. He pic- 
tured the probate agents of county courts, the commission- 
ers, appraisers, criers, clerks, lawyers, administrators, and 
executors as parasites feeding on the assets of the estate 
until very little was left." 
Not surprisingly, these deficiencies prompted agitation 
for reform of the county court system. Indeed such efforts 
were made almost as soon as the system had been codified 
by the Kentucky legislature. In 1'194 "a Farmer" wrote a 
lengthy letter to the Gazette denouncing the county mag- 
11 Commonwealth for Robbins v. Williams, i J. J. Marshall 308 (1829); 
Yeoman, 17 December 1846, 21 January 1847; Flemingsburg Fleming Flag, 
quoted in Convention, 9 January, 1 May 1847. 
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istrates and by implication calling for changes in the Con- 
stitution which would prohibit them from serving in the 
General Assembly. Not only were the justices of the peace 
dominating the legislative branch of the state government, 
according to the correspondent, but they were also counsel- 
ing the governor and thus were in effect an aristocratic 
cabal running both state and local governments. "Why shall 
we suffer them to lord it over us with the pre-eminence of 
such dangerous, complicated and extensive powers?" he 
asked. At the very least, he continued, the voters should re- 
ject these "petty tyrants" at the next election. Several 
months later another correspondent to the Gazette warmly 
endorsed "Farmer's" sentiments and more expressly called 
for a constitutional convention.12 
These initial efforts for a repudiation of the justices at 
the polls were unsuccessful, nor did this early protest re- 
sult in the desired reforms at the Constitutional Convention 
of 1799. While that conclave did alter the Constitution with 
respect to the county courts, the changes strengthened rather 
than weakened the political leverage of the magistrates. The  
justices were not prohibited from serving in the legislature 
and in effect were given the right to fill vacancies on the 
county courts, a privilege which had formerly been exclu- 
sively possessed by the governor and the Senate. Most of 
the deliberation at the convention appears to have been 
directed toward protecting slavery, securing the popular 
election of state senators, and preserving an independent ju- 
diciary, the latter reform bolstering the position of the jus- 
tices of the peace. 
Public protest against the county courts generally abated 
during the next four decades. There were isolated outbursts, 
such as that from the "Hibernian Visitor" in 1804, but no 
constitutional reform was seriously considered until 1837. 
In that year the legislature authorized a statewide poll to be 
12 Gazette, 4 March, 4 October 1794. 
DEFICIENCIES A N D  R E F O R M  [ 155 1 
held in August 1838 on the question of whether to convene 
another constitutional convention. Many supporters of a 
convention in the assembly were seeking basic changes in 
the system of couty courts. Senator Archibald Dixon of Hen- 
derson County asserted that "nearly the whole people of the 
State are . . . opposed to the present county court system" 
and advocated an alteration in the Constitution allowing 
the voters "every six or ten years, to purge the judicial 
bench" of incompetents. John L. Helm, representative from 
Hardin County, denounced the self-perpetuating nature of 
the courts which allowed "unqualified men to remain in 
office" and proposed that magistrates be elected or at least 
appointed for a limited term.13 
Convention opponents rallied to the defense of the courts, 
asserting that any defects could be remedied by the legis- 
lature. Robert Nelson Wickliffe, editor of the Lexington 
Observer and Reporter, argued that the legislature had 
"heaped upon the county courts" so many responsibilities 
that they could not perform all of them efficiently and that 
it was up to the legislature rather than a constitutional con- 
vention to remedy faults in the system. Others equated pro- 
posals to elect members of the county courts with plans 
to abolish an independent judiciary, a prospect they viewed 
with horror. The  inefficiency of the early sheriffs of the state 
was cited as proof that elected county officials functioned 
even worse than appointed ones.14 
Many Whigs opposed a convention, fearing that it would 
undo their carefully gerrymandered legislative and con- 
gressional districts and undermine their solid control of 
state politics. Even certain leading Democrats disapproved 
of a convention because they feared that it would work the 
people "up into a feverish state." Some of these men, in- 
cluding Daniel Bradford and Matthews Flournoy, both of 
13 Ibid., 8 February 1838; Commonwealth, 1 1  April 1838. 
14 Gazette, 18 January 1838; Zntelligencer, 24 July 1838. 
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Fayette County, doubtless opposed constitutional reform 
because they themselves were county magistrates. Finally, 
the fact that abolitionists generally supported a convention 
poisoned such a call in the eyes of both party organizations. 
It  is therefore not surprising that the voters soundly de- 
feated the attempt to authorize another constitutional con- 
vention. Of over ioo,ooo votes cast in 1838, fewer than 
27,000 endorsed the proposal, far below the majority 
needed.15 
The  defeat of efforts to reform the Constitution in 1838 
did not end outcries against the county court system. In his 
opinion to the secretary of state in October 1840, Attorney 
General O. G. Cates expressed deep dissatisfaction not only 
with the practice of awarding the sheriffalty to the senior 
member of the county court but also with the nature of 
county government. He argued that the "system of county 
court jurisprudence" did not produce a county officialdom 
of "wise sober discreet intelligent men" as it was intended 
to do. Five years later the editor of the Paris Western Citizen 
attacked the courts as antirepublican and called for their 
abolition.16 
During the remaining years of the 1840s agitation for 
county court reform accelerated. Colonel Elisha Smith, 
representative to the legislature from Rockcastle County, 
described the organization of the courts as "at war with 
acknowledged principles of our government." The  Yeoman 
depicted "an odious county court system which is at variance 
with the very first principles of our national and state 
governments" because legislative, judicial, and executive 
15 Mathias, "The Turbulent Years of Kentucky Politics," p. 328; Gazette, 
1 February, 22 March 1838; Carl R. Fields, "Making Kentucky's Third Con- 
stitution" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Ky., 1951). pp. 25-26; Commonwealth, 5 De- 
cember 1838. 
16 0. G. Cates to James Harlan, 17 October 1840, Robert Letcher Letter- 
book, pp. 2-5 (G.P., reel 54); Paris Western Citizen, quoted in Yeoman, 1 1  
December 1845. 
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departments were all "centered in this most obnoxious, self- 
creative, self-elective, and self-perpetuating" body. Writing 
to the Frankfort Commonwealth in December 1846, a 
"Democrat" endorsed a constitutional amendment provid- 
ing for the election of all county officers.17 
In October 1846 the bipartisan committee of seventy-six 
legislators which issued a proclamation calling for a consti- 
tutional convention expressly approved a general overhaul 
of the county courts. The manifesto contended that "if ex- 
perience has not pointed out the necessity of a change in our 
county court system, then we despair of proving anything 
by experience." The legislators advocated changing the 
mode of selecting justices, limiting their term of office, and 
defining their districts of residence so as to eliminate geo- 
graphical malapportionment.18 Early in 1847 the legisla- 
ture, partly in response to the growing pressure for changes 
in the county court system, once again authorized a refer- 
endum on whether to summon a constitutional convention. 
Opposition to the courts mounted throughout 1847 as 
voters prepared to participate in the first round of two elec- 
toral mandates necessary to convene a convention. The  
courts were openly denounced as centers of nepotism. Can- 
didates for the legislature, sensing a popular issue, began to 
endorse county governmental reform. Early in the year 
Robert C. McKee, himself a member of the Franklin Coun- 
ty Court, inaugurated a newspaper called the Convention 
to promote the cause of constitutional reform, especially 
the reform of local government. The  newspaper lashed the 
courts unmercifully, accusing them of fostering the sale of 
public office, nepotism, malapportionment, incompetency, 
and the misappropriation of tax funds.l9 
17 Yeoman, 8 October 1846; Commonwealth, z i  April, 29 December 1846. 
18 Yeoman, 8 October 1846. 
19 Ibid., 21 January 1847; Convention, 30 January, 27 March, l o  April, 
8 May 1847. 
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Once again leaders of the established order rose to de- 
fend the Constitution. Many were local officeholders and 
not a few, allegedly, were justices of the peace. At the con- 
vention of 1849, Ben Hardin recalled that when he first 
took the stump in behalf of constitutional reform, "the 
office-holders . . . followed me round and spoke." When he 
addressed an audience at Bardstown, he was "haunted by 
the clerks and their families," but this time their efforts 
were unsuccessful. The  Whig party, which had been a bas- 
tion of defense against a call in 1838, was now seriously di- 
vided over the issue. The specter of emancipation dissipated 
in the face of denials by proconvention speakers that they 
intended to tamper with the peculiar institution. The  in- 
ternal improvements binge of the 1830s and 1840s and the 
increased taxation that it provoked prompted many to de- 
mand constitutional curbs on state spending. Furthermore, 
more and more politicians claimed that their constituents 
demanded democratization not only of county government 
but of the entire judiciary as 
Equally important, abuses of the county court system 
seemed to have multiplied. The emergence of party politics 
in Kentucky had intensified the oligarchical nature of the 
county courts and thus had made them even less responsive 
to the people and more vulnerable to the attacks of the re- 
formers. Control of courts by parties unsuccessful at the 
polls frustrated party politicians. Judicial malapportion- 
ment, which expanded markedly after the appearance of two 
parties, troubled both leaders and constituents. Organized 
competition for domination of local government length- 
ened the tenure of justices of the peace and restricted mo- 
bility of aspirants for political office. Entrenched factions 
in county courts seemed to stress loyalty over performance, 
a state of affairs which may have hastened the decline in the 
quality of local government. The  main goal of magisterial 
20 convention, 30 January, 6 March, 27 April 1847; Proceedings, p. 1080. 
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service, the sheriffalty, increasingly became the object of 
bargain and sale, and this situation was constitutionally 
debilitating. Furthermore, the deficiencies of the courts 
and their members which had existed before the beginnings 
of the two-party system-cumbersomeness, disorderliness, 
inexpertness, and inattentiveness-persisted. In short, many 
believed it was time for change. 
Despite fears that county government officials would tam- 
per with the election returns to defeat the attempt for a 
there is no evidence that they did so; even if they did, 
it was for naught because the proconvention forces over- 
whelmingly carried the question in August 1847, with 
92,639 affirmative votes out of 136,945 cast. Having won 
the first round, the reformers were required to carry the 
question once more to the voters the following year. Ac- 
cording to Ben Hardin, the officeholders, realizing that 
the voters would approve a convention, "pitched in, and 
swore they were in the hunt from the start. . . ; when they 
saw the convention was a beautiful trade wind, how they 
spread their sails . . . great God how they pitched in!" 22 The 
opposition having crumbled, the conventionists won the 
second round by an even greater margin. 
Most of the candidates in the election for delegates sup- 
ported revision of the county court system. Jefferson Evans, 
candidate for delegate from Greenup County, referred to 
the system as "a dead carcass." Sam Hanson, candidate from 
Clark County, described the courts as "unwieldy, . . . inef- 
ficient," and "totally unsuited to the correct and rapid dis- 
patch of judicial business." Garrett Davis and George TY. 
Williams of Bourbon County and Robert W. Scott of 
Franklin County, all candidates, also denounced the exist- 
ing system. Even Samuel Shy, a candidate from Fayette 
21 On 24 July 1847 the Convention urged the sheriffs of the various coun- 
ties to do their duty and hold honest elections on the question of calling a 
convention. The newspaper feared that some sheriffs would refuse to do this. 
22 Commonwealth, 2 1  September 1847; Proceedings, p. 1080. 
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County, who depicted the old order as "one of the best, 
wisest and cheapest systems known to the law," favored 
electing members of the county The  elections pro- 
duced a victory not only for the supporters of court reform 
but also for the Democratic party, which had been decided- 
ly in the minority for most of its twenty-two-year history. 
In accordance with the Constitution, which was about to 
be abolished, the voters elected loo delegates-52 Demo- 
crats and 48 Whigs. 
Although slavery, legislative apportionment, and the 
method of selecting judges of the Court of Appeals were the 
subjects of most of the debates of the convention, the re- 
form of the county court system played an important part 
in the proceedings. Many delegates believed that the de- 
fects of the system provided the raison d'dtre for the con- 
vention. George W. Kavanaugh, delegate from Anderson 
County, contended that "we, to-day, would not have been 
here forming a constitution, but for the universal dissatis- 
faction felt against our county courts," and many others 
seconded his remarks. Nevertheless, there was considerable 
division among the delegates concerning what changes were 
necessary. There was naturally a broad range of sentiment 
on the extent of failure in the county courts and the need 
for revision. Those who desired the most profound alter- 
ation saw the widest variety of faults. Larkin Proctor found 
the entire system "odious," the one thing that the people 
of Kentucky unanimously wanted "abolished," and Rich- 
ard L. Mayes of Graves County contended that the courts 
had met "the unqualified condemnation of the country" 
and called for sweeping reforms.24 
On the other hand, those seeking milder reforms gen- 
erally saw only two basic defects in the old system: the 
manner of appointing magistrates and the lifetime term of 
23 Commonwealth, 20 March, l o  April 1849; Yeoman, 14 June 1849; Ob- 
server and Reporter, 7 April, 7 July 1849. 
24 Proceedings, pp. 696-99, 701, 704,708, 710-1 1. 
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office. They denied that the local tribunals were more un- 
popular than other courts or departments of government. 
John T. Rogers of Barren County accused some of his col- 
leagues of attempting to make the "county court. .  . the 
scapegoat for others' sins." Thomas W. Lisle of Green 
County argued that "the complaint has not been greater 
against the county courts than the court of appeals and 
the circuit court," while James M. Nesbitt of Bath Coun- 
ty believed that "the principal grievance the people have 
labored under, is the manner in which the court is 
constituted." 25 
Once the delegates got down to the business of reform, 
one basic question emerged: who would constitute the 
newly devised county courts-one or more judges, or the 
justices of the peace? After rejecting a variety of proposals, 
the reformers agreed upon a compromise: each county court 
would consist of a presiding judge and two associate judges, 
with the provision that the legislature might abolish the 
office of associate judge and substitute for it the justices of 
the peace who would sit on the court of claims. Virtually all 
the delegates agreed that the judges and magistrates should 
be elected, the latter by districts within each county.26 The  
Constitution as approved by the delegates also provided 
that the "jurisdiction of the county court. . . shall be the 
same now vested in the county courts of this State." Yet 
early in the meeting the drafters had done away with a 
significant power of the county courts by eliminating the 
privilege of appointing sheriffs, jailers, surveyors, coroners, 
constables, clerks, and county attorneys, all of whom would 
be elected under the new Con~ t i tu t ion .~~  
25 Ibid., pp. 695,703,714-15. 
26 Ibid., pp. 127,437, 697-719. Early in the proceedings Squire Turner, a 
delegate from Madison County, introduced a resolution requiring that all 
judges of "inferior courts" be lawyers, but it was not considered again; it 
was the only attempt at the convention to convert the county courts into 
"lawyers' courts." Ibid., p. 25. 
27 Ibid., pp. 111,356,363,377,391-g2,403,413-17,420-28. 
[ 162 ] County Courts i n  Antebel lum Kentucky 
The constitutional reformers had eliminated some but 
not all of the grievances which had attached themselves to 
the county court system. They had made the courts the- 
oretically democratic and free of oligarchy. They had seem- 
ingly removed much unwieldiness by providing that not 
more than three judges instead of multitudes should ex- 
ecute most of the judicial business of a county. They had 
minimized, if not eliminated, the possibility of malap- 
portionment. They had made it more difficult to sell county 
offices. Yet they had left untouched some glaring weaknesses 
in the structure of local government. They had not pro- 
scribed magistrates from the legislature; neither had they 
established separate probate courts nor required that coun- 
ty judges be lawyers. The  prejudice of many delegates 
against a professional elite seems to have undercut efforts 
to create a tribunal specializing in wills and estates and to 
require technical expertise among all judges. However, the 
most serious obstacle to more complete reform appears to 
have been the assumption by the delegates that Kentuck- 
ians would be unwilling to tax themselves to secure better 
and more efficient county government. 
Few delegates to the Convention of 1849 were acting jus- 
tices of the peace, although substantial numbers were mag- 
istrates emeritus. Seven of the one hundred delegates at the 
convention were acting justices of the peace, and seventeen 
others had served as magistrates within the last twelve years. 
Four of these twenty-four participated in the debate on the 
county court system, and all but one voted in at least one 
of the ballots concerning this issue. James P. Hamilton of 
Larue County was the only acting magistrate to participate 
in the debate. While he admitted that the county court 
system was "a rotten concern," he nonetheless favored 
changing only the method of appointing its members and its 
own appointing power, while retaining the magistrates as 
its members. He argued that if the legislature increased 
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their fees, they would perform adequately. He opposed a 
court composed of three judges, who, he contended, would 
"come in, like so many Julius Caesars, to tax the people 
whether they like it or not." After the delegates voted to 
reconsider the motion to establish a three-judge court, Ham- 
ilton moved unsuccessfully to allow the legislature com- 
plete discretion to determine "the number of judges, their 
duty and salary." 28 
Two of the three ex-magistrates who spoke during the 
debate also favored a stronger role for the justices of the 
peace on the county courts than that which was ultimately 
provided by the convention. David Meriwether, who had 
served on the Jefferson County Court, offered an amend- 
ment early in the discussion which would have established 
county courts of one presiding judge together with the 
county magistrates. Richard D. Gholson, formerly a mem- 
ber of the Ballard County Court, was more restrained in 
his position on the proper place of the magistrates in county 
government; he favored allowing the justices of the peace 
to "sit on questions of claims and roads" only. The  final 
participant in the debates, James H. Garrard, formerly of 
the Clay County Court, strongly supported the three-judge 
plan.29 
In seven significant ballots three of the acting magistrate 
delegates can be classified as generally opposed to strength- 
ening the position of justices of the peace, two in favor, and 
two ambivalent. Of the seventeen ex-magistrates, nine gen- 
erally supported the interests of the justices of the peace, 
seven generally opposed them, and one did not vote. In all, 
eleven generally supported the magistrate position, ten gen- 
erally opposed it, two vacillated, and one did not vote. Thus 
magistrates and ex-magistrates did not vote as a bloc but 
tended to divide evenly on the question of the proper powers 
28 Proceedings, p. 705. 
29 Ibid., pp. 695,706,714. 
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and responsibilities of justices of the peace within county 
government. 
Among the delegates as a whole the Whigs tended to fa- 
vor more sweeping reform of the county court system than 
did the Democrats. In two principal ballots the Whigs voted 
thirty-seven to six in favor of the modified three-judge mea- 
sure which was incorporated into the Constitution, while 
voting twenty-nine to eleven against a last-minute effort to 
provide for an all-magistrate court. Democrats were more 
narrowly divided, voting twenty-six to sixteen in favor of 
the modified three-judge measure and twenty-one to twenty 
against the all-magistrate court. Significantly, they furnished 
the bulk of the support for the latter scheme.30 
By late December 1849 the delegates had finished the 
business of drafting and approving a new Constitution and 
had instructed the sheriffs to open the polls in early May to 
take the sentiments of the voters "in regard to adoption or 
rejection" of the document. It  was not a foregone conclusion 
that the voters would approve the charter; many of the 
delegates feared that if it were submitted to a popular vote, 
the members of the old county courts and their allies would 
somehow convert what had been an overwhelming senti- 
ment for reform into a victory for the status quo. John D. 
Taylor, delegate from Mason County, predicted that the 
county officialdom would enlist their "friends and relations, 
their sons and their sons-in-law, and sons-in-law in expecta- 
tion, and their daughters too . . . against this constitution, 
not because it does not accord with popular sentiment, but 
because it strikes at the root of their monopoly." Others 
foresaw that the magistrates would ally with the emancipa- 
tionists, who were distraught by the failure of the delegates 
to abolish slavery, and other dissidents to thwart the will of 
30 A list of the party affiliation of the delegates can be found in the 
Louisville Daily Journal, 13 September 1849. The votes are recorded in Pro- 
ceedings, pp. 716, 718. 
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the convention. Some believed that the agents of county 
government would actually refuse to open the polls to ob- 
tain an expression of the popular feeling. Still others en- 
visioned that if the voters ratified the Constitution, the 
magistrates and their allies would refuse to abandon their 
offices on the grounds that the old frame of government had 
somehow not been legally abolished. 
Although many of the courthouse clique undoubtedly 
campaigned against the Constitution, there is no indication 
that they allied with the abolitionists or that they conducted 
an improper election. Most of the ostensible opponents did 
not directly defend the old county court system but rather 
wisely camouflaged their sentiments by reviving the crusade 
which had worked for them in 1838, namely the fight to 
preserve an independent judiciary. There were new lines 
of defense also. Chilton Allen, a leading politician from 
Clark County, interjected Know-Nothingism into his pleas 
in behalf of an independent judiciary and predicted that if 
the Constitution were ratified, Roman Catholic bishops 
would commence instructing hordes of immigrants, who 
were allegedly pouring into the state, on how to vote. A 
correspondent to the Lexington 0 bseruer and Reporter, 
one of the few who openly defended the county courts, at- 
tempted to evoke regional prejudice by characterizing the 
old as the "Virginia gentlemanly court of justices" and the 
new as "the yankee 'Picayune Butler' system of pay-justices." 
These degrading appeals were in vain, however, for in May 
the voters ratified the new Constitution, 71,653 votes to 
20,302.~' 
In March 1851 the legislature, doubtless attentive to the 
frugality that had manifested itself at the constitutional 
convention, abolished the office of associate judge of the 
county court and provided that the justices of the peace 
31 Obseruer and Reporter, 3 October 1849, lo April 1850; Daily Journal, 
16, 18,31 January, 16 February 1850; Commonwealth, 28 May 1850. 
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should have a limited place on the local tribunal.32 By law 
it was specified that the presence of a majority of magistrates 
was necessary for the court to levy taxes and to make major 
appropriations, including those for the poor, roads, build- 
ings, and bridges. At the same session the legislators granted 
minor civil jurisdiction to the county judges, thereby some- 
what diluting that of the justices of the peace, and allocated 
magisterial districts to the counties, providing for over 
three hundred fewer justices of the peace than had existed 
before constitutional reform.33 
In May 185 1 special elections were held to select coun- 
ty judges, justices of the peace, and other county officials. 
Although it is impossible to determine how many magis- 
trates who served under the old county court system sought 
office under the new, the number who were elected to coun- 
ty judgeships and magistracies can be estimated. Election 
returns for eighty-seven counties indicate that in thirty- 
six of them candidates who had been acting justices of the 
peace at the termination of the old system were elected to 
county judgeships. In ten others candidates who had served 
as magistrates sometime between 1837 and 1850 but who 
had retired before the end of the old order were returned 
to judgeships. Thus in slightly over half of the eighty-seven 
counties magistrates under the old system were elected to 
positions of leadership under the new. On the other hand, 
a much smaller proportion of the newly elected justices of 
the peace had served as magistrates under the old system. 
Records for twenty-five of the state's one hundred counties 
indicate that slightly fewer than one-fourth of the newly 
elected justices of the peace had served as magistrates be- 
tween 1837 and 185 1 .34 
32 Acts, 1850-1851, chap. 419. 
33 Ibid., chap. 39. 
34 Slightly over 92 percent of these had been acting magistrates in 1851, 
while slightly less than 8 percent had retired before then. Furthermore, only 
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In summary, about one-fifth of the county executives act- 
ing under the old Constitution at the time of its demise 
continued in office under the new, either as county judges or 
as magistrates. A far greater proportion of county judges 
than of newly elected justices of the peace had been magis- 
trates under the former system. The  reasons for this are 
obvious. The  magistracy was far less attractive under the 
third Constitution than under the second. It  had only a 
limited place on the county court and was stripped of its 
most appealing prerogative, the sheriff's office. Conversely, 
the office of county judge was a position of unprecedented 
power in local government. 
On paper the constitutional reformers of 1849 had 
wrought profound changes in local government. The coun- 
ty court was no longer oligarchical, but democratic. Execu- 
tive power was no longer diffused among ten or twenty 
magistrates but was concentrated in the office of a single 
county judge. And although the magistrates continued to 
have a place on the county court, their role was restricted 
and their representation apportioned. Finally, the first 
county elections held under the new Constitution had re- 
sulted in a major turnover in the ranks of the magistracy 
and a substantial number of new leaders. 
Yet it is questionable whether the reforms of 1849 al- 
tered the reality as well as the form of county government. 
The  recorded debates of Kentucky's fourth and most recent 
constitutional convention, held in 1890 and 189 I ,  indicate 
16.6 percent of the magistrates in office (73 d 439) in 25 sample counties on 
the eve of constitutional reform continued in office under the new Constitu- 
tion. The names of newly elected county judges may be found in the Com- 
monwealth, 2 0 , q  May, 3 June 1851. Names of magistrates may be found in 
the appropriate county court order books. The counties in this sample were 
Bath, Boone, Bourbon, Bullitt, Christian, Fayette, Fleming, Franklin, Ful- 
ton, Garrard, Grant, Harrison, Henderson, Hickman, Jessamine, Madison, 
Mason, Nicholas, Oldham, Pendleton, Shelby, Todd, Trigg, Woodford, and 
Washington. 
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that many deficiencies of the old county court system per- 
sisted under the new. Delegates complained that during the 
life of the Constitution of 1849 the legislature continually 
increased the numbers of magistrates in each county and 
thereby made the court of claims (increasingly referred to 
after the Civil War as the "fiscal court") unwieldy. They 
charged that although the Constitution of 1849 had made 
most of the county offices elective, the county judges still 
retained some forms of patronage, which they dispensed 
unfairly. They further argued that few of the county judges 
were lawyers, and thus their administration of justice, 
especially in probate and petty criminal matters, was inept 
and sometimes farcical. They also contended that because 
their duties under the Constitution of 1849 were so in- 
significant most of the justices of the peace were incom- 
petent. Finally, at least one delegate implied that some 
county judges were under the thumb of railroad com- 
p a n i e ~ . ~ ~  Despite these allegations of incompetence, inef- 
ficiency, and corruption, the constitutional reformers of 
1890-189 1 made only minor changes in the county court 
system. They limited the maximum number of magistrates 
to eight per county and made it possible for the legislature 
to authorize individual counties to adopt a commission- 
type fiscal court in lieu of one comprised of justices of the 
peace and the county judge.36 
Not surprisingly, county government under the Consti- 
tution of 1891 was just as inadequate as that under the 
35 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates i n  the Convention . . . 
of . . . 1890 to Adopt, Amend or Change the Constitution of the State of 
Kentucky, 4 vols. (Frankfort, Ky., 1890), 3:3574, 3576, 3581-83, 3597-98. 
36 Under the commission form of fiscal court, county voters elect three 
commissioners who, along with the county judge, constitute the court. By 
1964 only 15 of Kentucky's 120 counties had adopted a commission form of 
fiscal court. Kenneth Vanlandingham, T h e  Constitution and Local Gouern- 
ment,  Kentucky Legislative Research Commission Informational Bulletin 
no. 36 (Frankfort, Ky., 1964). p. 15. 
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Constitutions of 1792, 1799, or 1849. A commentator writ- 
ing in 1938 submitted that the fiscal affairs of the county 
courts were steeped in secrecy, that tax assessment and 
collection were inefficient, and that the administration of 
justice was affected by "rampant politics." He further con- 
tended that only 2 0  of 1 2 0  county judges were lawyers and 
that many judges, as well as justices of the peace, lacked even 
a high school education.37 These shortcomings, plus others 
affecting both state and local government, prompted the 
legislature to authorize three referendums between 193 1 
and 1960 to take the sense of the people on whether to con- 
vene a constitutional convention. In  each instance the vot- 
ers rejected a call. 
Finally, in 1964, the legislature established a Constitu- 
tion Revision Assembly to draft a new state Constitution. 
Included in the proposed charter drawn up by this assembly 
were provisions which profoundly altered the nature of 
county government. The  drafters stripped the county judge 
and the justices of the peace of their judicial functions. 
Furthermore, they proposed that many officers of local 
government, including the county judge and the sheriff, 
not be of constitutional origin, thus making it possible for 
the legislature alone to abolish these positions or make 
them appointive. I t  also stipulated that the General As- 
sembly, with voter approval, could consolidate counties. 
The  legislature submitted the proposed Constitution to the 
voters in the November 1966 election.38 
Fearing that their offices and very counties were in jeop- 
ardy, the officials of Kentucky's county government, includ- 
ing many county judges and magistrates, led the fight to 
37 Henry C. Pepper, "County Government in Kentucky," (typescript in 
King Library, ca. 1938). By 1964 only 14 of izo county judges were lawyers. 
Louisville Courier-Journal, 28 May 1964. 
38 Louisville Courier-Journal, 18 February, 28 May, 5 July 1964, 29 De- 
cember 1965; Lexington Herald, 4 December 1965. 
[ 1701 County Courts in Antebellum Kentucky 
defeat the proposed Constitution at the polls. The Kentucky 
Sheriffs Association sounded the cry in May 1966 when it 
branded the newly drafted charter as an attempt to destroy 
county government; later it implied that the goal of the 
, 
reformers was a communist dictatorship. This chant was 
soon taken up by other organizations, such as the Kentucky 
Magistrates and Commissioners Association, and by count- 
less county officials. W. C. Flannery, judge of the Rowan 
County Court, in a letter to all his fellow county judges, 
depicted the new Constitution as an endeavor to establish 
a "police state," while the clerk of Jefferson County de- 
nounced the document as a bid to create "a monarchy in 
Frankfort." 39 
Unlike the courthouse cliques of 1850, the county of- 
ficials of 1966 were successful in their attempt to defeat the 
proposed Constitution. Kentuckians rejected the charter by 
a margin of more than three and a half to one.40 Thus for 
all their democratic appearance, the county courts of mod- 
ern Kentucky retain many of the deficiencies of their coun- 
terparts before the Civil War, and these weaknesses are 
likely to prevail for many years to come. The old county 
court system may be dead, but its spirit lingers on. 
39Louisville Courier-Journal, 15 May, 15, 28 June, l o  August, 13, 22 
October 1966; Lexington Herald, 16 May 1966. 
40 Louisville Courier-Journal, g November 1966. James Hunt, legislative 
representative from Pike County, was most prophetic when he warned in 
March 1966 that "the courthouse gang is not going to let this [the Constitu- 
tion] pass unless we leave their names in it." Louisville Courier-Journal, 19 
March 1966. 
T HE COUNTY COURTS affected the people of antebellum Kentucky more profoundly than any other govern- mental institution. The  miller, the apprentice, the 
heir, the ferry operator, the tavern owner, the land spec- 
ulator, the profligate, the vagrant, the poor, the taxpayer, 
the orphan, and the slave all dealt with the local tribunals. 
The  business of the courts encompassed a series of legal 
specialties in combination with significant prerogatives of 
government and patronage. 
Despite their great powers, the courts were not without 
countervailing institutions. The governor served as a check 
on their dispensation of county patronage. The legislature 
delegated and withdrew the courts' authority and on oc- 
casion established superseding agencies such as cities, in- 
corporated towns, and turnpike companies. The  Court of 
Appeals and the circuit courts, when duly petitioned, re- 
viewed their judicial decisions. 
The county courts did not usually seek to expand their 
constitutional niche by innovation as did their English 
counterparts throughout the eighteenth and early nine- 
teenth centuries.l When a particular county court was un- 
certain of its powers or responsibilities, or when it had 
delayed or neglected to perform some function, it usually 
sought clarification or ratification from the General As- 
sembly. Notwithstanding this constitutional timidity, there 
were occasions when courts assumed questionable powers 
without legislative confirmation, as in the case of some of 
their investments in enterprises of internal improvement; 
or when they acted in extralegal fashion, as in the case of 
their patronage nominations by means of rump sessions; or 
when they manifested outright defiance of higher constitu- 
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tional authorities, as in the cases of the Franklin County 
Court's nullification of a Court of Appeals decree in 1845 
or the Fayette County Court's nullification of a new road 
law in 1834; or when they engaged in illegal activities such 
as the sale of public office. 
As in England, the justices of the peace of Kentucky, as 
the principal governors of the local constitution, may have 
been the "most influential class of menv2 in the Common- 
wealth. Certainly they had the powers, positions, and pres- 
tige to be. They were the directors of what was in many 
ways the most pervasive portion of the state constitution. 
Most of them came from relatively high socioeconomic 
groups and were members of the political-military elite. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that they gave Kentucky, as it 
can be argued their counterparts gave Elizabethan England, 
"the best local government in the ~ o r l d . " ~  One reason for 
this was their failure to be as self-sacrificing or as well- 
trained as their English predecessors. Most were not lawyers 
and neglected to educate themselves in the subtleties of 
their very specialized judicial business. Without the stim- 
ulus of salaries or fees for their services on the county courts, 
too many of them invited reform by their persistent inat- 
tention to the duties of the system. They sat too little, too 
late, or not at all; they failed to maintain consistency or 
decorum in the dispatch of business; and they eventually 
succumbed to their own brand of partisanship and venality 
-all of which contributed to their constitutional demise. 
The collapse of the old county court system was also 
hastened by its commitment to oligarchy. County voters 
1 Sidney Webb Passfield and Beatrice Webb Passfield, English Local Gov- 
ernment: A Series . . . on the Growth and Structure of English Local Govern- 
ment, 1 1  vols. (London, 1906), vol. I ,  The Parish and the County, pp. 480- 
556. 
2 J. H. Gleason, The Justices of the Peace of England, 1558-1640 (Oxford, 
1969). P. 96. 
3 Ibid., p. "5. 
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and taxpayers had no express role in the selection of court 
members or in the formation of county policy. In most 
cases the courts filled their own vacancies without consult- 
ing their constituents, and too often the county courts 
formulated and executed policy without securing popular 
approval. This is not to say that democratic pressures were 
never effectively brought to bear on the county courts. 
Outraged citizens at times petitioned the legislature seek- 
ing statutory reversal of an unpopular policy, and from time 
to time members of a particular region or political party 
successfully petitioned the governor to ignore the rec- 
ommendations of county courts on the dispensation of 
patronage. Courts themselves occasionally initiated the 
democratic process by authorizing precinct elections to ob- 
tain popular opinion on would-be magistrates. In other 
instances the legislature ordered county courts to consult 
the voters by means of referendums on such weighty is- 
sues as county subscriptions to turnpike or railroad stock, 
although at times the courts themselves voluntarily au- 
thorized such elections. Yet these constitutional and ex- 
traconstitutional devices were so infrequently used and 
so unreliable that the democracy practiced by the county 
courts was an exception to their generally aristocratic 
tendencies. 
The  failure of the legislature to deal meaningfully with 
the numerous shortcomings of the county courts also con- 
tributed to their downfall. Although attempts were made 
to reform the county court system by means of legislation, 
none was successful. I t  should be reiterated, however, that 
this was due not to a monolithic cabal of self-interested 
justices of the peace in the assembly but rather to a general 
tendency of legislators to ignore the grievances arising from 
the practices of county government. 
Certainly the impact of the two-party system in Kentucky 
helped bring on the collapse of the county court system. I t  
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organized the factional bickering which had always plagued 
the courts, stressed more than ever politicking over per- 
formance, and accelerated the processes of geographical 
malapportionment. Above all, it frustrated scores of party 
leaders who, although they continually won at the polls, 
were often excluded from the ranks of the county oligarchy. 
Just as clearly, one party did not monopolize the county 
courts of antebellum Kentucky. Both parties benefitted 
from their oligarchical nature, although the Democrats 
may well have gained the most from the constitutional pro- 
vision which allowed the membership of the courts to per- 
petuate itself. I t  may well have been that many Jacksonians 
sought refuge in county magistracies as their ability to win 
elections to other offices diminished. We have seen that of 
five of twenty sample county courts dominated by parties 
not successful at the county polls, four were Democratic. 
SO, too, Democrats were more numerous among the mag- 
istrates in the legislature than in the membership at large, 
a fact which might indicate that there were more Democrats 
in the county court system than in any other governmental 
institution of the state. Certainly Jacksonian zeal for reform 
of local government, which was never very great, receded in 
the wake of continuing Whig victories. 
It  is evident, too, that the death of the old county court 
system did not come as the result of an unprecedented 
outpouring of Jacksonian sentiment. The  quest to reform 
the local tribunals was bipartisan. Indeed the caucus of 
seventy-six legislators, which in 1846 cited an ineffective 
county court system as a reason for a constitutional conven- 
tion, was composed of almost equal numbers of Whigs and 
Democrats. The  relative lack of Whig enthusiasm for gen- 
eral constitutional reform resulted not because of a com- 
mitment to the county court system but rather because 
many feared that a new charter would dilute the strength 
of the party by undoing its gerrymandering. When the con- 
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vention met, most Whig delegates supported basic reform 
of the county court system, while many Democrats endorsed 
a weaker revision. 
In the end the old county court system of Kentucky was 
struck down at the hands of reformers when its most ob- 
vious virtue, inexpensiveness, became outweighed by the 
burden of its many faults. 
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N INDISPENSABLE, though dated, guide for scholars study- A ing any aspect of Kentucky history is J. Winston Cole- 
man's A Bibliography of Kentucky History (Lexington, Ky., 
'949). 
Government Documents 
Published and unpublished governmental records were a 
treasure trove of authorities for this study of the county courts 
of Kentucky. Among the most significant of the unpublished 
records are the Papers of the Governors of Kentucky, located 
at the Kentucky State Historical Society in Frankfort and avail- 
able on microfilm. Emma Guy Cromwell's A Catalogue of the 
Records, Documents, Papers. . . of the Governors of Kentucky, 
1792-1926 (Frankfort, Ky., 1926) furnishes a generally reliable 
description of the contents of this collection. The  most useful 
types of documents in  the Papers are the journals and letter- 
books of the governors, the registers of justices of the peace, lists 
of justices of the peace for particular years, and letters, petitions, 
recommendations, and other documents relating to justices of 
the peace, sheriffs, and other county officers. 
The  order books of the county courts are also an invaluable 
source. They provide an excellent summary of the business of 
the courts and insights on such matters as attendance and intra- 
court disputes. Not all the order books for all one hundred of 
Kentucky's counties (to 1851) are extant, but most of those 
which do exist have been microfilmed by the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints, and copies of this film are available 
at the King Library, University of Kentucky. Those counties 
whose order books were most useful for this study are Ander- 
son, Bath, Boone, Bourbon, Boyle, Bracken, Bullitt, Caldwell, 
Christian, Estill, Fayette, Fleming, Franklin, Fulton, Garrard, 
Grant, Harrison, Henderson, Hickman, Jefferson, Jessamine, 
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Lincoln, Madison, Mason, Montgomery, Nicholas, Oldham, 
Pendleton, Scott, Shelby, Todd, Trigg, Washington, Whitley, 
and Woodford. Journals of a similar nature, the Record Books 
of the Town and City of Lexington, 1780--1836, are extremely 
helpful in establishing the constitutional and political relation- 
ship between the Fayette County Court and the town and city 
of Lexington. These books are located at the Lexington Mu- 
nicipal Building. 
Both the state tax records, microfilm of which is located at 
the Kentucky State Historical Society, and the federal censuses, 
microfilm of which is located at the King Library, are useful in 
compiling collective biographies of the members of the county 
courts. 
Finally, the judgments of the circuit courts provide some 
insights into the relationship of those tribunals to the county 
courts. Microfilm of some of these documents is located at the 
King Library. 
Among the published government records which are most 
revealing with regard to the county courts are the Acts of Ken- 
tucky, r792-r85r; the Journal of the House of Representatives, 
1792-1851 and Journal of the Senate, 1792-1851; and the Con- 
stitution of 1792, Constitution of 1799, and Constitution of 
1849. The Acts contain numerous statutes affecting the courts 
and county officers; the Journals, while not containing legisla- 
tive debates, summarize well the business and some of the votes 
of the two houses, much of which was related to the courts and 
county officers; and the Constitutions, of course, embrace the 
fundamental provisions on county government. 
One of the richest sources of information on the county courts 
is the Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention 
for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Kentucky, 
1849 (Frankfort, Ky., 1849). Delegates to that conclave were 
remarkably frank about the place of the courts in the constitu- 
tion of the state. Their debates also tell much about the politics 
and deficiencies of the county court system. Likewise the Of- 
ficial Report of the Proceedings and Debates in  the Convention 
. . . o f .  . . 1890 to Adopt, Amend, or Change the Constitution 
of the State of Kentucky, q vols. (Frankfort, Ky., 1890) reveals 
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much about the weaknesses of the county courts under the 
Constitution of 1849. 
The Reports of the Decisions of the Court of Appeals, 1792- 
1851, cited by the name of the reporter, are indispensable in 
establishing the relationship of the high tribunal to the county 
courts. 
Unoficial Statuto y Collections and Legal Digests 
William Waller Hening's T h e  Statutes at Large: Being a 
Collection of All  the Laws of Virginia, 1619-1792, 13 vols. (New 
York and Philadelphia, 1819-1823) furnishes valuable informa- 
tion on the ancestry of the county courts of Kentucky. William 
Littell's T h e  Statute Law of Kentucky with Notes, Praelections, 
and Obseruations on  the  Public Acts . . . , 5 vols. (Frankfort, 
Ky., 1809-1819) fills gaps left by nonextant volumes of the Acts 
and offers incisive annotations on the county courts. The fol- 
lowing statutory and judicial digests are also of great value: 
Littell and Jacob Swigert's A Digest of the Statute Law of Ken- 
tucky: Being a Collection of A11 the Acts of the General Assem- 
bly . . . , 2 vols. (Frankfort, Ky., 1822); C. S. Morehead and 
Mason Brown's A Digest of the Statute Laws of Kentucky of a 
Public and Permanent Nature . . . , 2 vols. (Frankfort, Ky., 
1834); Preston S. Loughborough's Kentucky Laws, Statutes,. . . 
of a Public and Permanent Nature passed since 1834 (Frankfort, 
Ky., 1842), and Benjamin Monroe and James Harlan's Digest 
of Cases at Common Law and in Equity Decided by the Court 
of Appeals of Kentucky. .  .17p t o  1853,~ vols. (Frankfort, Ky., 
1853). 
Newspapers 
The newspapers of antebellum Kentucky supply much knowl- 
edge about the county courts, especially concerning their poli- 
tics and their shortcomings. Of special merit are those published 
in Lexington, namely the Kentucky Gazette, the Kentucky Re-  
porter, the Observer and Reporter, and the Zntelligencer; in 
Frankfort, namely the Palladium, the Argus of Western Amer- 
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ica, the Commonwealth, the Kentucky Yeoman, and the Con- 
vention; and in Louisville, namely the Public Advertiser, the 
Daily Journal, and the Daily Focus. Also of some use are the 
Paris Western Citizen and the Russellville Weekly Messenger. 
Certain issues of a contemporary newspaper, the Louisville 
Courier-Journal, tell much about recent attempts to alter the 
structure of county government in Kentucky. The Lexington 
Herald, another current publication, is of more limited value 
on this topic. 
Manuscript Collections 
Seemingly most of the politicians of Kentucky who were 
connected with the county court system confined their observa- 
tions on local government to correspondence with the governor 
and thus their private papers yield very little information on 
the subject of this monograph. Some insights, however, can be 
found in the Papers of Joseph Hamilton Daveiss and the Pa- 
pers of Orlando Brown, both located at the Filson Club in 
Louisville, and the Mason County Historical Papers, microfilm 
of which is located at the King Library. 
Published Diaries, Correspondence, Travel Accounts, 
Histories, Memoirs, and Directories 
Only a few sources in this group provide information on the 
county courts. Humphrey Marshall's History of Kentucky, 2 
vols., 2d ed. (Frankfort, Ky., 1824) offers pungent comments on 
the alleged influence of the magistrates in the legislature. Pro- 
viding biographical information on Fayette County magistrates 
are William Leavy's "Memoir of Lexington and Its Vicinity 
With Some Notice of Many Prominent Citizens and Its Institu- 
tions of Education and Religion," Register, Kentucky State 
Historical Society 40 (1941): 107-31, 253-67, 353-75; 41 (1942): 
44-62, 107-37, 250-60, 310-46; 42 (1943): 26-53; Lexington's 
First City Directory, 1806 (Lexington, Ky., 1953); Lexington's 
Second City Directory, 1818 (Lexington, Ky., 1953); and Julius 
P. Bolivar Maccabe's Directory of the City of Lexington, 1838 
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(Lexington, Ky., 1838). Finally, G. Glenn Clift's T h e  "Corn 
Stalk" Militia of Kentucky, 1792-1811 (Frankfort, Ky., 1957) 
furnishes significant data on the early Kentucky militia. 
Monographs, Articles, and Dissertations 
In addition to the works cited in the Preface, there are some 
useful studies not directly related to county government. Rich- 
ard P. McCormick's T h e  Second American Party System: Partv 
Formation in  the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1966) and 
Leonard P. Curry's "Election Year: Kentucky, 1828," Register, 
Kentucky State Historical Society 55 (July 1957): 196-2 1 2 ,  deal 
with antebellum Kentucky politics. Perry Miller's T h e  Life of 
the Mind in America: From Revolution to the Civil War  (New 
York, 1965) puts Kentucky's fight to preserve an independent 
judiciary into proper historical focus. Jasper B. Shannon and 
Ruth McQuown's Presidential Politics in  Kentucky, 1824-1948 
(Lexington, Ky., 1950) and Shannon, McQuown, and Frank 
Mathias's "Gubernatorial Politics in Kentucky, 1820-1851" 
(manuscript in possession of authors) offer useful election statis- 
tics on a county-by-county basis. Mathias's "The Turbulent 
Years of Kentucky Politics, 1820-1850'' (Ph.D. diss., University 
of Kentucky, 1966) furnishes information on the issues of state 
politics in antebellum Kentucky. Lewis and Richard H. Col- 
lins's History of Kentucky, 2 vols. (Covington, Ky., 1874) con- 
tains lists of legislators supplementing those in the legislative 
journals, not all of which are extant. Carl R. Field's "The 
Making of Kentucky's Third Constitution" (Ph.D. diss., Uni- 
versity of Kentucky, 1951) provides some background material 
on the Constitutional Convention of 1849. Useful accounts of 
the twentieth-century county courts are Kenneth Vanlanding- 
ham's T h e  Constitution and Local Government, Kentucky Leg- 
islative Research Commission Informational Bulletin no. 36 
(Frankfort, Ky., 1964) and Henry C. Pepper's "County Govern- 
ment in Kentucky" (typescript in King Library, ca. 1938). 
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102; county courts as agents of, Hayman, Robert D., 69-70 
105; reverses county court or- 
~ ~ l ~ ,  john L., 155 
ders, 106-7; county court jus- H ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  William, 14 
tices as members of, 107-21; Henry County Court, 76, 86-87 
legislates for county courts, "Hibernian Visitor," 148-49, 151, 
115-21, attempts reform of 
'54 
county government, 1Z1-22, Hickey, Thomas, Judge, 129, 130, 
121-rrn, 147-48, 173; and 131, 1.32, 137 
towns, cities, and county courts, 
~ i ~ k ~ ~ ~  county, 94 
123-28, 143; and Lexington- Hill  v. Squire, 30 
Fayette House of Representatives, Ken- 
128, 129-30, 132-34, 139; calls tucky: investigates sale of pub- 
constitutional convention ref- lic g9, 92; voting records 
erendum, 157; creates new of J P  members, 1 15-2 I; and 
county court system, 165-66; Louisville-Jefferson County 
and county courts, generally, conflict, 142 
See Hughes, Jacob, 57, 59, 60 
sentatives; Senate 
Gholson, Richard D., 163 
Glass, Thomas J., 102 Isaacs, Nancy, 21 
Gorham, William A., 96-101 Isaacs v. Taylor, 2 1 
Governor of ~ e n t u c k i :  remits 
county court fines, 33-34, 147; Jackson, Andrew: supporters of, 
selects county court justices, 65. 77 
62-63; selects sheriff, 8 ~ 8 2 ,  83, Jailer, county, 79, 93, 124, 125 
James, Thomas, 94 
Jefferson County, 88 
Jefferson County Circuit Court, 
2 0  
Jefferson County Court: member- 
ship of (numbers), 8, g; dispute 
with Jefferson County Circuit 
court, 20; probate case of, 20; 
politics of, 68, 76; and dispute 
over sheriffalty, 84; and con- 
flict with Louisville, 14-44 
Jessamine County Court, 42, 76, 
88 
Johnson, Madison C., 39 
Johnston, G. W., 152 
Joice, Thomas J., 104 
Justices, county court: selection 
of, 7.62-74, 77-78; fees, duties 
and characteristics of, 7-10, 
12-15; as active politicians, 
74-76; in General Assembly, 
107-21; and towns, 124-25; 
competence of, 150-53, 172; at 
Constitutional Convention of 
1849; 162-64 
Justice of the peace: English, 
172; in Kentucky, see Justices, 
county court 
Kavanaugh, George W., 41, 42, 
160 
Keene, Samuel, 67 
Kellar's Executors v. Beelor, 20 
Kennedy, Samuel, 27 
Kentucky Gazette: correspon- 
dence to concerning county 
courts, 55, 58, 114-15, 148, 151, 
153-54; and Fayette County 
Court railroad investment, 57; 
and Lexington charter repeal 
attempt, 133, 137-38, 139 
Kentucky Magistrates and Com- 
missioners Association, 170 
Kentucky Reporter: criticizes 
roads, 46; correspondent criti- 
cizes roads, 49; criticizes Fay- 
ette County Court, 66 
Kentucky Sheriffs Association, 
170 
Kentucky Yeoman: correspon- 
dence to concerning county 
courts, 42,145,147, 151-52, 153; 
and Franklin County jailer 
dispute, 98-99; criticizes coun- 
ty courts, 156-57 
Kinkead, William B., Judge, 101 
Knox County Court, 30 
Kouns, George W., 85 
Lamb, William, 1 18 
Langston, Jonathan C., 81 
Lawrence County Court, 80 
Leavey, William A., 15-16 
Legislature, Kentucky. See Gen- 
eral Assembly 
Letcher, R. D., 106 
Letcher, Robert P., Governor: 
and county court patronage dis- 
putes, 71-72, 81-82, go, 101; 
and Anderson County Court 
malapportionment, 73 
Levies, county. See Taxation, 
county 
Lewis County Court, 32 
Lexington, Ky.: investment in 
railroad, 56-57; conflict with 
Fayette County Court, 124-zg, 
135-36, 143-44; General As- 
sembly incorporates, 128; effort 
to repeal charter of, 129-40, 
143-44; politics of, 131-32 
Lexington Intelligencer, 55 
Lexington Observer and Re- 
porter, loo, 165 
Libraries, county courthouse, 152 
Lincoln County Court, 12 
Lisle, Thomas W., 161 
Littell, William, 11 
Lobban, William G., 81-82 
Index 
Logan, David, 1 I 7 
Logan, J., 38 
Logan County Court, 73-74 
Louisville, Ky., 128, 140-44 
Louisville, Cincinnati and 
Charlestown Railroad Com- 
pany, 56-61 
Louisville Journal, 14 1-42 
Louisville Public Advertiser, 
141-42 
Luckett, Benjamin, 96-101 
McCalla, John, General, 133, 139 
McHatton, John, 118 
McKee, John, 89-90 
McKee, Robert C., 157 
McKee family, 67, 89-90 
Madison County, 12 
Madison County Circuit Court, 
30 
Madison County Court, 76 
Marion County, 88 
Marion County Court, 21 
Marshall, Humphrey, 40, 114-15 
Marshall, W. C., 4, 145, 151 
Mason County, I 1 
Mason County Court, 26, 47, 
71-72 
Mattingly, Philips, 28 
Mayes, Daniel, 135 
Mayes, Richard L., 160 
Mayo, H. A., 69 
Maysville, Ky., 1 I, 26, 143 
Maysville Road, 54-55 
Membership, county court. See 
Justices, county court, selec- 
tion of 
Mercer County, 13, 74 
Mercer County Court, 8, 74 
Meriwether, David, 163 
Metcalfe, Thomas, Governor, 83 
Milldams: county courts and, 
27-29 
Monroe County Court, 83 
Montgomery County, 75,88 
Montgomery County Court, 66, 
769 92 
Morehead, James T., Governor, 
132 
Morgan County Court, g2n 
Mount Eden, Ky., 103 
Nesbitt, James M., 161 
Newport, Ky., 2627 
Nicholas County Court, 44, 55". 
76 
Nuttall, Price, 86-87 
Ohio County Circuit Court, 42 
Ohio County Court, 42, 72  
Owen County Court, 8 
Owsley, William, Governor: and 
county court patronage dis- 
putes, 69-70, 73-74, 81, 84 
Owsley County Court, 42 
Paris Western Citizen, 156 
Payne v. Long, 23 
Perry County Circuit Court, 101 
Perry County Court, 101 
Piat v. Allaway, 21 
Poor law: county courts and, 
23-25 
Pope, Worden: family and poli- 
tics of, 68, 141-42 
Proctor, Larkin J., 32, 151, 160 
Pulaski County Court, 85, 115 
Quarter Sessions, Courts of, 2, 
2-gn, lo  
Rachel v. Emerson, 23 
Reed, Newton P., 92 
Reform of county courts: consti- 
tutional, 106, 114-15, I 19-20, 
154-56, 161-62; legislative, 
121-22, 121-22x1 
Removal of county officers: by 
county courts, 95-104 
Roads: county courts and, 42-53 
Robarts v. Desforges, 22 
Robertson, George, Chief Jus- 
tice, 27 
Rodes, James C., 92, gq 
Rogers, John T., 161 
Root, Ira, 151 
Roundtree, J. C., 89 
Sale of county offices, 7-8, 85-95, 
'72 
Samuel, James, 103-4 
Sandy Road, 52 
Saunders' Heirs v. Saunders' 
Executors, 20 
Scofield, Samuel R., go 
Scott, Charles, Governor, 46, 85, 
1'5 
Scott, Robert W., 159 
Scott County, 37 
Scott County Court, 19, 75-76 
Senate, Kentucky: fails to reform 
guardian and apprenticeship 
law, 23; and selection and re- 
moval of sheriffs, 80, 83, 104; 
defeats bill outlawing sale of 
office, 95; voting record of JPs 
in, I 18-2 1; and Louisville- 
Jefferson County conflict, 142 
Shelby County, 37 
Shelby County Court, 28 
sheriffs: and county courts, gen- 
erally, 79-90; selection process 
and disputes of, 81-85; and 
county court seniority, 82-84; 
and party politics, 85; corrup- 
tion of, gq; and towns and 
cities, 124, 125 
Shy, Samuel, 160 
Singleton, Jeconias, 19 
Slaughter, Gabriel, Governor, 34, 
95 
Slaves: and county courts, 29-30 
Smith, David T., 73 
Smith, Elisha, Colonel, 156 
Speed, James, 19 
Spencer County Circuit Court, 
103 
Spencer County Court, 28, 103 
Stanhope, William, 138, 139 
Surveyor, county: and county 
courts, 79 
Taxation: 
-state: and county courts, gener- 
ally, 35-39; tax commissioners 
controversy, 35-38 
-county: and county courts, gen- 
erally, 39-42. 106-7; critics and 
reform of, 39-40; delinquent 
and illegal levies, 41-42; vari- 
ations of, 41, 54; city-town 
immunity from, 126, 127,128 
Taylor, James, 26 
Taylor, John D., 42, 164 
Taylor v. Brown, 44-45 
Thomson, Asa, 31 
Todd County Court, 64-65 
Towns: county courts and, 123- 
24, 171. See also names of 
towns 
Trabue v. Macklin, 28 
Turner, Nelson, 130, 132 
Turner, Squire, 34 
Turnpikes: county courts and 
administration of, 52-53. 
54-56 
Vagrancy law: county courts 
and, 23-24 
Waggener, Herbert G., 34 
Waller, John, 117 
Warren County Court, 36, 64 
Wash, John, 73 
Washington, Ky., 11 
Washington County Court, 28,45, 
90-9 
Wayne County Court, 76 
Whig (Anti-Jacksonian) party: in 
Kentucky generally, 65; and 
Index 
county courts generally, 65, 66, 
67-71, 74, 75, 77, '74-75; and 
sheriffalty, 85-86, 89-90, 91; 
and reform of county courts, 
95, 121-22, 121-22n, 155, 158, 
164; and Franklin County 
jailer dispute, 96-101 ; JP 
members in General .4ssembly, 
11 1-13, 120-21; defends Lex- 
ington charter, 134-35, i 36; 
and Louisville-Jefferson Coun- 
ty conflict, 141-43 
Wickliffe, Charles, Governor, 37 
Wickliffe, Robert, Sr., 47-50, 60 
Wickliffe, Robert Nelson, 106, 155 
Wilderness Road, 52-53 
Williams, George W., 159 
Wills and estates: county courts 
and, 18-20, 153 
Woodford County Court, ig, 47, 
66, 75 
Wootten v. Campbell, 28 
Young, John D., gr 
